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those who have advised his Majesty to hire and
to send elsewhere those troops which should
have been employed for the Queen of Hungary's
assistance. It is not to be imagined, sir, that
his Majesty has more or less regard to justice
as King of Great Britain, than as Elector of
Hanover; or that he would not have sent his
proportion of troops to the Austrian army, had
not the temptation of greater profit been laid in-
dustriously before him. But this is not all that
may be urged against such conduct. For, can
we imagine that the power, that the designs of
France, are less formidable to Hanover than
Great Britain? Is it less necessary for the se
curity of Hanover than of ourselves, that the
house of Austria should be re-established it its
former splendor and influence, and enabled to
support the liberties of Europe against the enor-
mous attempts at universal monarchy by France ?
If, therefore, our assistance to the Queen of
Hungary be an act of honesty, and granted in
consequence of treaties, why may it not be
equally required of Hanover?
If it be an act
of generosity, why should this country alone be
obliged to sacrifice her interests for those of oth-

The advocates of the ministry have, on this occasion, affected to speak of the balance of power, the Pragmatic Sanction, and the preservation of the Queen of Hungary, not only as if they were to be the chief care of Great Britain, which (although easily controvertible) might, in compliance with long prejudices, be possibly admitted; but as if they were to be the care of Great Britain alone. These advocates, sir, have spoken as if the power of France were formidable to no other people than ourselves; as if no other part of the world would be injured by becoming a prey to a universal monarchy, and subject to the arbitrary government of a French deputy; by being drained of its inhabitants only to extend the conquests of its masters, and to make other nations equally wretched; and by being oppressed with exorbitant taxes, levied by military executions, and employed only in supporting the state of its oppressors. They dwell upon the importance of public faith and the necessity of an exact observation of treaties, as if the Pragmatic Sanction had been signed by no other potentate than the King of Great Britain; as if the public faith were to be obligatory upon ourselves alone. That we should inviolably observe our treat-ers? or why should the Elector of Hanover exert ies-observe them although every other nation should disregard them; that we should show an example of fidelity to mankind, and stand firm in the practice of virtue, though we should stand alone, I readily allow. I am, therefore, far from advising that we should recede from our stipulations, whatever we may suffer in their fulfillment; or that we should neglect the support of the Pragmatic Sanction, however we may be at present embarrassed, or however disadvantageous may be its assertion.

But surely, sir, for the same reason that we observe our stipulations, we ought to excite other powers also to observe their own; at the least, sir, we ought not to assist in preventing them from doing so. But how is our present conduct agreeable to these principles? The Pragmatic Sanction was guaranteed, not only by the King of Great Britain, but by the Elector of Hanover also, who (if treaties constitute obligation) is thereby equally obliged to defend the house of Austria against the attacks of any foreign power, and to send his proportion of troops for the Queen of Hungary's support.

Whether these troops have been sent, those whose province obliges them to possess some knowledge of foreign affairs, are better able to inform the House than myself. But, since we have not heard them mentioned in this debate, and since we know by experience that none of the merits of that Electorate are passed over in silence, it may, I think, be concluded that the distresses of the Queen of Hungary have yet received no alleviation from her alliance with Hanover; that her complaints have excited no compassion at that court, and that the justice of her cause has obtained no attention.

To what can be attributed this negligence of treaties, this disregard of justice, this defect of compassion, but to the pernicious counsels of

his liberality at the expense of Great Britain?

It is now too apparent, sir, that this great, this powerful, this mighty nation, is considered only as a province to a despicable Electorate; and that in consequence of a scheme formed long ago, and invariably pursued, these troops are hired only to drain this unhappy country of its money. That they have hitherto been of no use to Great Britain or to Austria, is evident beyond a doubt; and therefore it is plain that they are retained only for the purposes of Hano

ver.

How much reason the transactions of almost every year have given for suspecting this absurd, ungrateful, and perfidious partiality, it is not necessary to declare. I doubt not that most of those who sit in this House can recollect a great number of instances in point, from the purchase of part of the Swedish dominions, to the contract which we are now called upon to ratify. Few, I think, can have forgotten the memorable stipulation for the Hessian troops: for the forces of the Duke of Wolfenbuttle, which we were scarcely to march beyond the verge of their own country or the ever memorable treaty, the tendency of which is discovered in the name. A treaty by which we disunited ourselves from Austria; destroyed that building which we now endeavor, perhaps in vain, to raise again; and weakened the only power to which it was our interest to give strength.

To dwell on all the instances of partiality which have been shown, and the yearly visits which have been paid to that delightful country; to reckon up all the sums that have been spent to aggrandize and enrich it, would be an irksome and invidious task-invidious to those who are afraid to be told the truth, and irksome to those who are unwilling to hear of the dishonor and injuries of their country. I shall not dwell far

ther on this unpleasing subject than to express my hope, that we shall no longer suffer ourselves to be deceived and oppressed: that we shall at length perform our duty as representatives of the people and, by refusing to ratify this contract, show, that however the interests of Hanover have been preferred by the ministers, the

Parliament pays no regard but to the interests of Great Britain.

The motion was carried by a considerable majority; but Mr. Pitt's popularity was greatly increased throughout the country by his resistance of this obnoxious measure.

SPEECH

OF LORD CHATHAM ON A MOTION FOR AN ADDRESS OF THANKS AFTER THE BATTLE OF DETTINGEN, DELIVERED IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, DECEMBER 1, 1743.

INTRODUCTION.

THE battle of Dettingen was the last in which any English monarch has appeared personally in the field. It was fought near a village of this name in Germany, on the banks of the Mayn, between Mayence and Frankfort, on the 19th of June, 1743. The allied army, consisting of about thirty-seven thousand English and Hanoverian troops, was commanded, at the time of this engagement, by George II. Previous to his taking the command, it had been brought by mismanagement into a perilous condition, being hemmed in between the River Mayn on the one side and a range of precipitous hills on the other, and there reduced to great extremities for want of provisions. The French, who occupied the opposite side of the Mayn in superior force, seized the opportunity, and threw a force of twenty-three thousand men across the river to cut off the advance of the allies through the defile of Dettingen, and shortly after sent twelve thousand more into their rear, to preclude the possibility of retreat. The position of the French in front was impregnable, and, if they had only retained it, the capture of the entire allied army would have been inevitable. But the eagerness of Grammont, who commanded the French in that quarter, drew him off from his vantage ground, and induced him to give battle to the allies on more equal terms. When the engagement commenced, George II., dismounting from his horse, put himself at the head of his infantry, and led his troops on foot to the charge. The conduct of the King in this conflict," says Lord Mahon, "deserves the highest praise; and it was undoubtedly through him and through his son [the Duke of Cumberland], far more than through any of his generals, that the day was won." The British and Hanoverian infantry vied with each other under such guidance, and swept the French forces before them with an impetuosity which soon decided the battle, and produced a complete rout of the French army. The exhausted condition of the allies, however, and especially their want of provisions, rendered it impossible for them to pursue the French, who left the field with the loss of six thousand men.

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The King, on his return to England, opened the session of Parliament in person; and in reply to his speech, an Address of Thanks was moved, " acknowledging the goodness of Divine Providence to this nation in protecting your Majesty's sacred person amid imminent dangers, in defense of the common cause and liberties of Europe." In opposition to this address, Mr. Pitt made the following speech. In the former part of it, either from erroneous information or prejudice, he seems unwilling to do justice to the King's intrepidity on that occasion. But the main part of the speech is occupied with an examination,

1. Of Sir Robert Walpole's policy (which was that of the King) in respect to the Queen of Hungary and the balance of power.

II. Of the conduct of the existing ministry (that of Lord Carteret) in relation to these subjects.
III. Of the manner in which the war in Germany had been carried on; and,

IV. Of the consequences to be anticipated from the character and conduct of the ministry.

The speech will be interesting to those who have sufficient acquaintance with the history of the times to enter fully into the questions discussed. It is characterized by comprehensive views and profound reflection on the leading question of that day, the balance of power, and by a high sense of national honor. It has a continuous line of argument running throughout it; and shows the error of those who imagine that "Lord Chatham never reasoned.'

SPEECH, &c.

From the proposition before the House, sir, ister [Walpole] betrayed the interests of his we may perceive, that whatever alteration has country by his pusillanimity; our present minbeen, or may be produced with respect to for- ister [Carteret] would sacrifice them by his eign measures, by the late change in administra- Quixotism. Our former minister was for negotion, we can expect none with regard to our do- tiating with all the world; our present minister mestic affairs. In foreign measures, indeed, a is for fighting against all the world. Our formost extraordinary change has taken place. mer minister was for agreeing to every treaty, From one extreme, our administration have run though never so dishonorable; our present minto the very verge of another. Our former minister will give ear to none, though never so rea

sonable. Thus, while both appear to be extravagant, this difference results from their opposite conduct that the wild system of the one must subject the nation to a much heavier expenditure than was ever incurred by the pusillanimity of the other.

The honorable gentleman who spoke last [Mr. Yorke] was correct in saying, that in the beginning of the session we could know nothing, in a parliamentary way, of the measures that had been pursued. I believe, sir, we shall know as little, in that way, at the end of the session; for our new minister, in this, as in every other step of his domestic conduct, will follow the example of his predecessor, and put a negative upon every motion which may tend toward our acquiring any parliamentary knowledge of our late proceedings. But if we possess no knowledge of these proceedings, it is, surely, as strong an argument for our not approving, as it can be for our not condemning them. Sir, were nothing relating to our late measures proposed to be inserted in our address upon this occasion, those measures would not have been noticed by me. But when an approbation is proposed, I am compelled to employ the knowledge I possess, whether parliamentary or otherwise, in order that I may join or not in the vote of approbation. What though my knowledge of our late measures were derived from foreign and domestic newspapers alone, even of that knowledge I must avail myself, when obliged to express my opinion; and when from that knowledge I apprehend them to be wrong, it is my duty, surely, to withhold my approbation. I am bound to persist in thus withholding it, till the minister be pleased to furnish me with such parliamentary knowledge as may convince me that I have been misinformed. This would be my proper line of conduct when, from the knowledge I possess, instead of approving any late measures, I think it more reasonable to condemn them. But supposing, sir, from the knowledge within my reach, that I consider those measures to be sound, even then I ought not to approve, unless such knowledge can warrant approval. Now, as no sort of knowledge but a parliamentary knowledge can authorize a parliamentary approbation, for this reason alone I ought to refuse it. If, therefore, that which is now proposed contain any sort of approbation, my refusing to agree to it contains no censure, but is a simple declaration that we possess not such knowledge of past measures as affords sufficient grounds for a parliamentary approbation. A parliamentary approbation, sir, extends not only to all that our ministers have advised, but to the acknowledgment of the truth of several facts which inquiry may show to be false; of facts which, at least, have been asserted without authority and proof. Suppose, sir, it should appear that his Majesty was exposed to few or no dangers abroad, but those to which he is daily liable at home, such as the overturning of his coach, or the stumbling of his horse, would not the address proposed, instead of being a compliment, be an affront and

an insult to the sovereign? Suppose it should appear that our ministers have shown no regard to the advice of Parliament; that they have exerted their endeavors, not for the preservation of the house of Austria, but to involve that house in dangers which otherwise it might have avoided, and which it is scarcely possible for us now to avert. Suppose it should appear that a body of Dutch troops, although they marched to the Rhine, have never joined our army. Suppose it should appear that the treaty with Sardinia is not yet ratified by all the parties concerned, or that it is one with whose terms it is impossible they should comply. If these things should appear on inquiry, would not the address proposed be most ridiculously absurd? Now, what assurance have we that all these facts will not turn out as I have imagined?

I. Upon the death of the late Emperor of Germany, it was the interest of this nation, I Walpole's grant, that the Queen of Hungary should policy. be established in her father's dominions, and that her husband, the Duke of Lorraine, should be chosen Emperor. This was our interest, because it would have been the best security for the preservation of the balance of power; but we had no other interest, and it was one which we had in common with all the powers of Europe, excepting France. We were not, therefore, to take upon us the sole support of this interest. And, therefore, when the King of Prussia attacked Silesia-when the King of Spain, the King of Poland, and the Duke of Bavaria laid claim to the late Emperor's succession, we might have seen that the establishment of the Queen of Hungary in all her father's dominions was impracticable, especially as the Dutch refused to interfere, excepting by good offices. What, then, ought we to have done? Since we could not preserve the whole, is it not evident that, in order to bring over some of the claimants to our side, we ought to have advised her to yield up part? Upon this we ought to have insisted, and the claimant whom first we should have considered was the King of Prussia, both because he was one of the most neutral, and one of the most powerful allies with whom we could treat. For this reason it was certainly incumbent upon us to advise the Queen of Hungary to accept the terms offered by the King of Prussia when he first invaded Silesia. Nay, not only should we have advised, we should have insisted upon this as the condition upon which we would assist her against the claims of others. To this the court of Vienna must have assented; and, in this case, whatever protestations the other claimants might have made, I am persuaded that the Queen of Hungary would to this day have re

Walpole on the Queen of Hungary. He strongly advised her to give up Silesia rather than involve Europe in a general war. She replied that she

1 This, it is now known. was the course urged by

"would sooner give up her under petticoat;" and, as this put an end to the argument, he could do nothing but give the aid which England had promised -See Coxe's Walpole iii., 148.

mained the undisturbed possessor of the rest of her father's dominions, and that her husband, the Duke of Lorraine, would have been now seated on the imperial throne.

This salutary measure was not pursued. This appears, sir, not only from the Gazettes, but from our parliamentary knowledge. For, from the papers which have been either accidentally or necessarily laid before Parliament, it appears, that instead of insisting that the court of Vienna should agree to the terms offered by Prussia, we rather encouraged the obstinacy of that court in rejecting them. We did this, sir, not by our memorials alone, but by his Majesty's speech to his Parliament, by the consequent addresses of both houses, and by speeches directed by our courtiers against the King of Prussia. I allude, sir, to his Majesty's speech on the 8th of April, 1741, to the celebrated addresses on that occasion for guaranteeing the dominions of Hanover, and for granting £300,000 to enable his Majesty to support the Queen of Hungary. The speeches made on that occasion by several of our favorites at court, and their reflections on the King of Prussia, must be fresh in the memory of all. All must remember, too, that the Queen of Hungary was not then, nor for some months after, attacked by any one prince in Europe excepting the King of Prussia. She must, therefore, have supposed that both the court and nation of Great Britain were resolved to support her, not only against the King of Prussia, but against all the world. We can not, therefore, be surprised that the court of Vienna evinced an unwillingness to part with so plenteous a country as that claimed by the King of Prussia-the lordship of Silesia.

pose an equal resistance to the Queen of Hungary alone, much less so to that Queen when supported by Hanover and the whole power of Great Britain. During this posture of affairs, it was safe for us, I say, it was safe for Hanover, to promise assistance and to concert schemes in support of the Queen of Hungary. But no sooner did France come forward than our schemes were at an end, our promises forgotten. The safety of Hanover was then involved; and England, it seems, is not to be bound by promises, nor engaged in schemes, which, by possibility, may endanger or distress the Electorate! From this time, sir, we thought no more of assisting the Queen of Hungary, excepting by grants which were made by Parliament. These, indeed, our ministers did not oppose, because they contrive to make a job of every parliamentary grant. But from the miserable inactivity in which we allowed the Danish and Hessian troops to remain, notwithstanding that they received our pay; and from the insult tamely submitted to by our squadron in the Mediterranean, we must conclude that our ministers, from the time the French interfered, resolved not to assist the Queen of Hungary by land or sea. Thus, having drawn that princess forward on the ice by our promises, we left her to retreat as she could. Thus it was, sir, that the Duke of Bavaria became Emperor. Thus it was that the house of Austria was stripped of great part of its dominions, and was in the utmost danger of being stripped of all, had France been bent on its destruction. Sir, the house of Austria was saved by the policy of France, who wished to reduce, but not absolutely to destroy it. Had Austria been ruined, the power of the Duke of Bavaria, who had been elected Emperor, would have risen higher than was consistent with the interests of France. It was the object of France to foment divisions among the princes of Germany, to reduce them by mutual strife, and then to render the houses of Bavaria, Austria, and Saxony nearly equal by partitions.

But, sir, this was not all. Not only had we promised our assistance to the Queen of Hungary, but we had actually commenced a negotiation for a powerful alliance against the King of Prussia, and for dividing his dominions among the allies. We had solicited, not only the Queen of Hungary, but also the Muscovites and the Dutch, to form parts of this alliance. We had taken both Danes and Hessians into our pay, in support of this alliance. Nay, even Hanover had subjected herself to heavy expenses on this occasion, by adding a force of nearly one third to the army she had already on foot. This, sir, was, I believe, the first extraordinary expense which Hanover had incurred since her fortunate conjunction with England; the first, I say, not-istration; and this leads me to consider the oriwithstanding the great acquisitions she has made, and the many heavy expenses in which England has been involved upon her sole account.

If, therefore, the Queen of Hungary was obstinate in regard to the claims of Prussia, her obstinacy must be ascribed to ourselves. To us must be imputed those misfortunes which she subsequently experienced. It was easy to promise her our assistance while the French seemed determined not to interfere with Germany. It was safe to engage in schemes for her support, and for the enlargement of the Hanoverian dominions, because Prussia could certainly not op

G

It was this policy which restrained the French from sending so powerful an army into Germany as they might otherwise have sent. And then, through the bad conduct of their generals, and through the skill and bravery of the officers and troops of the Queen of Hungary, a great improvement in her affairs was effected. This occurred about the time of the late changes in our admin.

gin of those measures which are now proceeding, and the situation of Europe at that particular time, February, 1742. But, before I enter upon that consideration, I must lay this down as a maxim to be ever observed by this nation, that, although it be our own interest to preserve a balance of power in Europe, yet, as we are the most remote from danger, we have the least reason to be jealous as to the adjustment of that balance, and should be the last to take alarm on its

2 The Duke of Bavaria was elected Emperor on the 12th of February, 1742.

account. Now the balance of power may be supported, either by the existence of one single potentate capable of opposing and defeating the ambitious designs of France, or by a well-connected confederacy adequate to the same intent. Of these two methods, the first, when practicable, is the most eligible, because on that method we may most safely rely; but when it can not be resorted to, the whole address of our ministers and plenipotentiaries should tend to establish the

second.

The wisdom of the maxim, sir, to which I have adverted, must be acknowledged by all who consider, that when the powers upon the Continent apply to us to join them in a war against France, we may take what share in the war we think fit. When we, on the contrary, apply to them, they will prescribe to us. However some gentlemen may affect to alarm themselves or others by alleging the dependency of all the European powers upon France, of this we may rest assured, that when those powers are really threatened with such dependency, they will unite among themselves, and call upon us also to prevent it. Nay, sir, should even that dependence imperceptibly ensue; so soon as they perceived it, they would unite among themselves, and call us to join the confederacy by which it might be shaken off. Thus we can never be reduced to stand single in support of the balance of power; nor can we be compelled to call upon our continental neighbors for such purpose, unless when our ministers have an interest in pretending and asserting imaginary dangers.

the ambition of France. For France, although she had assisted in depressing the house of Austria, had shown no design of increasing her own dominions. On the other hand, the haughty demeanor of the court of Vienna, and the height to which that house had been raised, excited a spirit of disgust and jealousy in the princes of Germany. That spirit first manifested itself in the house of Hanover, and at this very time prevailed not only there, but in most of the German sovereigntics. Under such circumstances, however weak and erroneous our ministers might be, they could not possibly think of restoring the house of Austria to its former splendor and power. They could not possibly oppose that single house as a rival to France. No power in Europe would have cordially assisted them in that scheme They would have had to cope, not only with France and Spain, but with all the princes of Germany and Italy, to whom Austria had become obnoxious.

In these circumstances, what was this nation to do? It was impossible to establish the balance of power in Europe upon the single power of the house of Austria. Surely, then, sir, it was our business to think of restoring the peace of Germany as soon as possible by our good offices, in order to establish a confederacy sufficient to oppose France, should she afterward discover any ambitious intentions. It was now not so much our business to prevent the lessening the power of the house of Austria, as it was to bring about a speedy reconciliation between the princes of Germany; to take care that France should get as little by the treaty of peace as she said she expected by the war. This, I say, should have been our chief concern; because the preservation of the balance of power was now no longer to depend upon the house of Austria, but upon the joint power of a confederacy then to be formed; and till the princes of Germany were reconciled among themselves, there was scarcely a possibility of forming such a confederacy. If we had made this our scheme, the Dutch would have joined heartily in it. The Germanic body would have joined in it; and the peace of Germany might have been restored without putting this nation to any expense, or diverting us from the prosecution of our just and necessary war against Spain, in case our differences with that nation could not have been adjusted by the treaty for restoring the peace of Germany.

The posture of Europe since the time of the Romans is wonderfully changed. In those times each country was divided into many sovereignties. It was then impossible for the people of any one country to unite among themselves, and much more impossible for two or three large countries to combine in a general confederacy against the enormous power of Rome. But such confederacy is very practicable now, and may always be effected whenever France, or any one of the powers of Europe, shall endeavor to enslave the rest. I have said, sir, that the balance of power in Europe may be maintained as securely by a confederacy as it can be by opposing any one rival power to the power of France. Now, let us examine to which of these two methods we ought to have resorted in February, 1742. The imperial diadem was then fallen from the house of Austria; and although the troops of the Queen of Hungary had met with II. But our new minister, as I have said, ran some success during the winter, that sovereign into an extreme quite opposite to that of Carteret's was still stripped of great part of the Austrian the old. Our former minister thought policy. dominions. The power of that house was there- of nothing but negotiating when he ought to fore greatly inferior to what it was at the time have thought of nothing but war; the present of the late emperor's death; and still more in-minister has thought of nothing but war, or at ferior to what it had been in 1716, when we least its resemblance, when he ought to have considered it necessary to add Naples and Sar- thought of nothing but negotiation. dinia to its former acquisitions, in order to render it a match for France. Besides this, there existed in 1742 a very powerful confederacy against the house of Austria, while no jealousy was harbored by the powers of Europe against

A resolution was taken, and preparations were made, for sending a body of troops to Flanders, even before we had any hopes of the King of Prussia's deserting his alliance with France, and without our being called on to do so by any

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