EQUAL CHECK.

[PART Chrysostomus alicubi, &c. (Inst. lib. 2, cap. 2, sec. 4.) That is, "St. Chrysostom says somewhere, 'Forasmuch as God has put good and evil in our own power, (electionis liberum donavit arbitrium,) he has given us a free power to choose the one or the other; and as he does not retain us against our will, so he embraces us when we are willing.' Again: "Often a wicked man, if he will, is changed into a good man; and a good man, through sloth, falls away* and becomes wicked; because God has endued us with free agency: nor does he make us do things necessarily, but he places proper remedies before us, and suffers all to be done according to the will of the patient," &c. words of St. Chrysostom, Calvin draws this conclusion:-Porro Graci From these præ aliis, atque inter eos singulariter Chrysostomus, in extollenda humanæ voluntatis facultate modum excesserunt. That is, "The Greek fathers above others, and among them especially Chrysostom, have exceeded the bounds in extolling the power of the human will." Hence it appears that, Calvin himself being judge, the fathers, but more parti. cularly the Greek fathers, and among them St. Chrysostom, strongly opposed bound will and necessity.

8. ST. AMBROSE, a Latin father, was also a strenuous defender of the second Gospel axiom, which stands or falls with the doctrine of free will. Take two proofs of it :-Ideo omnibus opera sanitatis detulit, ut quicunque periret mortis suæ causas sibi adscribat; qui curari noluit cum remedium haberet quo posset evadere. (Amb. lib. 2, de Cain et Abel, cap. 12.) That is, "God affords to all the means of recovery, that whoever perishes may impute his own destruction to himself; forasmuch as he would not be cured when he had a remedy whereby he might have escaped." Again, commenting upon these words of Christ, "It is not mine to give," &c, he says, Non est meum qui Justitiam servo, non Gratiam. Denique ad Patrem referens addidit, "Quibus paratum est," ut ostendat Patrem quoque non petitionibus deferre solere, sed MERITIS; quia Deus personarum acceptor non est. "Quos præscivit prædestinavit." Non enim ante prædestinavit. (Amb. Unde et apostolus ait, de fide. cap. 4.) That is, "It is not mine [to give the next seat to my person] in point of justice, for I do not speak in point of favour; and referring the matter to his Father, he adds, To them for whom it is prepared, to show that the Father also [in point of reward] is not wont to yield to prayer, but (meritis) to worthiness; because God [when he acts

* I have advanced several arguments to prove that Judas was sincere, when Christ chose him to the apostleship. I beg leave to confirm them by the judgment of two of the fathers. St. Chrysostom, in his fifty-second discourse, says, O lovda ; Bariλcias vias HowTov nv, &c. That is, "Judas was at first a child of the kingdom, and heard it said to him with the disciples, You shall sit upon twelve thrones ;* but at last he became a child of hell." And St. Ambrose, upon Rom. ix, 13, has these remarkable words, Non est personarum acceptio in præscientia Dei, &c. That is, "There is no respect of persons in God's foreknowledge; for prescience is that whereby he knows assuredly how the will of every man will be, in which he will continue, and by which he shall be damned or crowned, &c. They who, as God knows also, will persevere in goodness, are frequently bad before; and they who, as he knows also, will be found evil at last, are sometimes good before, &c. For both Saul and Judas were once good." Hence it is, that he says, in another place, "Sometimes they are at first good, who afterward become and continue evil; and in this respect they are said to be written in the book of life, and blotted out of it."

as judge and rewarder] is no respecter of persons. Hence it is that the apostle says, Those whom God foreknew he predestinated. For he did not predestinate to reward them before he foreknew them" [as persons fit to be rewarded.] From this excellent quotation it appears that St. Ambrose maintained the two Gospel axioms, or the doctrines of grace and justice, of favour and worthiness, on which hang the election of distinguishing grace, and the election of remunerative justice, which the Calvinists perpetually confound, and which I have explained, section twelfth.

9. ST. JEROME, warm as he was against Pelagius, is evidently of the same mind with the other fathers, where he says:-Liberi arbitrii nos condidit Deus. Nec ad virtutes nec ad vitia necessitate trahimur. Alioquin ubi necessitas est, nec damnatio nec corona est. That is, "God hath endued us with free will. We are not necessarily drawn either to virtue or to vice. For where necessity rules, there is no room left either for damnation or for the crown." Again, in his third book against the Pelagians, he says:-Etiam his qui mali futuri sunt, dari protestatem conversionis et penitentiæ. That is, "Even to those who shall be wicked, God gives power to repent and turn to him." Again, upon Isaiah i, Liberum servat arbitrium, ut in utramque partem, non ex præjudicio Dei, sed ex meritis singulorum, vel pæna vel præmium sit. "Our will is kept free to turn either way, that God may dispense his rewards and punishments, not according to his own prejudice, but according to the merits [that .is, according to the works] of every one. Once more: he says to Ctesiphon, Frustra blasphemas, et ignorantium auribus ingeris, nos Liberium Arbitrium condemnare. Damnetur ille qui damnat. That is, "You speak evil of us without ground; you tell the ignorant that we condemn free will; but let the man who condemns it, be condemned."

You

When I read these explicit testimonies of ST. JEROME, in favour of free will, I no longer wonder that Calvin should find fault with him, as well as with ST. CHRYSOSTOM. Take Calvin's own words: (Inst. lib. 2, cap. 2, sec. 4.) Ait Hieronymus (Dial. 3, contra Pelag. &c.) Nostrum [est] offerre quod possumus; Illius [Dei] implere quod non possumus. "Jerome says, (in his third dialogue against Pelagianism,) it is our part to offer what we can. It is God's part to fill up what we cannot. see clearly by these quotations," adds Calvin, " that they [these fathers, upon the Calvinian plan,] attributed to man too much power to be virtuous." Such a conclusion naturally becomes Calvin. But what I cannot .help wondering at is, that Zelotes should indifferently call all the advocates for free will, Pelagians, when St. Jerome, who, next to St. Augustine, distinguished himself by his opposition to Pelagianism, is so strenu ous a defender of the doctrine of free will, in the books which he wrote against Pelagius.

10. EPIPHANIUS confirms this doctrine where he says, Sane quidem justius a stellis, quæ necessitatem pariunt, pœnæ repetantur, quam ab eo qui quod agit necessitate aductus aggreditur. (Epiph. advers. Hær. l. 1.) "It would be more just to punish the stars, which make a wicked action necessary, than to punish the poor man, who does that wicked action by necessity." He expresses himself still more strongly in the same book. Speaking of the Pharisees, who were rigid Predestinarians, he says, Est illud vero extremæ cujusdam imperitiæ, ne dicam amentiæ, cum resurrec

tionem mortuorum esse fateare, ac justissimum cujusque facti judicium constitutum, fatum nihilominus esse ullum asserere. Qui enim duo ista convenire possunt, JUDICIUM atque FATUM! That is, "It is extreme ignorance, not to say madness, to allow the resurrection of the dead, and a day of most righteous judgment for every action; and at the same time to assert that there is a destiny; for how can these two agree together, a JUDGMENT AND A DESTINY?" (or necessity?)

11. ST. BERNARD grants rather more liberty than I contend for, where he says, Sola voluntas, quoniam pro ingenita libertate aut dissentire sibi, aut præter se in aliquo consentire nulla vi nulla cogitur necessitate, non immerito justum vel injustum, beatitudine seu miseria dignam ac capacem creaturam constituit, prout scilicet justitiæ, injustitiæve consenserit. (Bern. De Grat. et lib. Arb.) That is, "The will alone can make a man deservedly just or unjust, and can deservedly render him fit for bliss or misery, as it consents either to righteousness or to iniquity; forasmuch as the will, according to its innate liberty, cannot be forced to will or nill any thing against its own dictates."

12. CYRILLUS ALEXANDRIUS upon John, (book vi, chap. 21,) vindicating God's goodness against the horrid hints of those who make him the author of sin, as all rigid Predestinarians do, says with great truth :-"The visible sun rises above our horizon, that it may communicate the gift of its brightness to all, and make its light shine upon all; but if any one shut his eyes or willingly turn himself from the sun, refusing the benefit of its light, he wants its illumination, and remains in darkness: not through the fault of the sun, but through his own fault. Thus the true Sun who came to enlighten those that sit in darkness, visited the earth, that in different manners and degrees he might impart to all the gift of knowledge and grace, and illuminate the inward eyes of all, &c. But many reject the gift of this heavenly light freely given to them, and have closed the eyes of their minds, lest so excellent an irradiation of the eternal light should shine unto them. It is not then through the defect of the true Sun, but only through their own iniquity," i. e. through their own perverse free will. And, (book i, chap. 11,) the same father, speaking on the same subject, says, "Let not the world accuse the word of God and his eternal light; but its own weakness: for the Sun enlightens, but man rejects the grace that is given him, blunts the edge of the understanding granted him, &c, and, as a prodigal, turns his sight to the creatures, neglecting to go forward, and through laziness and negligence [not through necessity and predestination] buries the illumination, and despises this grace."

13. CLEMENS ALEXANDRINUS is exactly of the same sentiment; for, calling "the Divine word" what St. Cyril calls "Divine light," he says, "The Divine word has cried; calling all, knowing well those that will not obey; and yet, because it is in our power, either to obey or not to obey, that none may plead ignorance, it has made a righteous call, and requireth but that which is according to the ability and strength of every one." (CLEM. ALEX. Strom. book ii.)

14. The father who wrote the book De Vocatione Gentium, says, Sicut qui crediderunt juvantur ut in fide maneant; ita qui nondum crediderunt, juvantur ut credant: et quemadmodum illi in sua potestate habent, ut xeant; ita et isti in sua habent potestate ut veniant. That is, "As they

that have believed are helped to abide in the faith; so they that have not yet believed are helped to believe; and as the former have it in their power to go out, so the latter have it in their power to come in."

15. ARNOBIUS produces this objection of a heathen: "If the Saviour of mankind be come, as you say, why does he not save all?" and he answers it thus :-Patet omnibus fons vitæ, &c. That is, "The fountain of life is open to all, nor is any one deprived of the right of drinking: but if thy pride be so great that thou refusest the offered gift and benefits, &c, why dost thou blame him [Christ] who invites thee," cujus solæ sunt hæ partes, ut sub tui juris arbitrio fructum sua benignitatis exponat? (ARN. Contra Gentes, lib. 2,) "whose full part it is to submit the fruit of his bounty to a choice that depends upon thyself?"

16. PROSPER, although he was St. Augustine's disciple, does justice to the truth which I maintain. For speaking of some that fell away from holiness to uncleanness, he says, Non ex eo necessitatem pereundi habuerunt quia predestinati non sunt; sed ideo prædestinati non sunt ; quia tales futuri ex voluntaria prævaricatione præsciti sunt. (PROSP. Ad. Ob. ii, Gall.) That is, "They did not lie under a necessity of perishing because they were not elected [to a crown of life;] but they were not elected [to that reward] because they were foreknown to be such as they are by their voluntary iniquity." The same father allows that it is absurd to believe a day of judgment, and to deny free will. Judicium futurum, says he, omnino non esset si homines Dei voluntate peccarent. (PROS. ad. obj. 10, Vinc.) That is, "By no means would there be a day of judgment, if men sinned by the will or decree of God." The reason is plain, if we sinned through any necessity laid on us by "the will of God," or by predestinating fate, we might say, like the heathen poet, Fati ista culpa est; nemo fit fato nocens : "It is the fault of fate: necessity excuses any one."

17. FULGENTIUS, although he was also St. Augustine's disciple, cuts up the doctrine of bound will by the root, where he says:-Nec justitia justa dicetur, si puniendum reum non invenisse, sed fecisse dicatur. Major vero injustitia, si lapso Deus retribuat pœnam, quem stantem dicitur prædestinasse ad ruinam." (FULG. 1. 1, ad Mon. cap. 22.) That is, "Justice could not be said to be just if it did not find, but made man an offender. And the injustice would be still greater, if God, after having predestinated a man to ruin when he stood, inflicted punishment upon him after his fall."

18. If any of the fathers is a rigid bound willer, it is heated AUGUSTINE: nevertheless, in his cool moments, he grants as much free will as I contend for. Hear him: Nos quidem sub fato stellarum nullius hominis genesim ponimus, ut liberum arbitrium voluntatis, quo bene vel male vivitur, propter justum Dei judicium ab omni necessitatis vinculo vindicemus. (Aug. 1, 2, contr. Faust. c. 5.) That is, "We place no man's nativity under the fatal power of the stars, that we may assert the liberty of the will, whereby our actions are rendered either moral or immoral, and keep it free from every bond of necessity, on account of the righteous judgment of God." Again: Nemo habet in potestate quid veniat in mentem; sed consentire vel dissentire propriæ voluntatis est. (Avo. De Litera et Spiritu, cap. 34.) That is, "Nobody can help what comes into his mind; but to consent or to dissent from involuntary suggestions, is the pre.

rogative of our own will." Once more: Initium salutis nostræ a Deo miserante habemus; ut acquiescamus salutiferæ inspirationi, nostræ est potestatis. (De Dogmatibus Ecclesiasticis, cap. 21.) That is, "The beginning of our salvation flows from the merciful God; but it is in our power to consent to his saving inspiration." And what he means by having a thing in our power," he explains in these words, Hoc quisque in sua potestate habere dicitur, quod si vult facit, si non vult non facit. (AUG. De Spir. et lit. c. 31.) That is, "Every one has that in his own power which he does if he will, and which he can forbear doing if he will not do it."

Agreeable to this is that rational observation, which, I think, is St. Augustine's, also:-Si non est liberum arbitrium, non est quod salvetur. Si non est gratia, non est unde salvetur: "If there be no free will, there is nothing to be saved: if there be no free grace, there is nothing whereby we may be saved:" a golden saying this, which is as weighty as my motto, "If you take away free grace, how does God save the world? And if you take away free will, how does he judge the world ?” So great is the force of truth, that the same prejudiced father, commenting upon this text, "Every man that hath this hope in him purifieth himself," 1 John iii, 3, does not scruple to say :-"Behold after what manner he has not taken away free will, that the apostle should say, 'keepeth himself pure.' Who keepeth us pure, except God? But God keepeth thee not thus against thy will. Therefore inasmuch as thou joinest thy will to God, thou keepest thyself pure. Thou keepest thyself pure, not of thyself, but by him who comes to dwell in thee. Yet because in this thou dost something of thine own will, therefore is something also attributed to thee. Yet so it is ascribed to thee, that still thou mayest say, with the psalmist, Lord, be thou my helper!' If thou sayest, 'Be thou my helper,' thou dost something; for if thou dost nothing, how does he help?" Happy would it have been for the Church if St. Augustine had always done justice in this manner to the second, as well as to the first Gospel axiom! He would not have paved the way for free wrath, and Antinomian free grace. Nor could Mr. Wesley do more justice to both Gospel axioms than Augustine does in the following words:-Non illi debent sibi tribuere, qui venerunt, quia vocati venerunt: nec illi, qui noluerant venire, debuerant alteri tribuere, sed tantum sibi: quia ut venirent vocati in libera erat voluntate. (Avg. lib. 83, Quæstionum.) "They that came [to Christ] ought not to impute it to themselves, because they came, being called: and they that would not come, ought not to impute it to another, but only to themselves, be

* Dr. Tucker judiciously unfolds St. Augustine's thought, where he says, "There is a sense, in which it may be allowed on the semi-Pelagian, (semiAugustinian] or Arminian plan, that grace is irresistible: but it is a sense that can do no manner of service to the cause of Calvinism. Grace, for instance, especially prevenient, or preventing grace may be considered as a precious gift, or universal endowment, like the common gifts of health, strength, &c, in which case the recipient must necessarily receive them; for he has not a power to refuse. But after he has received them, he may choose whether he will apply them to any good and salutary purposes or not: and on this freedom of choice rests the proper distinction between good and evil, virtue and vice, morality and immorality. Grace therefore must be received; but, after it is received, it may be abused: the talent may be hid in a napkin, and the Spirit may be quenched, or have a despite done to it.”