fellow-men only by Time and Place; formed only to animal enjoyment; and destined to perish with his kindred brutes. By this scheme, all that is glorious, divine, and lovely, in that of the Christian, is annihilated; and all which, in the natural world, cannot be annihilated, and which possesses an inherent greatness and sublimity, is miserably contracted and degraded. Nothing is left to expand his views, refine his affections, or ennoble his conduct. Motives to virtue, dignity, and usefulness, he obliterates from the creation. In the future World, he finds no such motives; for to him the future world is nothing. His evil passions, in the mean time, (for such passions, whencesoever derived, he possesses) are let loose without restraint, to rage and riot without control. Of all motives to do evil, his scheme is prolific; of motives to do good, it is absolutely barren. At the same time, it is founded on mere hypothesis, sustained by no evidence, and believed, against demonstration and impossibility.

Thus it is, I think, unanswerably evident, that he, who hath said, There is no God, is a Fool; that his Atheism is a scheme, dictated only by an evil heart; that it corrupts, of course, the whole moral character; that it is productive of all abominable works; and that it completely precludes the performance of any thing that is good.

SERMON IV.

UNITY OF GOD.

I. CORINTHIANS, viii. 4.

There is none other God but one.

In the three preceding sermons, I have attempted to prove the Existence of God; to refute the Objections, and expose the systems, of Atheists; and by an examination of the necessary Influence of these systems on the intellect, heart, and life, compared with that of the Christian system, to show the malignant efficacy of the former, and the desirable consequences of the latter.

The text is a direct declaration of the Unity of God; the next subject of discourse in the order which I have proposed.

That there is but one God, is a doctrine acknowledged in this country by every man. No attempt, therefore, to prove the soundness of this doctrine by arguments, can be necessary, in order to produce conviction of its truth. My design, in choosing it for the subject of the present discourse, is, to exhibit the manner, in which we become possessed of it, and the evidence, with which it is attended. In pursuing this design, I shall inquire in the

I. Place, What arguments are presented to us by the works of Creation and Providence in support of this doctrine:

II. What views men have entertained concerning it, under the direction of Reason:

III. What has been the influence of Revelation on the reception and continuance of this doctrine.

I. I shall inquire, what arguments are presented to us, by the works of Creation and Providence, in support of this doctrine.

In answer to this inquiry, I observe, that the works of Creation and Providence furnish to Reason, unaided by Revelation, the following considerations.

1st. The human mind, whenever it has admitted the being of One infinite God, has plainly found a difficulty in admitting the existence of more.

This argument I have chosen to express in these general terms, because I am aware, that different men have thought differently concerning this subject. This, indeed, is not at all to be wondered at, when we remember the peculiarly abstruse nature of those doctrines, which respect Infinity. The only conception, which the human mind is capable of forming concerning infinity, is that it exists. This fact we distinctly understand; and from it we can argue with success; but the nature of the thing, which is infinite, or, in more proper language, the nature of infinity itself, we cannot understand, nor can we argue from it at all. As the idea cannot enter our minds; so it is plain, we can never compare it with any other idea; for it is self-evident, that an idea, which we have not, can never, by us, be compared with another idea. Of course, no proposition can be formed by us, in this case, and no argument founded, or conducted, with any knowledge, or evidence. In every such case, where men think that they conceive, argue, conclude, and demonstrate, they deceive themselves; and will, if they examine, find, that they have formed propositions without ideas, or mere collections of signs without any thing signified; so far at least as they are concerned.

Multitudes of mankind have considered it as obviously impossible, that two infinite beings should exist. As an infinite being and finite beings can, however, coexist in time and place, I see no decisive evidence, that two infinite beings cannot coexist. In truth, there is no perceptible difficulty, arising from the nature of the case, in supposing, that Spirits, or immaterial beings, can occupy the same place, at the same time. The contrary opinion seems, at least, to attribute to Spirits a property, or mode of being, substantially the same with what is called Solidity, or Impenetrability, in Matter.

Others, and, so far as I know, all, who have acknowledged one infinite God, have regarded the acknowledgement of more as an absurdity. In this sentiment have concurred the Patriarchs, Jews, Christians, Mohammedans, and all those modern Infidels, who have not denied the existence of such a God. These classes of men, have, with one voice, renounced the idea of more than one such God. Such a general accordance in men, differing in other respects so widely, clearly indicates, that the admission of one infinite God brings with it, to the human mind, serious difficulties against the admission of more; and plainly implies, that more cannot be admitted by the mind without violence done to the understanding.

Some degree of force is lent to this argument by Polytheism. Wherever more Gods than one have been acknowledged; it is remarkable, that none of them has been considered as Infinite.

The ideas of Polytheistical nations concerning their Gods have, I confess, been confused and contradictory. But it appears to me evident, that no such nation, and no individual holding a plurality of Gods, has ever introduced an infinitely perfect Being into a religious Creed. From this fact it would seem, that the idea of infinite Perfection was, in the view of the human Mind, incompatible with Polytheism.

Several ancient Nations, as well as Individuals, particularly the Persians, Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Greeks, according to Plutarch, agreed in the acknowledgement of two Gods. Plutarch himself also, and according to his testimony Plato, in his old age, together with the Pythagoreans, acknowledged two Gods; the one the author of Good, the other the author of Evil. From the account given of this subject, taken in all its parts, it would seem, however, that the evil God, or Angyos, was inferior to the Ayadagyos, or good God. Two equal original causes seem not to have been received into any scheme of Theology; much less two infinite original Causes. That such was generally the fact, if not universally, will, I presume, be acknowledged without a question.

From all these facts, taken together, it may, I think, be fairly concluded, that the sense of the human mind has every where been against the admission of more than one Infinite God.

2dly. Although the proofs of the existence of God are complete, yet there is no proof of the existence of more than one God.

The argument for the being of God, which I mentioned as exhibited in the happiest manner by Mr. Locke, proves unanswerably the being of one eternal, self-existent Cause, possessed of sufficient Intelligence to contrive, and sufficient Power to create, the Universe of worlds, and all which it contains. The existence of one such Cause completely removes from the mind every difficulty, and satisfactorily accounts for every thing. But this argument proves nothing concerning the existence of a second Cause; nor does it possess the smallest influence to persuade us that a second exists.

The argument, which I mentioned as managed with peculiar felicity by Bishop Berkeley, exhibits in a different manner, but with conclusive evidence, one universally present and universally acting Power; animating, directing, and controling all things: but it furnishes not a single trace of evidence, that there is a second.

From the existence of Evil, a considerable number of men have, I acknowledge, imagined, that there was reason to suppose the existence of a second Original Cause. They appear to have argued in this manner. "The good and perfect Cause cannot be the source of Evil. Particularly, he cannot, in any sense, be concerned, or connected, with the existence of Moral Evil. Such Evil, however, exists; and has, therefore, been produced. Of course, there must have been some other Cause, beside the good and perfect one."

This argument is specious, but plainly unsound. For, should it be admitted, as perhaps it safely may be, that Evil cannot proceed immediately from the perfect God; yet no argument can be alleged, to prove, that he cannot with entire propriety create such moral Beings, as, left to themselves, may yield to temptations, necessarily existing in the nature of things, and thus fall into Sin. In any supposable world, Pleasure may of course attend transgression; because Good may and must exist, (if Good exist at all) which cannot be lawfully enjoyed. The Good, which lawfully belongs only to others, may be seen, coveted, and seized; and thus for the time enjoyed. Finite Beings may, therefore,