the weakness and scantiness of our understandings; as we must in innumerable other cases, where apparent and undeniable fact, in God's works of creation and providence, is attended with events and circumstances, the manner and reason of which are difficult to our understandings. But to proceed,

II. We will consider the difficulties themselves, insisted on in the objections of our opposers. They may be reduced to these two: First, That such a constitution is injurious to Adam's posterity. Secondly, That it is altogether improper, as it implies falsehood, viewing and treating those as one, which indeed are not one, but entirely distinct.

FIRST DIFFICULTY, That the appointing Adam to stand, in this great affair, as the moral head of his posterity, and so treating them as one with him, as standing or falling with him, is injurious to them, and tends to their hurt. To which I answer, it is demonstrably otherwise; that such a constitution was so far from being injurious and hurtful to Adam's posterity, or tending to their calamity, any more than if every one had been appointed to stand for himself personally, that it was, in itself considered, very much of a contrary tendency, and was attended with a more eligible probability of a happy issue than the latter would have been: Andso is a constitution truly expressing the goodness of its author. For, here the following things are to be considered,

1. It is reasonable to suppose, that Adam was as likely, on account of his capacity and natural talents, to persevere in obedience, as his posterity (taking one with another) if they had all been put on the trial singly for themselves. And supposing that there was a constituted union or oneness of him and his posterity, and that he stood as a public person, or common head, all by this constitution would have been as sure to partake of the benefit of his obedience, as of the ill conse quence of his disobedience, in case of his fall.

2. There was a greater tendency to a happy issue, in such an appointment, than if every one had been appointed to standfor himself; especially on two accounts. (1.) That Adam had stronger motives to watchfulness than his posterity would have had; in that not only his own eternal welfare lay at

stake, but also that of all his posterity. (2.) Adam was in a state of complete manhood, when his trial began. It was a constitution very agreeable to the goodness of God, considering the state of mankind, which was to be propagated in the way of generation, that their first father should be appointed to stand for all. For by reason of the manner of their coming into existence in a state of infancy, and their coming so gradually to mature state, and so remaining for a great while in a state of childhood and comparative imperfection, after they were become moral agents, they would be less fit to stand for themselves, than their first father to stand for them.

If any man, not withstanding these things, shall say, that for his own part, if the affair had been proposed to him, he should have chosen to have had his eternal interest trusted in his own hands; it is sufficient to answer, that no man's vain opinion of himself, as more fit to be trusted than others, alters the true nature and tendency of things, as they demonstrably are in themselves. Nor is it a just objection, that this constitution has in event proved for the hurt of mankind. For it does not follow that no advantage was given for a happy event, in such an establishment, because it was not such as to make it utterly impossible there should be any other event.

3. The goodness of God in such a constitution with Adam appears in this: That if there had been no sovereign, gracious establishment at all, but God had proceeded only on the foot of mere justice, and had gone no further than this required, he might have demanded of Adam and all his posterity, that they should perform perfect, perpetual obedience, without ever failing in the least instance, on pain of eternal death, and might have made this demand without the promise of any positive reward for their obedience. For perfect obedience is a debt, that every one owes to his Creator, and therefore is what his Creator was not obliged to pay him for. None is obliged to pay his debtor, only for discharging his just debt. But such was evidently the constitution with Adam, that an eternal happy life was to be the consequence of his persevering fidelity, to all such as were included within that constitution (of which the tree of life was a sign) as

well as eternal death to be the consequence of his disobe dience.

I come now to consider the

SECOND DIFFICULTY. It being thus manifest that this constitution, by which Adam and his posterity are dealt with as one, is not unreasonable upon account of its being injurious and hurtful to the interest of mankind, the only thing remaining in the objection against such a constitution, is the impropriety of it, as implying falsehood, and contradiction to the true nature of things; as hereby they are viewed and treated as one, who are not one, but wholly distinct; and no arbitrary constitution can ever make that to be true, which in itself considered is not true.

This objection, however specious, is really founded on a false hypothesis, and wrong notion of what we call sameness or oneness, among created things; and the seeming force of the objection arises from ignorance or inconsideration of the degree, in which created identity or oneness with past existence, in general, depends on the sovereign constitution and law of the Supreme Author and Disposer of the Universe.

Some things, being most simply considered. are entirely distinct, and very diverse, which yet are so united by the established law of the Creator, in some respects, and with regard to some purposes and effects, that by virtue of that establishment it is with them as if they were one. Thus a tree, grown great, and an hundred years old, is one plant with the little sprout, that first came out of the ground, from whence it grew, and has been continued in constant succession, though it is now so exceeding diverse, many thousand times bigger, and of a very different form, and perhaps not one atom the very same; yet God, according to an established law of nature, has in a constant succession communicated to it many of the same qualities and most important properties, as if it were one. It has been his pleasure to constitute an union in these respects, and for these purposes, naturally leading us to look upon all as one. So the body of man at forty years of age, is one with the infant body which first came into the world, from whence it grew; though now constituted of dif

férent substance, and the greater part of the substance proba bly changed scores (if not hundreds) of times; and though it be now in so many respects exceeding diverse, yet God, according to the course of nature, which he has been pleased to establish, has caused that in a certain method it should communicate with that infantile body, in the same life, the same senses, the same features, and many of the same qualities, and in union with the same soul, and so, with regard to these purposes, it is dealt with by him as one body. Again, the body and soul of a man are one, in a very different manner, and for different purposes. Considered in themselves, they are exceeding different beings, of a nature as diverse as can be conceived; and yet, by a very peculiar divine constitution or law of nature, which God has been pleased to establish, they are strongly united, and become one, in most important respects; a wonderful mutual communication is established; so that both become different parts of the same man. But the union and, mutual communication they have, has existence, and is entirely regulated and limited, according to the sovereign pleasure of God, and the constitution he has been pleased to establish.

And if we come even to the personal identity of created intelligent beings, though this be not allowed to consist wholly in that which Mr. Locke places it in, i. e. same consciousness; yet I think it cannot be denied, that this is one thing essential to it. But it is evident that the communication or continuance of the same consciousness and memory to any subject, through successive parts of duration, depends wholly on a divine establishment. There would be no necessity that the remembrance and ideas of what is past should continue to exist, but by an arbitrary constitution of the Creator. If any should here insist that there is no need of having recourse to any such constitution, in order to account for the continuance of the same consciousness, and should say, that the very nature of the soul is such as will sufficiently account for it; and that the soul will retain the ideas and consciousness it once had, according to the course of nature; then let it be remembered, who it is gives the soul this nature; and let that

be remembered, which Dr. Taylor says of the course of ngture, before observed; denying, that "the course of nature is a proper active cause, which will work and go on by itself without God, if he lets and permits it;" saying that "the course of nature, separate from the agency of God, is no cause, or nothing;" and affirming that "it is absolutely impossible the course of nature should continue itself, or go on to operate by itself, any more than produce itself;"* and that "God, the Original of all Being, is the Only Cause of all natural effects." Here is worthy also to be observed, what Dr. Turnbull says of the laws of nature, in words which he cites from Sir Isaac Newton. It is the will of the mind that is the first cause, that gives subsistence and efficacy to all those laws, who is the efficient cause that produces the phenomena, which appear in analogy, harmony and agreement, according to these laws." And he says, "The same princi ples must take place in things pertaining to moral, as well as natural philosophy."

From these things it will clearly follow, that identity of consciousness depends wholly on a law of nature, and so, on the sovereign will and agency of God; and therefore, that personal identity, and so the derivation of the pollution and guilt of past sins in the same person, depends on an arbitrary divine constitution; and this, even though we should allow the same consciousness not to be he only thing which constitutes oneness of person, but should, besides that, sup pose sameness of substance requisite. For, if same consciousness be one thing necessary to personal identity, and this depends on God's sovereign constitution, it will still fol low that personal identity depends on God's sovereign constitution.

And with respect to the identity of created substance itself, in the different moments of its duration, I think, we shall greatly mistake, if we imagine it to be like that absolute, independent identity of the FIRST BEING, whereby he is the same, yesterday, today, and forever. Nay, on the contrary,

Page 134, S. + Page 140, S. ‡ Mor. Phil. p. 7. § Ibid, p. 9.