reasoning, I ought to argue for the Deity of all such individuals. I ask, in reply, How does he prove this? Does he mean to say, that, if I find the name of "Christ" entering into the composition of the name of " Antichrist," I am consequently to believe that Antichrist is Christ? or that, if I observe the letters I.H.S. on a tombstone, 1 am to believe that the tombstone is Jesus Hominum Salvator? But in no case, in which the name of God enters into the composition of the name of a confessedly created being, could it ever be supposed, that the name of God was given as a proper appellation to the person so denominated. One of the great designs of the Jewish religion, was to form a standing memorial of the exclusive Deity of the ONE God of Israel; and one of the subordinate means by which this object was effected, was by inserting the name of Jehovah in the composition of the names of persons and places, so as thereby to scatter monuments and proofs of his exclusive Godhead: so that, when a Gentile came from his own country to the land of Judea, he found, in every place so designated, a testimony against the Polytheism of his own people, and in favour of the Deity of the one God of Israel. Or whenever a Jew, who bore a similarly constructed name, travelled into another country, he carried with him, in that very name, a similar proof that the God of Israel was the only true God. But, further, let me examine the import of some of these compound names, to which Mr. Porter has referred. Jacob was called Israel, not because he was God, but because he had power with God, and prevailed. The designation of " Jehovah Jireh," which Abraham gave to the place where he was about to offer up Isaac, signifies, "Jehovah will provide;" and was a short prophetic declara tion, pointing to the atonement of the Saviour, whom "God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood;" and of which atonement, the presentation of Isaac upon the altar was a type. The name, "Jehovah Nissi," was not intended to deify the allar to which it was given by Moses; but was simply a short sen. tence, equivalent to saying, "Jehovah is my banner." And the name of Elijah was equivalent to this sentence: "Jehovah is my God.". In fact, all these compound names were short commemorative sentences, not relating to the objects to which they were given; but intended to be descriptive of facts relating to Jehovah, and to reflect back upon the mind of every person who heard these names pronounced, an overwhelming testimony of his exclusive Deity. Just as if a ray of light came down from the meridian sun, and forming an angle on a surface against which it darted, sent back upon the eye of the ob server a reflected specimen of the brightness of that great orb from which it originated; so, an emanation of the glory of God coming down from the eternal throne, and meeting as it were, in an angle in the name of Elijah, carried back upon the minds of those who heard that name pronounced, a reflected evidence of the Deity of Jehovah, so as to lead them, by an irresistible influence, from a contemplation of the creature, back to a recognition of the majesty and glory of the great Creator. But the title of "Jehovah our righteousness," which is given to Christ in JER. xxiii. 6, is of a different nature from those to which I have just referred. In this case, the name

"Jehovah" was actually given to Christ, "the Branch:" whereas, when Abraham called the place where he offered Isaac, "Jehovah Jireh," he did not mean to say that the place was Jehovah, or that the place would provide; or, when Moses called the altar "Jehovah Nissi," he did not mean to say that the altar was his banner, but that Jehovah was his "banner." So that we here ascertain a general principle by which to try the value of these compound words; viz. if we can substitute the name of the object in place of the word 'Jehovah,” and read it in connexion with the other word which was connected with Jehovah, then we may infer, that the name of "Jehovah" is applicable to the object. Now, if we apply this rule to the cases above adduced, it will appear evident, that we cannot say that "the altar is my banner," or "the place will provide;" whereas, if we apply the same rule to JER. xxiii. 6, we shall find, that we may substitute the name "the Branch" for the name Jehovah," so as to say "the Branch is our righteousness;" for we read in 1 COR. i. 30, that "Christ is made unto us wisdom and righteousness;" and, in ROM. x. 4, that "be is the end of the law for righteousness." Hence it is manifest, that, in JER. xxiii. 6, we may interchange the names "Jehovah" and "Christ," so as either to say, "Jehovah is our righteousness," or "Christ is our righteousness;" therefore, “Christ" is "Jehovah," since there is only one righteousness by which we are justified. And, further, on considering the nature of righteousness as implying our standing clear and guiltless by the transferred moral merit of another, we must infer, that no person less than Jehovah could supply a righteousness to sinful man: for what creature could perform a transferable work?

I shall now proceed to investigate the principle which Mr. Porter has advanced in reference to subordinate agency in creation, and the doctrine which he has based upon an assumption of that principle, that Christ was nothing more than an instrument, employed by an infinitely superior power, for the accomplishment of that great work, This doctrine I oppose upon the following grounds:

This opinion is manifestly inconsistent with the declaration in GEN. i. 1, that "in the beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” For here we have no revelation made of an instrument having been employed. And, again, we read in the third verse, that "God said, Let there be light:" but did a subordinate agent interpose, in order to effect its production? Surely not; for "God said, Let there be light, AND THERE WAS LIGHT." Who does not see, that the application of Mr. Porter's principle to this passage is calculated to destroy the evidence it contains of the omnipotent efficacy of the very fiat of the Eternal, and to extract and obliterate those traces of majesty and power, which even an Heathen author could recognise as a worthy reflection of the glory of that great being of whom Moses wrote! The creation of the world is also described in Isa. xliv. 24, in the following terms: "Thus saith the Lord thy Redeemer, and he that formed thee from the womb: I am the Lord that maketh all things; that stretcheth forth the heavens alone; that spreadeth abroad the earth by myself”—and in Isa. xlv. 12, in the following terms: " have made the earth, and created man upon it: I, even my hands,

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have stretched out the heavens, and all their host have I commanded." -In these passages there is no allusion whatever to the interference of an instrumental cause. In fact, creation is represented in Scripture as so peculiarly and exclusively the work of Deity, that it would be the very same thing to imagine, that a creature has been changed into God, as that a creature could have been the Creator!

But this principle of a subordinate instrument in creation, would at once contradict the argument which the Apostle institutes in Rom. i. 20. This passage is as follows: "For the invisible things of him; from the creation of the world, are clearly seen; being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse:" or we may paraphrase it thus: For the attributes of the Creator, which are in themselves invisible -namely, his eternity, power, and Godhead-are discernible by an obvious inference from a contemplation of those things which he has created: so that the Heathen are without excuse." Here the Apostle assumes, that creation is a demonstrative proof of the eternity, power, and Godhead of the Creator; upon the same principle which the Psalmist lays down in the nineteenth Psalm, where he says, "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth his handy-work."-Now, I care not, as far as my argument from this passage is concerned, whether you speak of a supreme agent or of a subordinate instrument, or whether you institute a distinction between a primary and a secondary cause; for most unquestionably the argument of the apostle, in this passage, is plainly this: That when we look abroad with an admiring eye, upon the splendid fabric of the universe, and survey the complicated, yet simple principles, by which the great architect has cemented and sustained the produce of his power, we necessarily see such outgoings of eternal power and Godhead consolidated with his work, that we are irresistibly convinced of the omnipotent supremacy of the proximate worker: mark-I say, of the worker; of the person who comes into immediate contact and direct collision with the execution of the work. For the argument of the Apostle implies, that it is of him the testimony is made. And observe how it is declared in this text, that the visible creation is a proof not merely of the eternal power, but of the Godhead of the Creator; and also that it does not merely speak of a sufficiency of power, but of a power that is eternal, which must be a power that cannot be controlled.

But, again, this doctrine of a subordinate and finite instrument in creation, is contrary to the declaration of the Apostle, in Rom. i. 25; where he speaks of the Heathen having "worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator." Here there is no mention of a person intervening between the creature and the Creator; but all beings in existence are, in this text, classed under two denominations the creature and the Creator; and both are mentioned with such distinctness, aa to show that a creature could not have been the Creator, nor could the Creator have been a creature.

Further we read in HEB. iii. 4, "He that built all things is God;" and this declaration is made without any reference to a primary or secondary cause. And I request you to observe, that the builder is

the person who actually executes the work; therefore, whether you represent Christ as the instrument or not, still there is a principle propounded here which proves him to be "God.”

I read the following address to Jehovah, in NEH. ix. 6: "Thou, even thou, art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth, and all things that are therein, the seas, and all that is therein." Now, might I not as well maintain, that the "Jehovah" who was here addressed was a subordinate agent in the hands of some superior Deity, who did not manifest himself in the work, but sat behind the curtain of the universe; as argue that, though it is said of Christ in COL. i. 16, "by him were all things created," yet he was not the Creator, except in this inferior sense?

But, in fact, creation was not a work in the sense in which we understand the term. It was effected, not by "working," but by "commanding." This is proved by the passage to which I have already referred, in GEN. i. 3: "God said, Let there be light; and there was light;" also from Ps. xxxiii. 9: "For he spake, and it was done; he commanded, and it stood fast ;" and Ps. cxlviii. 5: "He commanded, and they were created;" and from Isa. xlv. 12: "All their host have I commanded." I ask, then, What was the occasion for a subordinate agent, if the work was achieved by the fiat of the Creator? Does not such a doctrine detract from the perfect efficiency of the command of the Eternal? Surely there was nothing for a subordinate agent to effect. And, to suppose the intervention of any secondary instrumentality between the command of God and the effect produced, would destroy the omnipotence of God, by referring the more difficult part of the work to a created and finite instrument, and the easier department to the superior being; for, surely, it is far easier to command, than to do; it is far easier to say, "Let there be light," than actually to generate and produce the light. And Mr. Porter would do well to show, how a created agent could be of any avail, where there was not any pre-existent matter upon which his limited faculties could be brought to bear. For a finite instrument could not create. For, what, let me ask, is creation? Is it not an origination from nothing?-a filling up, as it were, of that unmeasured vacuum which exists by the inherent constitution of all things as ordained of God, between a state of being and a state of nonentity? And what created being could conduct any thing through that infinite process of origination? Surely nothing but the unlimited and unrestricted power of Jehovah could achieve so great a work. In fact, the doctrine which teaches that Christ, as a created and subordinate agent, could create a world, amounts to this—THAT A FINITE POWER PERFORMS EVERY THING, WHILST THE INFINITE POWER OF GOD PERFORMS ABSOLUTELY NOTHING. I say it again: This doctrine represents the power of Christ, as a finite and delegated power, achieving all things; whilst the infinite omnipotence of Jehovah-the length, and breadth, and height, and depth of which, the highest angel cannot scan-is represented, on Mr. Porter's principle, as retaining its lodgment within the nature of Deity, reposing in a state of inactive indolence, whilst the stupendous work of creation was effected by the instrumentality of a subordinate cause. And, at the same time, such is the

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nature of the work, that we would be led to regard the immediate agent, by whom the power was actually exerted, as our Creator and our God.

But let me suppose, for a moment, that Christ, as a created being, was the subordinate instrument in the creation of the world. I ask, then, whether did God impart to him a finite or an infinite power, as a qualification for the work? Let me examine this dilemma: Suppose I am answered that God imparted to Christ an infinite power, I reply at once, that this would represent him as conveying over to a creature (for the supposition is, that Christ is a creature) an incommunicable attribute of Deity. It would also involve a supposition of the existence of two omnipotent beings-the being who originally had infinite power in himself, and the being to whom that infinite power was imparted. But it requires only an exercise of the first principles of common sense to know, that the existence of two dis. tinct omnipotent beings is a philosophical absurdity; because, if one be omnipotent, he must necessarily possess control and power over the other. So that we conclude it to be impossible, that God, as an infinitely superior being, could have imparted omnipotence to Christ; as he would, by doing so, have surrendered even his own infinite superiority. But I may be told, that he only communicated a finite power to Christ, to enable him to create. I call, then, on Mr. Porter to prove how a finite power could be sufficient for the execution of so great a work. Perhaps he will answer, that, because creation is in itself finite, a finite power could be able to create. But mark the sophism which is involved in this reply: it assumes that the word "finite" has the same signification in the two clauses of the sentence; whereas this word, when applied to creation, is a term of quantity; but when applied to power, is a term of quality. And, therefore, there is no such analogy between a "finite power" and a "finite creation;" and the answer is nothing more than a mere play on words. Consequently, the doctrine which supposes that a finite power is sufficient for creating, must fall to the ground.

But, again, let me imagine this doctrine to be true. I should like, then, to know what proof has any man that God is omnipotent, if a finite power could create. Is it not by a reference to the works of creation that we usually argue for the uncontrolled and illimitable power of the Eternal? And if creation cannot demonstrate the omnipotence of Jehovah, does it not follow, that he has achieved nothing by which to prove the boundless nature of his physical power?-But I have said enough to warrant me in drawing this general conclusion, that creation is the work of Deity-that the omnipotence of the Creator is written, in legible characters, upon the visible structure of the material universe; and that, as Christ is revealed in Scripture as the being by whom "all things were created," he must be omnipotent, and, therefore, God.

But before I conclude this address, I must refer you to a passage upon which those who agree with Mr. Porter are accustomed to lay considerable stress, and which he has advanced to-day, as an argument against the true Deity of Christ. The passage I allude to, is to be found in JOHN xiv. 28, "If ye loved me, ye would rejoice, because I said, I go unto my Father: for my Father is greater