On our desire of being beloved by friends, relatives, and connections.

The last of our desires which I shall now mention is that of being beloved by those with whom we live, and more especially by our nearest relatives, friends, and connections. No situation can well be regarded as more forlorn than his who has no regard or love for any one, nor is himself blest with the esteem and affection of a single individual.

So powerful, however, is this principle, that it has been observed, that those who have been thus circumstanced have been gratified with the affection which domestic animals have shown towards them, though devoid of reason. Nay, even inanimate objects have excited strong attachments. The house or the tree which has afforded us shelter, and from which we have derived benefit, we may, by an involuntary play of the imagination, regard as an object that has loved us; and this notion, combined with early associations of happiness in our early years, inspire us with a stronger attachment for them in return, and make home more pleasing and delightful. Still, nothing can be more evident than that this desire may be misemployed, and be made productive of evil when influenced and biassed by the animal motives.

The adulterer desires the affections of the wife to be transferred to him from her husband, the person to whom she is betrothed, and to whom she has solemnly promised, in the consecrated place of

be beloved by the unsuspecting object of his criminal appetites, that he may more easily betray and ruin her, and thus eventually involve, not only herself, but her more immediate connections and nearest relatives, in shame and sorrow.

And thus in this respect, as in many others, the bad passions to which we are subject may dispose us to turn a blessing into a curse, and make that desire a source of evil, which, under the direction of reason and duty, contributes so essentially to our happiness and comfort.

Nothing can be so delightful as to love, and experience the consciousness that we are beloved in return by the amiable and the virtuous. Hence it is that we take an interest in the pursuits and plans of others; that we rejoice with those that rejoice, and derive satisfaction from the prosperous issue of their undertakings.

Still, for the same reasons that have been before assigned, it is a distinct motive from the two before denominated primary; to the developement of these, indeed, it is accessory, and opens a wider field for their operations, and thus acts in unison with them, and furthers the end and design which they were intended to effect.

On the whole, it may be observed, of all our desires, that they contribute very essentially to the developement of our primary motives, and afford a wider scope for their exercise. Our primary motives, if not aided and assisted by our desire of knowledge, power, wealth, happiness, society, exercise, and the esteem and love of others, would have but a narrow and confined sphere for their oper

ations; but, with these auxiliaries, a wide and grand theatre is opened for the exhibition of the good and bad qualities of our nature, not perhaps directly and immediately, but through the medium of choice elicited by opposition.

CHAP. IX.

A recurrence to the consideration of choice, and the mode by which it is elicited.

I HAVE before endeavoured to show how this result takes place; and if it be granted that we can choose, as, in common matters at least, no one can, with any show of reason, entertain a doubt, we cannot form any conception how such a power could be elicited without opposition, in moral matters more especially.

For, as we have before observed, if we had no rational nor spiritual motives urging us to act agreeably to their suggestions, we must of course act as the animal propensities prompted us, and should be no more accountable for our actions than brutes devoid of reason; and, on the other hand, if we had no animal motives to oppose to rational ones, we must act necessarily as our rational and spiritual motives directed us. For if there be no impediment nor counteracting power to alter the current of those thoughts which reason suggests, they will proceed without disturbance or interruption in one and the same direction.

Motives proceed from our own minds, and are not external agents acting upon us arbitrarily.

Were there, as we have before hinted, any thing arbitrary in motives; were they, as abstract and general ideas were supposed by some ancient philosophers to have been, real existences acting upon us, and over which we had no control; then indeed, under such an order of events, our choice could not have been voluntary, nor have resulted from our own powers.

But this is not the case, indeed the supposition is absurd, inasmuch as we cannot harbour such a notion in our minds without a tacit belief, that the invisible world is peopled with a class of beings, called motives, which are permitted to exercise a wanton power over us. Such an improbable and vain imagination is sanctioned neither by reason nor revelation.

For though we collect from the latter source of information that the invisible world is inhabited by good and bad angels, the former of whom take an interest in our salvation, and rejoice in the conversion of a sinner; and the latter are permitted to tempt the thoughtless, carnal, and unguarded mind. into evil, yet there is nothing ever hinted of such an order of living beings as motives. They are, in

deed, a part of ourselves; we have a power over them committed to us; and we can, by our own vigorous exertions, aided by God's grace, give encouragement and strength to those which are good,