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an intent to affect commerce, the Board can apply the statute to that enterprise.

This Court has also recognized the principle that an industrial dispute having the necessary effect of substantially burdening commerce would be within the control power of Congress. Industrial Association v. United States, 268 U. S. 64, 81; United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 410-411. Hence, the statute is applicable to an enterprise which is shown by evidence before the Board to be of such a character that strife, if it occurred, would have such a necessary effect. The proper application of the statute to such situations depends, of course, on the precise scope of the "necessary effect" principle. Although the Court has recognized the principle it has not heretofore had occasion to define it.

Lastly, the scope of the control power extends to recurring evils which in their totality constitute a burden on interstate commerce. This Court has stated that such recurrent evils may, after appropriate findings, be subjected by Congress to national supervision and restraint. Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U. S. 495; Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U. S. 1. This principle extends to industrial strife in enterprises which receive a substantial part of their raw material from, or ship a substantial part of their products in, interstate commerce. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co., 259 U. S. 344, 408; United Leather Workers v. Herkert & Meisel Trunk Co., 265 U. S. 457, 469; Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U. S. 548. Here Congress has found, and experience shows, that industrial strife in such enterprises constitutes such a recurring evil. Under this view of the control power the statute may be applied to the individual instances. of this recurring burden—that is, to any enterprise which

Argument for Petitioner.

301 U.S.

receives a substantial part of its materials from, or ships a substantial part of its products in, interstate commerce, and is dependent upon such commerce for the successful conduct of its business.

We believe that the instant case falls within each of these three situations in which the control power of Congress may be exercised.

The reasonable likelihood of a controversy with the intent to affect commerce might be demonstrated in either of two ways: First, evidence might be presented to the Board that in a particular situation the intent already exists; or second, evidence might be presented to the Board that the situation was comparable to, and of the same general type as, others out of which in the past there had evolved controversies with intent to affect commerce, or that in the particular situation confronting the Board, such definite intention might reasonably be expected to develop. In the case at bar it is not claimed that there is evidence of the first sort; but there is abundant evidence that the situation is fraught with the risk that after strife developed it would involve the purpose to curtail the movement of goods in commerce.

As previously stated, the Court has not yet determined the exact scope of the phrase "necessary effect of substantially burdening commerce." It undeniably includes situations in which the participants cannot be charged with a conscious specific desire to interrupt commerce. United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525. The statements of this Court make it clear that the application of this principle may depend upon the magnitude of the effect on commerce. The possible use of such a standard is entirely consistent with Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238. Three possible definitions of the scope of the "necessary effect" principle may be advanced: (1) a necessary effect on commerce results from industrial strife occurring in

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an enterprise which lies within a well-defined stream or flow of commerce, or (2) a necessary effect on commerce results from industrial strife which restrains a substantial part of all the commerce in a particular commodity, or (3) a necessary effect on commerce results from industrial strife which restrains the movement of a substantial volume of goods which would otherwise move in interstate commerce. The instant case falls within all three of these aspects of the principle, but this brief addresses particular attention to the first and second.

Neither Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, nor Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U. S. 238, is here applicable. In the Schechter case it was urged that wages and hours in local industry bore a relation to interstate commerce by reason of an intricate chain of economic causes and effects. An effect on commerce which occurred in such a manner the Court characterized as indirect. The Act involved in the Carter case had as its purpose the "stabilizing" of the bituminous coal industry through regulation of prices and wages. The effect of wage cutting on interstate commerce was held to be indirect on the basis of the Schechter case. The collective bargaining provisions of that Act were, as is clear from the face of the statute and from the opinion of the Court, ancillary to the wage fixing provisions and furnished the means through which regulations with respect to wages having the force of law were to be arrived at. On the other hand, the National Labor Relations Act is designed solely to eliminate the burden on interstate commerce caused by industrial strife. Such strife constitutes an interruption to commerce operating directly without "an efficient intervening agency or condition." Thus it deals with matters closely connected with commerce, does not go beyond what is necessary for the protection of commerce, and does not attempt "a broad regulation of industry within the State."

Argument for Respondent.

301 U.S.

Mr. Earl F. Reed, with whom Messrs. Charles Rosen and W. D. Evans were on the brief, for respondent.

The respondent contends that the National Labor Relations Act is, in reality, a regulation of labor relations, and not of interstate commerce, and that, as a consequence, it is not within the power of Congress to enact. Even if it should be considered a true regulation of interstate commerce, it still has no application to the respondent's relations with its production employees, because they are not subject to regulation by the Federal Government. In addition, the provisions of the Act which the petitioner seeks to apply in the present cases are invalid, because they violate § 2 of Art. III of the Constitution, as well as the Fifth and Seventh Amendments.

The respondent is a corporation engaged in the manufacture of iron and steel products. In this connection, it owns and operates a large steel plant at Aliquippa, Pennsylvania, in which are employed approximately ten thousand men. The present case is, in reality, a controversy between ten individuals who were formerly employed by the respondent in production work at this plant, and the respondent. These individuals, with three others, filed a complaint with the petitioner, the National Labor Relations Board, charging that they had been discharged or demoted by the respondent because of union affiliations. The respondent objected to the jurisdiction of the petitioner, but its motion to dismiss was overruled and the petitioner, after hearing, determined that the complainants had been wrongfully discharged and ordered their immediate restoration, with compensation for lost pay.

The petitioner has endeavored to justify its assumption of jurisdiction over the respondent's employment relations, by making a finding that the respondent has en

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gaged in unfair labor practices "affecting commerce" within the definition of the National Labor Relations Act. The respondent insists that the facts upon which this "finding" pretends to be based are, in law, insufficient to justify any such conclusion, and that this Court is entitled to reexamine the facts for the purpose of determining the jurisdictional issue. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22; St. Joseph Stock Yards v. United States, 298 U.S. 38.

The National Labor Relations Act is not a true regulation of interstate commerce.

The power of Congress is clearly defined by the commerce clause of the Constitution, and considerations of political expediency have no weight in fixing the dividing line between the powers of Congress and the reserved powers of the several States. The argument of the petitioner is, in the last analysis, a plea that, from an economic standpoint, Congress should have power to apply its legislation to the respondent's employment relations. This, we submit, is entirely beside the point if the exercise of such power would run counter to the Constitution.

The jurisdiction of Congress under the commerce clause includes the power to regulate, restrict and protect interstate commerce; but not the right to use such jurisdiction as a pretext for legislation which interferes with the local sovereignty of the separate States. Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Wheat. 1. The use of an admitted power of Congress as a pretext to interfere with local activities which are not subject to its jurisdiction, is to be condemned. The commerce clause will not serve as an excuse for legislating with respect to labor relations, which do not constitute a part of interstate commerce. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495; Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330; United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1.