CHAPTER X.

THE SAME SUBJECT PURSUED.

CONCLUSION.

Cum aperiret homini veritatem Deus, ea sola scire nos voluit, quæ interfuit hominem scire ad vitam consequendam: quæ vero ad curiosam et profanam cupiditatem pertinebant, reticuit, ut arcana essent. Quid ergo quæris, quæ nec potes scire, nec si scias, beatior fias? Lactantii Div. Inst. ii. 9.

WE might here terminate our reply to those, who allege the want of antiquity and universality in the Gospel as an objection to its truth. But this objection is sometimes placed in a point of view so specious and imposing, that it yields a source of triumph to the sceptic, and awakens an uneasy feeling in the mind of the believer. To counteract its pernicious tendency, being an object of unquestionable moment, may therefore justify the offering of a few additional remarks.

The difficulty we propose to consider may be stated as follows. The Gospel, as its professors contend, is the only religious system which lays open the way of eternal life. The same Gospel denounces eternal misery on all by whom it is not embraced. Yet it is certain, that the largest portion of mankind have in all ages been wholly unacquainted with it and at this day, the professors of Christianity are few in comparison with the bulk of mankind. Those, moreover, who are ignorant of its doctrines, are so through no fault of their own. Those doctrines have never been offered to their acceptance, and themselves have been placed beyond the reach

of revealed truth, by circumstances which were not subject to their control. What then is the future destiny of these subjects of involuntary ignorance and error? Are they to be consigned to hopeless and eternal misery?

With regard to the difficulty thus stated, it is to be premised, that there are two classes of persons by whom it is, or may be, advanced. These classes must be had in distinct and separate consideration in the reply which is framed to it.

The first class is that of the philosophizing unbeliever: who, taking the foregoing statement as his hypothesis, contends, that it exhibits either the power, the wisdom, or the goodness, of God, as circumscribed within a narrow boundary, and the Deity himself as actuated only by a partial regard for the welfare of his creatures; while he cannot admit any religious system to be worthy of the Divine nature, but that which ascribes to it unlimited perfection and universal benevolence.

The second class is that of the sincere professor of the Gospel: who, though well grounded in the faith, is sometimes subject to an uneasy feeling when this subject occurs to his mind. Such a disposition may sometimes be startled by the difficulty of reconciling this view of things with the sentiments which it cherishes respecting the Divine attributes. To suppose the occurrence of such feelings throws no imputation on the real piety of a Christian. On the contrary, to imagine that even the highest degree of religious conviction should be adequate to the exclusion of every painful and uneasy thought, seems to imply a supposition, that the struggles of

faith may be over, and its final triumph achieved, on this side of the grave; and thus to militate against the notion of a warfare, under which the Christian life is so frequently represented to us in scripture.

Let us then proceed to examine the proposed difficulty with a separate regard to the two descriptions of persons to whom we have adverted. And first with regard to the infidel objector.

You allege that, according to the doctrine of the Gospel, the sentence of eternal misery must necessarily pass on all to whom that doctrine has not been made known. We deny then, that you have the warrant of scripture for this assumption; which if you cannot maintain, whatever inferences you may draw from it to the prejudice of the Gospel, must necessarily fall to the ground.

It is to be observed however, that in order to the purpose of a satisfactory reply to this objection, it is wholly unnecessary to dogmatise on the contrary side to that which the objector has chosen. The advocate for Christianity is not called upon to maintain or avow the negative of the proposition. He is not required to state the true view of the case: it will suffice, if he can shew, that the assertion of his opponent is untenable, and that the ground which has been taken up cannot be maintained.

That the Gospel denounces condemnation on all by whom its offers are rejected, is an awful but undeniable truth. But whether this condemnation embraces also those to whom its overtures were never propounded, is by no means equally manifest. On this point, the obligation of proof rests with those who maintain that it does.

"Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel "to every creature. He that believeth and is bap"tized shall be saved; but he that believeth not "shall be damned s." Is it not justly questionable, whether in these latter words we are authorized to understand any thing further, than the sanction by which the preaching of the Gospel was enforced? To those who had the Gospel offered to them, it was indeed no matter of choice what course they should pursue. They must either embrace it or perish. But it is not clear, that any regard is had in this declaration, to such as might involuntarily continue strangers to it: on the contrary, there is reason to suppose that such persons were not in contemplation when the words were spoken. The former part of the citation delivers our Lord's injunction to preach the Gospel, with a description of the persons to whom it was to be preached: Go ye into all the world, and preach the Gospel to every creature. Is it not then natural to interpret the latter division of it, as properly applying to those only who were the subjects of the former, and to whom the Gospel would actually be preached? He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved; but he that believeth not shall be damned.

Let the following words of our Lord be duly considered. "God sent not his Son into the world to "condemn the world; but that the world through "him might be saved. He that believeth on him

is not condemned: but he that believeth not is "condemned already, because he hath not believed

8 Mark xvi. 15, 16.

"in the name of the only begotten Son of God. "And this is the condemnation, that light is come "into the world, and men loved darkness rather "than light, because their deeds were evil" It will not be denied, that the condemnation here spoken of is the same which is denounced in the text previously quoted. What then is the ground of condemnation here stated? Is it not, that men rejected the truth after it had been made known to them? Light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light. How then can the same condemnation apply to those to whom that truth has never been made known? If this view of the text be just, it yields a corroborative testimony to the exposition we proposed of the former citation from St. Mark.

...

"If I had not come and spoken unto them, they "had not had sin: but now have they no cloke for “their sin. . . . . If I had not done among them the "works which none other man did, they had not had "sin but now have they both seen and hated both "me and my Father." Is it not here distinctly stated, that the guilt of the Jews in rejecting the Messiah consisted in their disobedience to the word that was preached, and disregard to the evidence that was offered, to them? If our Lord had not spoken to them, if he had not offered to them the most decided attestation of his Divine authority; they had not had sin. It surely is not easy to reconcile these declarations with the language of those who maintain, that the severe judgment of everlast

h John iii. 17, 18, 19.

i John xv. 22, 24.