ample of a dog (d) tied to a cart's tail; he may follow without being drawn, but if he doth not, he muft follow by being drawn. Τὸ αυτὸ δή πε καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων καὶ μὴ βελόμενοι γὰρ ἀκολυθεῖν ἀναγκασθήσονται πάντως εἰς τὸ πεπρώμενον εἰσελθεῖν. And this alfo is the cafe of men, for if they will not follow fate, they fhall by all means be neceffitated to come under the laws of fate. Their wife man, faith (e) Seneca, doth nothing unwil lingly; Neceffitatem effugit quia vult quod ipfa coactura eft, he avoids neceffity by doing willingly what otherwife fhe would compel him to do; and this is the plain import of the prayer of (f) Epictetus out of Cleanthes, lead me, O fate, to that to which thou haft ordained, that I may follow willingly; for if I do not follow fo, I fhall be compelled to do it.

2dly. This neceffity, fay they, proceedeth from external and antecedent caufes; as either; ft. The eternal decree of God difpofing all things to happen as they do. (g) Omnia certâ, et in æternum dictâ lege decurrunt, all things, faith Seneca, follow by a certain law established from eternity; Olim conftitutum eft quid gaudeas quid fleas, it is of old ordained at what we fhall rejoice or weep. (h) Fata nos ducunt, we are led by fate; and the firft law of fate is this, ftare decreto, that God will fland to his decree, and not be moved from it by prayers or facrifices. If any man doth profitably use them, Id ipfum quoque in fato eft, it is alfo his fate to use them.Accordingly (i) the concourfe of caufes, faith Mr. Hobbs, whereof every one is determined to be fuch, may well be called the decree of God in this refpect, that they were all fet and ordered by the eternal caufe of all things, God Almighty. Or, 2dly. being an eternal series of caufes upon which all effects depend, (h) ordinem rerum fati æterna feries rotat, caufa ex caufa pendet, the eternal courfe of fate turns about all things, faith Seneca, one caufe depends upon another. It is, fay all, (1) an immutable feries of caufes, by virtue of which thus knit to one another, all things are produced; or a fatal neceffity, by virtue of which whatfoever happens flows from a continuation of caufes. Now here obferve with Bishop Bramhall,

(d) Liber ined. apud Menaque in illud Stoicorum apud Laert. xaß eμαρμένην δε φάσι πάντα γενέσθαι. 1. 7. p. 459.

(e) Ep. 54.

(f) "Aye μs- σὺ ἡ πεπρωμένη ὅποι πό τε ὑμῖν εἰμι διατεταγμένος ὡς ἕψομαι γὲ ἄοκνος ἦν δὲ γὲ μὴ θέλὼ ἐδὲν ἧττον ἕψομαι. Enchirid. p. 37. (g) De Provid. c. 5(b) Natural. Qu. c. 36, 37.—(i) Br. p. 665.(k) Ubi fupra.

(1) Immutabilis caufarum cohærentium feries, Sen. ad Helvid. c. 8. Fatalis quædam neceffitas quà, quicquid accidit, id ex caufarum continuatione fluxiffe dicitur. Cic. de Nat. D. 1. 1. n. 30, 39 De Div. 1. 1. n. 106. De Fato, n. 16. Plut. de Pl. Philof. I. 2. c. 27, 28: De Stoic. Repugn. p. 1056.

1ft, That (m)" it is not much material whether they af cribe this neceffity to God's decrees, or to the flars, or to a connexion of causes, so as they establish neceffity; for neceffity upon what ground foever it be established renders the doom of all the fame." Either they must run into this abfurdity, that the effect is determined, the caufe remaining undetermined; or else hold fuch a connexion of caufes as the Stoicks did.

2dly. That whereas they fay the Stoicks took away liberty and contingency, but they allow them; as this is falfe as to their notion of liberty joined with neceflity, fo is it little to the purpose, fince they allow it only in actions which will do us no good as to our fpiritual and eternal interests, depriving men without that grace God hath decreed not to afford to reprobates, of liberty to choose what is fpiritually good; for furely men thus determined to one, that is, to do evil only, have only the liberty to choose by what actions they will incur damnation.

Now the natural reafon of mankind induced the heathen philofophers to condemn this doctrine of fatal neceffity upon thefe feveral accounts.

SECTION III-1. That it fundamentally deftroyed the liberty of humane actions, and left nothing in our power; for no man can be faid, (n) durezesiws evapyev, to act freely, who by external caufes is neceffitated to act, or not to act; and they, faith, (o) Cicero, who introduce an eternal series of causes, ii mentem hominis voluntate liberâ fpoliatam neceffitate fati de. vinciunt, they rob the foul of its liberty, and leave us nothing in our own power; Nam nihil effet in noftra poteftate si res ita fe haberet. It is the most ridiculous of all things, faith (p) Oe. nomaus, to Jay τὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις τὶ εἶναι, καὶ εἱρμὸν ἐδὲν TTOV Eival, that any thing is in the power of man, and yet that there is a connexion of caufes; for this therefore, fay they, destroys the liberty of our defires, choice; and confequently of our actions, because it introduceth an antecedent and ex ternal caufe on which they depend, as the effect upon the caufe; for a caufe being that, (9) Quæ id efficit cujus eft Caufa, which produceth the effect. "A caufe which neceflitates the action, renders the effect neceffary; and when the effect depends on my appetite, will, defire and choice, muft lay the like necefity on them. And whereas the patrons of fate would fometimes own, that they did many things willingly, but added, that (r) μετὰ τἔτο αυτὰ γένεσθαι καθείμαρτο, they were determined by fate to will them, and fo their very will

(m) P. 692, 693.

-(n) Simpl. in Epict. p. 23.- -(0) De Fato, n. (p) Ibid. n. 7. (9) Ibid. n. 26. -(r) Diog, apud Eufeb. Præp. Ev. 1. 6. c. 11. p. 266. B. D.

16.

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was, περιειλημένον ὑπὸ τῆς εἰμαργένης, involved in, or contained under the decree of fate. This fate, fay they, can no more confift with the liberty of the will, than fweet with bitter, white with black, cold with heat; for as thofe things are faid to be done by fate, ὅσα καὶ ἐκόντων καὶ αἰκόντων ἡμῶν πάντως γίνεται, which are certainly done whether we will or no: So those things are faid to be done, Tap' nuas, by our will, osa ex το σπεδάζειν ἡμας καὶ ἐνεργεῖν ἐπὶ τέλος ἔρχεται, which are brought to pass by our fudy and labor, and only through our floth and negligence are left undone.

2dly. That if our actions did proceed from fuch a fate, no man could deferve praise or difpraife, reward or punishment, for any of his actions; for hence, faith () Cicero, it follows that our actions and choice is not in our own power; ex quo efficitur ut neque laudationes juftæ fint, nec vituperationes, nec honores, nec fupplicia; whence it follows, that there is. nothing in our actions which justly can deferve praife or dif. praife, reward or punishment. If fuch a fate fhould be allowed, faith (t) Alcinous, τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῖν οἰχήσεται, καὶ ἔπαινοι, καὶ ψός γοι καὶ πᾶν τὸ τοιέτοις παραπλήσιον, our liberty is deftroyed to. gether with praife and difpraife, and every thing that is like to it. They, faith (u) Simplicius, who take away, to Q' nμio our liberty, ἐτοὶ καὶ τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς κακίας ψυχικὴν διαφορὰν avaipo, they take away the natural difference betwixt vice and virtue, and leave no place for praife or dispraife; for to praise and honor men, faith (x) Oenomaus, for being good, or bad out of necefity, is as abfurd; ὡς εἰ τῆς μὲν καλὸς τὰ σώματα ἐπαινοίη, καὶ γεραίροι, τὰς δὲ αἰς χρὲς ψέγοι καὶ κολάζοι, ας εξα man fhould praife and honor them for having handfome bodies, and difpraife and punish them for being deformed. And laftly, thefe very men, faith (y) Alexander Aphrodifienfis, by exhorting men to ufe difcipline and ftudy, and by leaving volumes to inftruct young men how to live, and condemning others who, ἢ τὰ προσήκοντα ὁρῶσιν, do not things convenient, or what they ought to do, evert the neceffity of fate, ovvisaodai dé κατα φύσιν ἡμῖν ὁ πάρχειν τὸ αυτεξέσιον, and cftablified the nat. ural liberty of the will.

3dly. This doctrine of fate, fay they, leaves no place for repentance, or for accufing of ourselves, or others; whereas, faith (z) Diogenianus, when we do any thing without deliberation, ohhánis μεTavoμev, we frequently repent, and blame ourfelves for our rafhnefs; and when we fee others act in like manner, we pronounce them offenders, is iQui O TY TOISTY, as believing these things are in our own power.

기

(f) Ibid. n. 30.- -(t' De Phil. Plat. c. 26. -(u) P. 29.—(*) Apud. Eufeb. Ibid. p. 260. D.(y) Ibid. p. 272, —(z) Alex, A. phrod. Ibid.

4thly. They add, that were this fo, God could not justly punish men for their iniquities, they being only the refult of unavoidable neceffity; for thus they who are punished plead their caufe in (a) Oenamaus, with Fupiter and Apollo, & Sinasa Bolets & "Aroλdov, thou dealeft not with us juftly, Apollo; thou doeft not righteously punish us who have not offended and why doth Jupiter himfelf ἡ τῆς ἡμετέρας ανάγκης αναγκη, the impulfive caufe of our neceffity, punish us rather than himfelf who hath impofed upon us this neceffity. Ceafe, Jupiter, to be angry, ἔξὶ γὰρ ὁ πέπρωται καὶ τέτο προστέτακται ποιεῖ ὁ σας εἰρμός ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸς τότον ἐδέν εσμεν, for that is only done which fate, and the feries of caufes ordered to be done, and we are not able to refift. We justly say to you (b) Oh ye Gods that you permitted us not to be good; and not only fo, aλλà x 610ασθε εἶναι πονηρές, but ye have alfo laid upon us a neceffity to be evil. Note,

8

edly. That this fate was brought into the church by the (c) Colobarfians, the followers of Bardesanes, and the Prifcillianifts, and before them by the (d) Marcionites; who abstained from matrimony on this opinion, that nature was evil by reafon of the evil matter of which we were compofed; and this doctrine, faith Clemens of Alexandria, they learned from the philofophers, to all whom it was common (e) fato adfcribere converfationes hominum, to aferibe the actions of men to fate. Now the doctrine of the chriftians is this, faith (1) Justin Martyr, that nothing is done or fuffered, xa0' číμappěvnv according to fate, ἀλλὰ κατὰ μὲν προαίρεσιν ἑκατὸν κατορθών, papraven; but that every man doth good or evil according to his own free thoice. And in this they all agree for these rea

fons,

ft. Because no man can be worthy of punishment for what he was made, and cannot alter: No man, faith (g) Justin Mar tyr, would be worthy of reward and praise, in a caUTH EλÓUEνος τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ τότον γινόμενος, who doth not of kimfelf choofe to be good, but is made fuch; nor if he be wicked, can he te jufly punified, ἐκ ἀφ' ἑαυτῷ τοιῦτος ὤν, ἀλλ ̓ ἐδὲν δυνάμενος Rivas eTepor map' & ¿ysyóvel, as being not fuch of himself, and being not able to be otherwife than as he was born. God made us fo that we fhould be good not by nature, but by our own free will and purpose: (h) nihil enim laudis eft id effe à quo te mutari

(a) Apud Eufeb. ibid. p. 263. B.(b) Ibid. D. (c) August. Hær. 15.

(α) Ὁ μὲν από Μαρκίων φύσιν κακὴν ἐκ τὸ ὕλης κακῆς

Strom. 3. p. 432. 13. Παρ' ὧν (φιλοσόφων) τὴν γίνεσιν κακὴν εἶναι ἀσεβῶς ἐκμαθόντες οἱ από Μαρκίων - καθαπερ ἰδίῳ δόγματι φράττονται. Ibid. D. (f) Hær. 70.—(ƒ) Apol, 1. p. 45.-(8) Apol, 2. p. 81. B. (b) Recogn: 1. 9. Sec. 4.

M M

naturæ neceffitas non finat; for it is not praiseworthy to be as the

Clemensity of nature forceth thee to be. So Pfeudo

કરે

2dly. That a neceffity of finning would free men from all fault, as doing nothing of their own accord, nor being fo much the cause of their actions, as he who laid this neceffity upon them. Thus (a) Justin Martyr argues, if all things flow from fate, Te to tonu si dhws, and we have no freedom of will, ἔθ ̓ ἔτος ἀποδεκτός, ἐδὲ ἐκεῖνος μεμπτέος, neither is one to be ap. proved, nor another blamed Again, if mankind hath not powser by his free choice to avoid evil, and to choose the good avaiτίον ἐει τῶν ὅπως δήποτε πραττόμενων; he is unblameable what oever he doth. (b) Origen, in his differtation again ft fate, declares that the affertors of it do, aπoλúaιv πávтos šynaŃμZTOS, (C) free men for all fault, and caft the blame of all the evil that is done upon God; and that this is a doctrine, avaipov rò ÈQ' ñuïv, which fubverts our liberty, nai dia teto, and by that all vice and virtue, all praife and difpraife. (d) Eufebius declares that this opinion, τες μέν πλημμελλοντας ἀπολύει, ὡς μηδὲν τῶν ατόπων ἐξ οἰκείας γνώμης διαπεπραγμένης, abfolves finners, as doang nothing on their own accords which was evil, and would caft all the blame of all the wickedness committed in the world upon God, and upon his providence; if that were admitted by the affertors of this fate, whether he himself did neceffitate them to do these things, or ordered matters fo that they should be conArained to do it by fome other caufe. See the like arguments in Epiphanius's Har. 16. p. 35.

3dly. They add, that this opinion renders all commands, admonitions and exhortations not to do evil, or to do good, ufelefs; he who is thus admonished, being inftructed by it, to reply after this manner, (ε) τὶ μὲ ὦ ἄνθρωπε να ελεῖς, to what end dost thou admonish me, O man, when fate hath foreftalled me, and not left it in my power to change my mind? Ti v deï · συντάττεσθαι πρὸς ἃ ἐδὲ προθυμνεῖσθαι δυνήσομαι ; Το what purpofe therefore is it to frive after that which I have not the power to defire or will, unless alfo it be my fate thus to will? That men lie under no neceffity from God's foreknowledge, [which was of old the chief argument of the fatalifts, efpoufed of late by Mr. Hobbs, and is ftill made the refuge of the predeftinarians] may be thus proved, faith (f) Origen, becaufe the prophets are exhorted in the holy feriptures to call men to repentance, and to do this in fuch words, as if it were unknown whether they would turn to God, or would continue in their fins; as in those words

(a) Apol. 2 p. 80(b) Apud Eufeb. Præp. Ev. 1. 6. c. 11. p. 282. B. (c) P. 287. A. ——— (d) Præp. Ev... 6. c. 6. p. 251. per Tot. and p. 252. — (e) Eufeb. Ibid. p. 243. -(ƒ) Apud Eufeb. ibid. c. 11. p. 289 B. C.