many times larger than the moon; the moon is opake and visible only by means of light coming from the Sun,'-I speak falsehood.-Cyphers might thus be made, so that known words should be used in interchanged senses; or that negative expressions should be understood affirmatively:-and these might happen to deceive those who accidentally saw them, but if the agreement made was observed, they would contain no falsehood, on that account.

Hence we may see, how some propositions may be true, which according to the Letter are false. In this case, customary words are used, but not in their first customary sense; they have acquired a new sense by some agreement, (probably of the tacit sort,) and yet they have not quite lost their old one: an habitual feeling remains, by which the old one is deemed the right one. My Master is not at home,' says a Servant, when his master is really within; this proposition is false according to the Letter, that is, according to the old customary signification; but it is true according to the new meaning, which fear of offending has forced upon the words; this new meaning is, my master cannot receive you at this time;'-in which a doubt is left, whether real absence, or business, &c. is the cause of the refusal. I have been told that Archbishop Secker, being asked about this matter, answered, The first man that used this excuse when he was really at home, told a Lie.' Ironical expressions may be ranked under this head, and such writings as Gulliver's Travels.

5. If any one imagines that I lightly esteem the duty of veracity, or that I look upon it as any mark of an improved mind to be careless about it, he mistakes me exceedingly. Nothing is farther from my wishes, than to lay any foundation for subterfuge

subterfuge or evasive pretences: I should be sorry to have any man in the world thought a warmer friend to sincerity and simplicity, than myself. I honour and adore them; I abhor deceit; I never deceive any one; at least it is my study to avoid deceiving; I would not deceive a child, nor, when many other men would, a sick person. When I think of the evils which mankind bring on themselves by duplicity and artifice, by simulation and dissimulation, I feel greatly dejected; when I think of the happiness which they might procure by an universal sincerity, nay, which they might immediately enjoy, by a general openness, frankness, and a genuine effusion of their hearts and minds, I feel myself filled and elated with pleasure.-Let no one think so ill of me as to conceive me saying this through ostentation; it is a necessary declaration; made necessary first by the likelihood that the scope of my reasoning may be misapprehended; and next by the alarm which this third book has actually given to some persons of great learning and eminence; who judged of it from the printed Heads of Lectures. 6. This

Bishop Law talks of leading the members of the Church "into all the labyrinths of a loose and a perfidious casuistry." On Subscription, p. 22.

b When published in 1783;-Bishop Porteus and Bishop Hallifax in particular expressed themselves, in Letters to me, as entertaining apprehensions concerning some parts of the Heads relating to Veracity. And I have been lately advised to omit some things, which had been reported from the Lectures: no one can be more willing to retract any mistaken position than I am; I claimed the liberty of retracting at the opening of the Lectures; (see Book I. Chap. 1. Sect. 6.): but, if I have publicly delivered any thing, it seems best either to retract or publish it. All I say in this Book about Veracity, seems to me quite a plain series of arguments or observations: not being able to retract what I deem to be such, I think it best to submit them to the judgment of others.-I once had a glimpse (in a Review, I believe,) of something said by Mr. Dyer against this book; and I had intended to examine it; but, in country retirement, I have not opportunity; and, as I remember, the expressions were chiefly declamatory.

6. This Apology will receive great help from considering, in the last place, the consequences of not seeing clearly the distinction between real and apparent falsehood. They seem to be these; that those who are not scrupulous, run the more easily into real falsehood; and that those who are scrupulous, suffer poignant unhappiness because they have been almost unavoidably drawn into that which is only apparent. First, when men find that they are in some sense violating the obligations of veracity, and yet that they did not mean to do wrong, and are not blamed, if they have not an idea of the boundaries between real and apparent falsehood, they pass imperceptibly from apparent to real, and then think they are as little wrong, and will be as little blamed, as before: and so they get confirmed in habits of real falsehood. It is the same thing in Justice, or Honesty; injustice may be, and is often, apparent when it is not real; and seeming injustice gets excused, till men who have not studied the difference, come to allow themselves in that which is real. Nothing could better serve the cause of Justice than to mark out the distinction between real and apparent so plainly, that no one could avoid seeing it for real injustice would not then be tolerated. In like manner nothing can be of greater service to Truth than to shew plainly the nature of apparent falsehood: for when that is clear, real falsehood has no excuse.

Those, who are very desirous of doing their duty in all things, and are scrupulously anxious about every seeming transgression, suffer as great unhappiness about any apparent falsehood, which they may have run into, as if it were real;-if they are not duly aware of the distinction. The case of a person in this situation is truly worthy of compassion, whether he forgoes advantages which he might lawfully enjoy, or possesses them with secret misgivings,

misgivings, or under compunction and self-condemnation. And that man who should neglect to comfort the feeble-minded", and support the weak, when so worthy of relief; or who should avoid describing apparent falsehood lest he himself should be suspected of insincerity, would deserve a greater torment, if greater there can be, than that of a mind disquieted by unsettled scruples, and fluctuating remorse.

a 1 Thess. v. 14.

СНАР.

СНАР. III.

OF RELIGIOUS SENTIMENTS.

1. In the first place we may take notice of the effects of sentiments in general.-If we speak of mankind from a general view of them, and found our observations upon experience, we may say, that they act from their habitual sentiments. Their vices arise from vicious sentiments, indulged so as to be unduly prevalent: their virtues arise from good sentiments, to which habit has given power and authority.-Religious sentiments, of various sorts, have been found by experience uncommonly forcible.

This is so clearly seen, that corrupting a man's sentiments, is regarded by Lawgivers as causing him to commit wickedness; and therefore punishments are decreed against the cause, as well as against the effect; and those are deemed offenders who seduce, bribe, suborn.

Not that there is an absolute necessity that a man to whom a bribe is offered should be dishonest, or wicked in any way;-when we look at the nature of things, and at actions, beforehand, we see a possibility that an impulse of passion or sentiment may be resisted and overcome: but when we look back upon facts, we naturally expect that which has happened, to happen again: and all provisions should be made on probable expectations: provisions, of public Laws, and private prudential maxims.

2. The sentiments which arise in the human mind are innumerable; and, we might say, of innumerable

a Mentioned B. ii. Chap. iv. Sect. 1.