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man is a subject of Christ, who does not make the laws and will of Christ his choice, and desire to be governed by him, and to live in subjection to the will of Christ, as good, and fit, and best to be the rule of his living, and way to his happiness. A forced obedience to Christ is no obedience. It is in terms a contradiction. Christ draws men with the cords of love, and the bands of a man. Our Lord has himself expressly determined this point." There are other passages in the same book, to the same purpose. So that I had no need to beg this point of Mr. Williams, since he had given it largely, and that in full measure, and over and over again, without begging.

In p. 120, he observes, "That to say such a profession of internal, invisible things is the rule to direct the church in admission....is to hide the parallel, and beg the question. For the question here is about the person's right to come, and not about the church's admitting them." Here Mr. Williams would make us believe that he does not know what begging the question is: For it is evident his meaning is, that my saying so is beside the question. But to say something beside the question is a different thing from begging the question, as has been observed. My saying that a profession of invisible things is the church's rule in admission, is not begging the question; because it is not, nor ever was any thing in question. For Mr. Stoddard and Mr. Williams himself are full in it, that a profession of invisible things, such as a believing that Christ is the Son of God, &c. is the church's rule. Yea, Mr. Williams is express in it, that a credible profession and visibility of gospel holiness is the church's rule, p. 139. Nor is my saying as above, beside the question then in hand, relating to the church of Israel's admitting to the priesthood, those that could not find their register. For that wholly relates to the rule of admission to the priesthood, and not to the priests' assurance of their own right. For, as I observed, if the priests had been never so fully assured of their pedigree, yet if they could not demonstrate it to others, by a public register, it would not have availed for their admission.

Again in p. 124, Mr. Williams charges me with begging the question, in supposing that sacraments are duties of worVOL. I.

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ship, whose very nature and design is an exhibition of those vital and active principles and inward exercises, wherein consists the condition of the covenant of grace. He charges the same thing as a begging the question, p. 131. But this is no begging the question, for two reasons; (1.) Because I had before proved this point, by proofs which Mr. Williams has not seen cause to attempt to answer, as has been just now observed, in the last section. (2.) This, when I wrote was no point in question, wherein Mr. Williams and I differed; but wherein we were agreed, and in which he had declared himself as fully as I, in his sermons on Christ a King and Witness, p. 76. "When we attend sacraments (says he) we are therein visibly to profess our receiving Christ, and the graces of his Spirit, and the benefits of his redemption, on his own terms and offer, and giving up the all of our souls to him, on his call, covenant and engagement." And in the next preceding page but one, in a place forecited, he speaks of these acts "as mockery, hypocrisy, falsehood and lies, if they are not the expressions of faith and hope, and spiritual acts of obedience." So that I had no manner of need to come to Mr. Williams as a beggar for these things, which he had so plentifully given me, and all the world that would accept them, years before.

SECTION VIII.

Shewing how Mr. Williams often begs the Question himself.

THE question is certainly begged in that argument, which Mr. Williams espouses and defends, viz. "That the Lord's supper has a proper tendency to promote men's conversion." In the prosecution of the argument Mr. Williams implicitly yields, that it is not the apparent natural tendency alone, that is of any force to prove the point; but the apparent tendency

under this circumstance, that There is no express prohibition. And thus it is allowed, that in the case of express prohibition with respect to the scandalous and morally insincere, no seeming tendency in the nature of the thing proves the ordinance to be intended for the conviction and conversion of such. So that it is a thing supposed in this argument, that all morally insincere persons are expressly forbidden, but unsanctified persons not so. Now when it is supposed, that morally insincere persons are expressly forbidden, the thing meant cannot be, that they are forbidden in those very words; for no such prohibition is to be found; nor are men that live in sodomy, bestiality and witchcraft, any where expressly forbidden in this sense. But the thing intended must be, that they are very evidently forbidden, by plain implication or consequence. But then the whole weight of the argument lies in this supposition, that unsanctified persons are not also plainly and evidently forbidden; which is the very point in question. And therefore, to make this the ground of an argument to prove this point, is a manifest begging the question. And what Mr. Williams says to the contrary, p. 127, that Mr. Stoddard had proved this point before, avails nothing: For let it be never so much proved before, yet after all, to take this very point and make use of it as a further argument to prove itself, is certainly begging the question. The notion of bringing a new argument is bringing additional proof: But to take a certain point, supposed to be already proved, to prove itself with over again, certainly does not add any thing to the evidence.

Mr. Williams says my supposing unconverted persons, as such, to be as evidently forbidden, as scandalous persons, is as much begging the question. I answer, so it would be, if I made that point an argument to prove itself with, after Mr. Williams's manner. But this is far from being the case in fact.

And the question is again most certainly begged, in that other thing said to support this argument, viz. " That though the Lord's supper may seem to have a tendency to convert scandalous sinners, yet there is another ordinance appointed for that. Here the meaning must be, that there is another

ordinance exclusive of the Lord's supper; otherwise it is nothing to the purpose. For they do not deny but that there are other ordinances for the conversion of sinners, who are morally sincere, as well as of those who are scandalous. But the question is, Whether other ordinances are appointed for their conversion exclusive of the Lord's supper; or, Whether the Lord's supper be one ordinance appointed for their conversion? This is the grand point in question. And to take this point as the foundation of an argument, to prove this same point, is plainly begging the question. And it is also giving up the argument from the tendency, and resting the whole argument on another thing.

Mr. Williams again plainly begs the question in his Reply, p. 127, that God's prohibition is an argument, that God saw there was no such tendency for their conversion. His so saying supposes again, that there is no evident prohibition of unsanctified persons. In which he again flies to the very point in question, and rests the weight of his reasoning upon it.

Just in the same manner Mr. Williams begs the question in espousing and making use of that argument, « That all in external covenant, and neither ignorant nor scandalous, are commanded to perform all external covenant duties." Here it is supposed, that scandalous persons (which, according to Mr. Williams's scheme, must include all that have not moral sincerity) though in the external covenant, are expressly, that is, evidently excepted and forbidden: And that unsanctifi ed men are not also evidently forbidden ; which is the point in question. For if unsanctified men, though in external covenant, are as evidently forbidden and excepted, as scandalous men that are in cxternal covenant, then the argument touches not one any more than the other. So that the argument is entirely a castle in the air, resting on nothing. The grand thing to be proved, first taken for granted, and then made an argument to prove itself.

In explaining the nature of begging the question, I observed, that it is begging the question, or equivalent to it, whether the point that is taken for granted, and made an argument of,

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be the main point in controversy, or some particular, known disputed point between the controverting parties. I will now illustrate this by an example. It is a known disputed point in this controversy, whether in the parable concerning the man without the wedding garment, the king condemned the man for coming into the church without grace. Now supposing that I, because I look on the matter very clear, should, besides using it as one distinct argument, also make it the basis of other arguments; and should use it in opposition to the strongest arguments of my opposers, as if it were sufficient to stop their mouths, without offering any proper solution of those arguments: As, in case I were pressed with the argument from the passover, if I should fly to the man without the wedding garment; and should say, it is certain, this argument from the passover can be of no force against the express word of God in the 22d of Matth. For there it is plain as any fact that ever the sun shone upon, that the king condemns the man for coming into the church without a wedding garment ; and it is plain as the sun at noon day, that the wedding garment is grace. And if when the argument from Judas's partaking of the Lord's supper is alleged, I should again fly to the man without a wedding garment, and say, whatever reasons Christ might have for admitting Judas, yet it is plainly revealed in Matth. xxii. 12, that God does not approve of men's coming into the church without a wedding garment. would be an impertinent way of disputing, thus to answer one argument by throwing another in the way, which is contested, and the validity of which is denied. It is fair that I should have liberty to use the argument concerning the wedding garment, in its place, and make the most of it; but to use it as the support of other arguments, is to produce no additional proof. And thus from time to time, to produce the disputed hypothesis of one argument, for answer to the arguments of my antagonist, instead of solving those arguments, is flying and hiding from arguments, instead of answering them: Instead of defending the fortress which is attacked, it is dodging and flying from one refuge to another.

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