it ought to resist; that its native mildness will be a snare; that it will be decided only, while all things are smooth around it; and that it will yield before the rude blast of opposition, the sigh of the wintry storm of adversity, the turbulence of conflicting passion, or worse than all, the sunshine of this world's approbation. The indication here is obvious, viz. to enforce the entire dependence of action upon principle, of principle upon the word of God; and the absolute necessity of a constant reference to both, in order to render conduct either free from danger, or from imperfection. A moment's reflection must convince, how difficult it is, to make the mild and open, ingenuous character, really conscious that others will be actuated by designing errors, or evil in any of its hydra forms: nature has formed it unsuspecting, and it is easily betrayed. The parent will often find a secure (though an indirect) remedy in intellectual, rather than in moral instruction for if the tone of the mind can be raised in this way to a certain extent, and attention can be fixed; if it can be taught to deduce effects from their causes; if it can be induced to reason out consequences from the collection and mutual relation of a certain number of acknowledged principles, and to receive that only as established which it is capable of appreciating, though it cannot demonstrate, it will assume the mould of reason, and will carry its impression into active life, an impression which will prove a most important

defence, and which will induce the individual to ask, before he acts, before even he admits of the validity of a conclusion, is it consistent with reason? Conviction arising out of deliberate judgment is the object sought after; and in morals is analogous, and of equal force with the demonstrations of mathematicians.

This observation perhaps requires some further explanation; or it may be thought that too great power has been allowed to reason, too little to the moral tact of conscience. But let it be remembered, that by the proposition, it is supposed that reason is exerted upon the dictates of revelation; and that conscience results from an interior judgment formed upon the same basis. No fears need be entertained from teaching a child to reason, where this is subordinated to revelation, and where the difference is rightly understood, between those things which are beyond reason, and those which are opposed to it. Of the former class, there are many facts, and maxims, and opinions which are adopted without hesitation, because they are recorded by the pen of inspiration, which as infinitely superior to reason, are not fit subjects for the exercise of this principle, and which then stand in the place of reason, only with the additional authority of conscience, and the weight of omniscience: but of the latter, or those which are contrary to reason, man does not adopt them, or bow to their influence, because they are opposed to his own judgment and con

viction, to the voice of conscience, and to the authority of revelation. The fear then of placing reason in the room of obedience to the will of God is quite chimerical; since it is a talent, which if duly exercised can only add to the glory of God, and secure the performance of what he enjoins. Here it is therefore, that the study of Euclid will be eminently beneficial; attention to his demonstrations will not render the mind less impressible by truth, but will preserve it from yielding to the impulse of error, will enable it to detect inconsequential reasoning, and will fortify it against the dogmas of designing profligacy. This study will however, only form one great feature of a system which will be pursued from the earliest indication of mental power, and which by accustoming the mind to reason, will diminish its tendency to be acted upon by feeling. In the completion of this system, the demonstration of fixed science must not be very early resorted to; for it may then be capable of impairing the mental vigour, by creating too large a demand upon its exertions, and thereby depressing and enfeebling the power which is necessary to sustain them. The criterion for the utility of this study, is not to employ it as a remedy, until the demonstrations of reason can be relished.

The hand of the instructress, may in like manner counteract, or encourage any other form of natural disposition, by some of the means which nature and art, reason and religion, science and

revelation, have placed within her power, but which we cannot now particularize; the above is merely the exemplification of a principle, which must be left for its application to the immediate judgment of the parent. We shall, therefore, now proceed to notice some of the more frequent characteristics of childhood, as pride and selfconceit-disobedience to parents-the love of pleasure, and carelessness of religion.

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CHAP. X.

THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED-ON PRIDE AND SELFCONCEIT.

THESE principles are thrown together for united consideration, because of their mutual affinity, and from their interchange of motive: since the former commonly arises from the opinion we may have formed of the great and good qualities we possess, or think we possess; since it enlarges the diameter of our self-importance; since it borrows not support from the opinion of others; and since it places the circle of individual enjoyment in self alone! Hence the common observation, that such an one is "bloated out with pride;" the views of his own estimation are extended beyond their just measure; and although when amalgamated with the complex character of man, it may not be always easy to unravel the perplexities and interlacings of thought and action, yet it may not perhaps be unfair to state, the gradations of this principle, as consisting in ignorance, leading to an erroneous judgment of self, a conceited view of our own good qualities, and the fully formed state of the mind, which we denominate pride.

Thus originating in evil, much good cannot be