nees. Where he expressly says, "That man since the fall, is ignorant of divine truth, and full of prejudices against it; has a view of the truth contained in the Bible, as a doubtful, uncertain thing; receives it as what is probably true; sees it as a probable scheme, and something likely to answer the end proposed: But that after conversion it appears divinely true and real. See p. 114, 115 and 144. Then unconverted men only looked on the truth of the word of God, as probable, something likely, yet as a doubtful, uncertain thing; but now they not only think, but know it to be true.

No distinction about the different kinds of knowledge, or the various ways of knowing, will ever help these absurdities, or reconcile such inconsistencies. If there be any such sort of knowing, as is contradistinguished to probable thinking, and to such opinion as is built on a thousand probabilities, which is yet consistent with being ignorant, not believing, being uncertain, not assured, not convinced, only looking on a thing probable, looking on it doubtful and uncertain, it must certainly be a new and very strange sort of knowledge.

But this argument, that is so clear and invincible, must have such supports as these, or must quite sink to the earth. It is indeed a remarkable kind of argument. It is not only as much against the scheme it is brought to support, as against that which it would confute; but abundantly more so. For if it were the case in truth, that none might come to the Lord's supper, but they that know they have a right, yet it would be no direct and proper proof, that unconverted men might come. It would indeed prove, that many godly men might not come: Which, it is true, would bring some difficulty on the scheme opposed; yet it would be no proof against it. But it is direct and perfect demonstration against the scheme it would support: It demonstrates according to the scripture, and according to the doctrine of those that urge the argument, that not one unconverted man in the world may lawfully come to the Lord's supper; as no one of them certainly knows the gospel to be divine, and so no one knows the charter to be authentic, in which alone the right of any to Christian privileges is conveyed; hence no one unsanctified VOL. I. 3 Q

man is sure of his right; and therefore (as they draw the consequence, no one unsanctified man may come to the Lord's supper. And so it follows, that the more strongly Mr. Wil liams stands to this argument, the more peremptory and confident his expressions are concerning it, the more violently and effectually does he supplant himself.

And this position, that a man must not take any privilege, till he not only thinks, but knows he has a right, is not only unreasonable, as used by Mr. Williams against me, when indeed it is ten times as much against himself; but it is unreasonable in itself, as it is an argument, which if allowed and pursued, will prove that a man may do nothing at all, never move hand or foot, for his own advantage, unless he first, not only thinks, but knows, it is his duty. Mr. Williams himself owns, p. 116, that all the duties, which God requires of us in his instituted worship, are privileges, as well as the Lord's supper: And so is every other duty, which we are to do for our own benefit. But all human actions are, upon the whole, either good or evil: Every thing that we do as rational creatures, is either a duty, or a sin; and the neglect of every thing that is our duty, is forbidden. So that we must never so much as take a step, or move a finger, upon only a probable judgment and hope; but must first know it to be our duty, before we do it: Nay, we must neither move, nor voluntarily forbear to move, without a certainty of our duty in the case, one way or other!

As to its being alike difficult for men to know or be assured of their moral sincerity, as of their real sanctification, I shall speak to that under the next head; whereby it will appear again, another way, that this argument is vastly more against Mr. Williams's scheme, than mine.

SECTION XVI.

A Consideration of Mr. Williams's Defence of the Tenth Objection, against the Doctrine of the unlawfulness of unsanctified Men's coming to the Lord's Supper, that it tends to the great Perplexity and Torment of many godly Men in their Attendance on this Ordinance.

MY first reply to this objection was, that it is for want of like tenderness of conscience, that the other doctrine which insists on moral sincerity, does not naturally bring such as are received on those principles, into as great perplexities.......Mr. Williams in his animadversion upon it says, "This is an assertion which I take to be contrary to common sense, and the experience of mankind; and the allowing of it to be true, must overthrow the law of nature, and cast infinite reproach upon the Author of it."

These are strong expressions; but let us bring the matter to the test of reason. The necessary qualification, on Mr. Williams's principles, is moral sincerity, and a certain degree of moral sincerity. For there is scarcely any man, that lives under the light of the gospel, and is not an atheist or deist, but what has some degree of moral sincerity, in some things pertaining to Christianity and his duty; some degree of common faith, some degree of conviction of the need of Christ, some desire of him, and moral willingness, though from selfish considerations, to be good; and some purpose to endeavor a conformity to the covenant of Grace, and to seek salvation on the terms of it. But how shall a man know what is a sufficient degree of these things? Mr. Williams has determined the matter thus: That his belief of the doctrine of the gospel, and moral willingness to be conformed to the covenant of grace, must be with his WHOLE heart, p. 49, 5, 36. And that his conviction of his undone state without Christ

must be deep; and his desire of Christ and his benefits fervent, and his purpose earnest, p. 75, 11, so as to induce him to enter into covenant with ALL the earnestness he can, and engage him to use endeavors with ALL the strength and power that he has, p. 83, 32, 36.

Now how exceedingly difficult must it be for unsanctified men to determine, with any assurance, whether they have moral sincerity to such a degree? How difficult for them to know, whether their convictions are thus deep? Every one that is used to deal with souls under conviction, knows, that when they are indeed under deep convictions, they are especially apt to complain of the hardness of their hearts, and to think their convictions are not deep. How difficult to determine, with any assurance, whether their assent rises so high, that they can truly be said to believe with all their hearts ? Whether their moral willingness to be conformed to the covenant of grace, be with their whole heart? And whether they are really engaged with all the solicitude they can, and are willing to do all that they can? These things, I am pretty sure, are of vastly more difficult determination, than whether a man has any true holiness, or not. For in the former case, the determination is concerning the degree of things, that are capable of an infinite variety of degrees; some of which are nearer to, and others are farther from, the lowest sufficient degree And consequently some of the degrees that are not sufficient, may yet be very near; which renders the matter of very difficult determination; unspeakably more so, than when what is to be distinguished, is the nature of things, which in all degrees is widely diverse, and even contrary to that which it is to be distinguished from: As is the case between saving and common grace; which Mr. Williams himself acknowledges. It is more easy to distinguish light from darkness, though there may be innumerable degrees of light, than to determine the precise degree of light: And so it is more

* See his sermon on Christ a King and Witness, p. 84, where he says, "Notwithstanding the visible likeness of nominal and real Christians, there is a wide difference, as there is between the subjects of Christ, and the slaves of the devil."

easy to determine, whether a man be alive, or dead, than whether there be exactly such a certain degree of vigor and liveliness.

This moral sincerity which Mr. Williams insists on, is a most indeterminate, uncertain thing; a phrase without any certain, precise meaning; and must forever remain so. It being not determined how much men must be morally sin cere; how much they must believe with a moral sincerity; whether the deeply awakened and convinced sinner must believe, that God is absolutely sovereign with respect to his salvation, and that Christ is perfectly sufficient to save him in particular; and to what degree of moral assent and consent, he must believe and embrace these things, and comply with the terms of the covenant of grace; whether he must be willing to obey all God's commands, the most difficult, as well as the most easy, and this in all circumstances, even the most difficult that can arise in providence; or whether only in some circumstances; and what, and how many. The scripture

gives us many infallible rules, by which to distinguish saving grace, and common: But I know of no rules given in the Bible, by which men may certainly determine this precise degree of moral sincerity. So that if grace is not the thing which gives a right to sacraments in the sight of God, we have no certain rule in the Bible, commensurate to the understanding of mankind, by which to determine when we have a right, and when not. Now let the impartial reader judge, which scheme lays the greatest foundation for perplexity to communicants, of tender consciences, concerning their qualifications for the Lord's supper; and whether this argument drawn from such a supposed tendency to such perplexity (if there be any force in it) is not vastly more against Mr. Williams's scheme, than mine..

And, here by the way, let it be noted, that by these things it is again demonstrated, that the ninth objection, the great argument considered in the preceding section, concerning the necessity of a known right, in order to a lawful partaking, is exceedingly more against Mr. Williams's principles, than mine; inasmuch as, on his principles, it is so much more