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to join Parma, and not to fight Drake unless attacked. He therefore now bore up, leaving this unbeaten enemy to follow and harass him. This sealed the fate of the expedition, for its only hope of success lay in first destroying the English fleet.

Howard and Drake followed, ready to pick up stragglers or fight if opportunity offered. On the 23rd there was an action off St Alban's Head, followed by another off Portland on the 24th, and a third off the Wight on the 25th, which last seems to have frustrated any intention they may have had of seizing an anchorage off that island. On the 27th the Armada anchored off Calais. The result of these actions had established the superiority of the English in fighting power. The Spaniards had lost three capital ships, including two flag-ships, and had been so harassed during their retreat that their morale must have been seriously impaired. Howard and Drake anchored to windward, and were joined by Seymour with his light division. Medina Sidonia had obeyed Philip's orders: he had joined Parma, and might have overpowered Seymour alone, but so long as Howard was present, and undefeated, Parma could not


On the night of the 28th eight improvised fire-ships were sent in and completed

Spanish demoralisation. Medina Sidonia signalled his fleet to cut their cables, which they did. In the morning they were off Gravelines,

closely followed by the English, who drove them with great loss into the North Sea, whence such as were not wrecked made their way northabout home to Spain. The Spanish losses were enormous : of the 130 ships which left Corunna 63 were reported as lost; the loss of life was in still greater proportion, and must be reckoned in thousands. The English losses were insignificant: their ships were uninjured, and the number of their killed and wounded amounted to only sixty in all. The disparity and the losses may be usefully compared with those at the recent battle of Tsushima.

The leading features of the war between England and Spain 1587-88 have been given in some detail, because the lessons which they teach have been confirmed and extended not only during the Nelsonian era, but by the experience of the steam-propelled navies of the present day. The attempted invasion of Great Britain by Napoleon in 1804-5 bore a striking resemblance to the "enterprise of England" arranged by Philip the Second. The whole resources of France, with assistance from Holland, Belgium, Italy, and Spain, were devoted to the undertaking during more than two years, and were directed by the greatest military genius of the age. The army of Napoleon, like that of Parma, was assembled on the shores of the Channel, at ports where the sea passage would be the shortest and the uncertainties of the

voyage the least. For Dun- to sea.
kirk and Nieuport were substi-
tuted Boulogne and other
adjacent harbours as ports of
embarkation. The transports
were again to be small oar-
propelled craft, but in much
greater numbers, as the invad-
ing army was to muster one
hundred and thirty thousand
men. Like the fleet of Medina
Sidonia, the capital ships to
cover the passage of the trans-
ports across the narrow seas
were to come from various
Mediterranean and Atlantic
ports, among which they were
necessarily distributed to ob-
tain facilities for shipbuilding
and repair.

To meet and defeat the plans of Napoleon the light squadron of Lord Henry Seymour in the narrow seas found its counterpart in the squadron under Lord Keith, with this important difference that as ships of the line were to be found in the Dutch ports, corresponding capital ships were placed under his orders. These covered his frigates and sloops, which might otherwise have been driven away by the ships of the line, thus leaving the passage free for the flotilla of transports.

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The result was a striking vindication of the great Elizabethan seaman. In 1587 he had counselled seizing a base and maintaining a squadron on the coast of Spain, with a view to a vigorous offensive. Instead of following his advice 8 defensive attitude was assumed, with the result that the Spanish navy was allowed to concentrate, and the Armada actually reached the narrow seas. 1805 his strategy was followed in every particular. Gibraltar was already a British possession, and was of great service as a base for the ships employed in the Mediterranean. The British fleets assumed the offensive, and defeated the enemy before they could concentrate and reach the Channel. In 1588 the British success was largely due to superior armaments and superior skill. In 1805 no such superiority in armaments

existed, as the

ships were practically equal. Success in this case seems to have been attributable to superior skill arising out of the strategy which, apart from preventing concentration, confined the enemy to his ports. The result was explained by Thucydides in Perikles' speech to the Athenians concerning the Peloponnesians :

"They will not easily acquire the art of seamanship; even you yourselves, who have been practising

ever since the Persian war, are not

yet perfect. How can they, who are not sailors, but tillers of the soil, do much? They will not even be permitted to practise, because a in wait for them. If they were large fleet will constantly be lying watched by a few ships only, they

might run the risk, trusting to their numbers and forgetting their inexperience; but if they are kept off the sea by our superior strength, their want of practice will make them unskilful, and their want of skill timid. Maritime skill is like skill of other kinds, not a thing to be cultivated by the way or at chance times it is jealous of any other pursuit which distracts the mind for an instant from itself."

The present Russo-Japanese war again confirms with added emphasis the lessons taught by the Armada campaign, and especially the necessity of being ready to assume the offensive by land as well as by sea without delay. In their maritime aspect these two wars bear a striking resemblance. In both cases the possibility of war had been foreseen for some years, and active preparations had been in progress for some months previous to the outbreak of hostilities. Russia underrated the power of Japan as did Spain that of England, and equally failed to make adequate preparations in time. On the other hand, Japan was better prepared than was England in 1588. Not only was her navy more ready, but her army was equally so, and added to her sea-power a strength which it is difficult to overestimate.

Japan broke off diplomatic relations on February 6, 1904. On the same day Togo put to sea from Sasebo with his whole force. About midnight on the 8-9th the Japanese destroyers attacked the Russian fleet lying outside Port Arthur, and seriously damaged two battleships and a cruiser. The attack was as disastrous to Russia,



and as unexpected and farreaching in its effect, as was Drake's attack on Cadiz. Togo had struck the first blow, and had put into the Mikado and "his people courage and boldness not to fear any invasion in his own country." But he intended to continue "to impeach the provisions" of Russia and to remain on the coast, as Drake recommended but was not allowed to do. To this end he established a base on the coast of Korea, and later nearer to Port Arthur at the Elliot Islands, whence he maintained a vigorous offensive against every ship which issued from Port Arthur. Using ships of all classes for the work to which each was suited, he gradually established such an ascendancy in those seas that Russian ships dare not leave the vicinity of the port. Both destroyers and torpedo - boats shared the fate of the battleships, and were eventually "bottled up." While Togo's crews became more skilful and his ships more efficient under the pressure of constant cruising, the Russian officers and men confined to port deteriorated, and probably lost what little skill and nerve they originally possessed. It was a striking example of the teaching of Drake and the practice of St Vincent, and proved that the change from sails to steam has not altered the fundamental principles of war.

On February 8, the same day on which the attack on the fleet off Port Arthur was delivered, the Japanese army


began to disembark at Chem- return to Plymouth directly ulpo. These troops were the the northerly wind failed him advanced-guard of the force during his dash for the coast which ultimately captured Port of Spain. The accounts of the Arthur and destroyed the Rus- battle are not yet sufficiently sian fleet. This could not have detailed to permit a final judgbeen done by the navy alone ment, but they indicate that without the help of the army. the Russian defeat was primThe destruction of the Russian arily due to the same causes fleet was a matter of vital im- as was the defeat of the Arportance, because so long as mada in 1588-superior gunthey were capable of fighting fire and superior skill. The Togo had to reckon with them, results confirm the lessons and this would have added taught by the action of greatly to the difficulty of deal- August 10 and by peace exing with the Baltic fleet. Port periments. The gun is the Arthur fell on January 2, and only weapon of the battleship. he was free to devote his whole No ship, however large and attention to Rojdestvensky. however thickly armoured, can stand up against the fire of a battleship's broadside properly served. The only efficient reply is a superior concentration of fire, which means as many effective guns as possible, coupled with superior tactics. To what extent the Whitehead torpedo and the asserted Japanese superiority of speed added to the result must remain an open question until the details of the battle are known and analysed. Hasty deductions are much to be deprecated. Unless care is taken, results may be ascribed to superior speed which should be assigned to lack of tactical skill on the opposite side. It is not to be forgotten that conclusions were drawn from the battle of Lissa in 1866 which misled naval opinion for a generation, and have since been proved to be entirely unsupported by fact.

Sufficient facts are not yet known to permit a full discussion of the Russian movements and of the battle of Tsushima on May 27; but the general similarity of the conditions to those of the Armada is striking. On putting to sea the Russians, like the Spaniards, were in difficulties, which showed that they were a mere mob of ships commanded and manned by men unaccustomed to the sea, and unskilled not only in working their guns but in managing their ships. They were equally encumbered by a number of store ships, colliers, and other nonfighting vessels. Whether Rojdestvensky was ordered to fight, or, like Medina Sidonia, was directed to try to reach Vladivostok without an engagement, is not known.

It was probably fear of missing him and doubts as to his own coal-supply which kept Togo at Tsushima. Analogous reasons for coal substitute provisions caused Howard to

This rapid sketch may perhaps suggest the thought that, while an altogether sudden and

unexpected attack need not be considered provided ordinary precautions are taken, a serious attempt to invade these islands is an eventuality which may be reasonably expected under certain circumstances. If the object-lesson given by Spain and France in the past, and by Japan in the present, be understood, the assailant will devote his whole resources to the undertaking and much time to preparation. Such an enterprise depends for its success on the conditions at the time, and largely on the preparations made to defeat it. Drake evidently thought the danger serious at the time of the Armada. In view of our

done in 1588 and 1805-a sufficient force in home waters, together with an army ready to provide and maintain a large expeditionary force.

The control of the water area over which the transports have to pass is the governing factor in any oversea expedition. Both in 1588 and 1805 the area which had to be thus closely watched was very limited, because with a large army it was important to cross the sea at the narrowest part. Sailing ships of war could control these limited waters without difficulty. The use of steam has increased this area, because transports with troops can now be moved with the same cergreat naval superiority in tainty from more widely separ1805, and the arrangements we ated ports. But it has equally had made, St Vincent was increased the facilities for clear that the French would watching the wider area. In not be able to the this case, cross as in others, the Channel at that time. The change from sail to steam has Japanese have shown the con- neither altered principles nor ditions under which an oversea affected unequally the two invasion is practicable even in opposing forces. Both steam the face of a nominally superior and wireless telegraphy have fleet; or, looked at from simply increased the effective another point of view, the best sphere of action of a fleet manner of preventing it. This or other naval force. The has been shown to lie in ade- attack and the defence have quate preparation both of gained equally from each. The means and plans before the wide gulf between the steam outbreak of war, and in a and sailing navies has no vigorous offensive by the navy existence in the mind of the supported by a landing force thoughtful seaman. Such difor army when the time for ferences as there may be will action arrives. Well-balanced be found on reflection to be in naval opinion will take the details rather than in prinview of St Vincent or Drake ciples. The uncertainties due according as the preparations to the wind were as nothing to defeat the enterprise are to the uncertainties of the complete or otherwise. Those human element, which in the preparations involve a navy past as in the present exercised large enough to act on the a predominant influence on the offensive while keeping-as was conduct of war.

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