must necessarily fall under our notice. To know why and how we are enabled to choose, it will appear that we must have some previous knowledge of our frame; that it consists, for instance, of two partsa mind and body; and, further, that reason is the characteristic distinction of the former-passion and appetite of the latter. We must, further, have some insight into the qualities of the mind, and propensities connected with the body, which will dispose us, if we value our own welfare, to cultivate the one and place a restraint upon the other. The relation, likewise, which subsists betwixt these twofold powers of mind and body, and the outward objects which supply materials to give them exercise, will afford us a further acquaintance with the ways and dispensations of God; for, without proper objects to give exercise to our mental faculties and bodily powers, they must consequently remain inactive. But not only materials for action are required, but motives and incentives.

For we may and have in many cases both powers within and materials without, and still continue inactive. Hence the necessity of motives; and these motives will be found, I trust, on examination, to be closely connected with our mental and bodily qualities, and will admit of a twofold division corresponding thereto. For we can know little of the mind, if we have not some general acquaintance with the distinct and appropriate nature of our motives; and that, whilst one class of them are rational and spi ritual, and urge us on to holiness and virtue, there is another connected with the body; and to their reckless impulse, when indulged at all hazards, sin,

selfishness, impurity, and misery may be ascribed. Should the same identical person be subject to motives of an opposite nature, productive of opposite results, there will be nothing difficult in conceiving that, till habits are formed within him, he will be under the influence of opposing motives; and, if these motives be regarded as laws, he will find a law in his members warring against the law in his mind; or, in other words, a conflict betwixt reason and the passions, or, in Scripture language, the spirit and the flesh.

A reason stated why Man is subject to the opposition here insisted on.

Now, why, it may be asked, are we thus formed and constructed? The obvious answer which occurs to me is this; not that we may be harassed by confusion, doubt, and perplexity, but that we may, by this competition of contending motives, be urged to choose; and a wide field opened by this instrumentality, and the occasions and opportunities connected with it, for the exercise of choice.

The power of choice cannot be accounted for by any other hypothesis.

If any one will make the trial, he will probably find it quite impossible to account for the power we have of choosing, upon any other hypothesis. And, that no one may think the means employed are disproportioned, or in any way unequal, to the end effected, that no one may think much is done to

produce little, or little much,-let him direct his attention, not merely to one of these, but both; and, doubtless, whilst the means employed will appear the only that are conceivable, the end effected will be regarded as pre-eminently important.

The important effects resulting from choice.

The effects hence resulting are, in one word, holiness or virtue, not terminating in its own sufficiency, but associated with happiness, which is its future, if not present, its slow, if not immediate, reward; so that, just as choice results from opposition, and virtue from choice, so does happiness likewise from virtue. Should any one suppose that virtue and happiness, or holiness and happiness, (for virtue and holiness mean much the same thing, viz. the conscientious discharge of our duty to God, our neighbour, and ourselves,) are not so closely allied as is here intimated; let him call to mind, that God, who is infinite in power and goodness, is the rewarder of those who diligently seek or obey him. A Being of infinite wisdom and goodness is not likely to reward those who are unworthy of his favour, or who hate him, and set him at defiance; but, on the contrary, those who, by patient continuance in welldoing, humbly and sincerely endeavour to serve and obey him.

A summary of the scope and intention of this

Treatise.

Sufficient has been advanced to intimate the drift and tendency of this treatise, which is an attempt

to show that we are formed with a twofold nature, consisting of soul and body—that we are under the influence of motives adapted to each respectively that they oppose one another, and afford a field for the exercise of choice. These are the grounds on which I wish to place the subject which I propose to the consideration of my reader; and I trust an attempt to show how choice is elicited will not be regarded altogether as a waste of time, inasmuch as there are doctrines, the bearing of which incline to the belief that we have no such power; on which account, as well as for other reasons, it may be of use to show how the process of its formation is conducted and completed.

Our human nature is twofold, consisting of mind and body.

And first, we will take into our review this position, that our human nature is twofold, consisting of mind and body. That this is really the case, and that we are composed of mind, as well as body, appears from the bare fact, that we can form a conception of each. He who alleges that there is no such thing as mind, or soul, cannot well do so without some notion of it. For if he argues without such notion, neither his words of affirmation or denial can have a meaning; but if he affix any signification to the term mind or soul, he assumes the existence of that which he denies.

The specific difference of mind and body.

Hence it may be useful to make some observations on the nature, and the qualities, and powers, and affections of mind and body; that we may have a clearer notion of their specific difference, as well as of their consequent susceptibility of being affected by different motives.

This

The distinct and diverse nature of the body, the circumstance of its being susceptible of different influences from outward objects, and subject to the operation of different laws, necessary and immutable, tend to show that it is a separate substance from the mind, however intimately these two component parts of our frame, through the medium of perception, may be combined. Our bodies are, in their primary state, material: unorganised matter may be regarded as their original substratum. Revelation tells us that we are dust, and that to dust we shall return; earth to earth, ashes to ashes, dust to dust. is a fact we may collect from observation as well as revelation. We may hence know experimentally that to the gradual accretion of atomic particles, the growth of the embryo in the womb, from a small to a larger size, may be ascribed; and that subsequently, by the same gradual accretion of parts, man, as well as other animals, advances to a state of maturity; and that afterwards, by a contrary process, their material part is decomposed. Such are the original materials of which our outward frame appears to be formed, when the particles of which