(3.) "If the allies of this country shall be less successful than they have every reason to expect they will be, in stirring up the people of France against Bonaparte, and in the further prosecution of the war." And, (4.) "If the pressure of the war should be heavier upon us than it would be convenient for These are the other us to continue to bear." two possible emergencies in which the right honorable gentleman would treat even with Bonaparte. Sir, I have often blamed the right honorable gentleman for being disingenuous and insincere. On the present occasion I certainly can power may have been acquired, as into the fact the negotiation which he doos not now possess? of where the power resides. The people did Is it quite sure, that when he finds himself safe acquiesce in the government of Cromwell. But in his seat, he will treat on the same terms as at it may be said that the splendor of his talents, present, and that you will get a better peace the vigor of his administration, the high tone some time hence than you might reasonably hope with which he spoke to foreign nations, the suc- to obtain at this moment? Will he not have one cess of his arms, and the character which he interest less to do it? and do you not overlook a favorable occasion for a chance which is exgave to the English name, induced the nation to These are the consideraacquiesce in his usurpation; and that we must ceedingly doubtful? not try Bonaparte by his example. Will it be tions which I would urge to his Majesty's minsaid that Bonaparte is not a man of great abili-isters against the dangerous experiment of waitties? Will it be said that he has not, by his vic-ing for the acquiescence of the people of France. tories, thrown a splendor over even the violence of the Revolution, and that he does not conciliate the French people by the high and lofty tone in which he speaks to foreign nations? Are not the French, then, as likely as the English in the case of Cromwell, to acquiesce in his government? If they should do so, the right honorable gentleman may find that this possible predicament may fail him. He may find that though one power may make war, it requires two to make peace. He may find that Bonaparte was as insincere as himself in the proposition which he made; and in his turn he may come forward and say, "I have no occasion now for conceal-not charge him with any such thing. He has ment. It is true that, in the beginning of the year 1800, I offered to treat, not because I wished for peace, but because the people of France wished for it; and besides, my old resources being exhausted, and there being no means of carrying on the war without a new and solid system of finance,' I pretended to treat, because I wished to procure the unanimous assent of the French people to this new and solid system of finance.' Did you think I was in earnest ? You were deceived. I now throw off the mask. I have gained my point, and I reject your offers with scorn. Is it not a very possible case that he may use this language? Is it not within the right honorable gentleman's knowledge of human nature 225 But even if this should not be the case, will not the very test which you require, the acquiescence of the people of France in his government, give him an advantage-ground in 1124 66 made to-night a most honest confession. He is open and candid. He tells Bonaparte fairly what he has to expect. "I mean," says he, to do every thing in my power to raise up the people of France against you; I have engaged a number of allies, and our combined efforts shall be used to excite insurrection and civil war in France. I will strive to murder you, or to get you sent away. If I succeed, well; but if I fail, then I will treat with you. My resources being exhausted; even my 'solid system of finance' having failed to supply me with the means of keeping together my allies, and of feeding the discontents I have excited in France; then you may expect to see me renounce my high tone, my attachment to the house of Bourbon, my abhorrence of your crimes, my alarm at your principles; for then I shall be ready to own that, on the balance and comparison of circumstances, there will be less danger in concluding a peace 24 It is a curious fact that Mr. Fox, in putting than in the continuance of war!" Is this politthese words into the mouth of Bonaparte, hit pre-ical language for one state to hold to another? cisely on the sentiments he entertained at this crisis. He says in his Memoirs, as dictated to Montholon, "I had then need of war; a treaty of peace which should have derogated from that of Campo Formio, and annulled the creations of Italy, would have withered every imagination. Mr. Pitt's an swer accordingly was impatiently expected. When it arrived. it filled me with a secret satisfaction. His answer could not have been more favorable! From that moment I foresaw that, with such impassioned antagonists, I would have no difficulty in reaching the highest destinies."-Vol. i., 33, 34. 25 This was a "palpable hit." A few months before, Mr. Pitt had made a descent upon Holland, which he declared, from "his knowledge of human nature," must be successful in rousing the Dutch against their French rulers. As it proved a miser able failure, he got many hints from Mr. Sheridan and Mr. Fox respecting "his knowledge of human nature." And what sort of peace does the right honorable "Potuit quæ plurima virtus 26 See Virgil's Eneid, book xi., line 313. The words are those of the Latin King in relation to his war with Eneas. Valor has done its utmost: we have fought He would then have to repeat his words, but | with a different application. He would have to say, "All our efforts are vain. We have exhausted our strength. Our designs are impracticable, and we must sue to you for peace." House, that they and not a contin. war. supporting the minister in his negotiation for a solid system of finance, can now bring themselves to countenance his abandonment of the ground he took, and to support him in refusing all negotiation! What will be said of gentlemen who shall vote in this way, and yet feel, in their consciences, that they would have, with infinitely more readiness, voted the other? coun terpart in martial I will not Sir, we have heard to-night a great many most acrimonious invectives against Bo- The military desnaparte, against all the course of parts its coun his conduct, and against the un- was applied to principled manner in which he Ireland." seized upon the reins of government. make his defense. I think all this sort of invective, which is used only to inflame the passions of this House and of the country, exceedingly ill timed, and very impolitic. But I say I will not make his defense. I am not sufficiently in possession of materials upon which to form an opinion on the character and conduct of this ex Sir, what is the question to-night? We are Appeal to the called upon to support ministers in and the whole na- refusing a frank, candid, and retion desire peace, spectful offer of negotiation, and to uance of the war. countenance them in continuing the Now I would put the question in another way. Suppose that ministers had been inclined to adopt the line of conduct which they pursued in 1796 and 1797, and that to-night, instead of a question on a war address, it had been an address to his Majesty to thank him for accepting the overture, and for opening a negotiation to treat for peace: I ask the gentlemen opposite; I appeal to the whole five hundred and fiftyeight representatives of the people, to lay their hands upon their hearts, and to say whether they would not have cordially voted for such an ad-traordinary man. On his arrival in France, he dress. Would they, or would they not? Yes, sir, if the address had breathed a spirit of peace, your benches would have resounded with rejoicings, and with praises of a measure that was likely to bring back the blessings of tranquillity. On the present occasion, then, I ask for the vote of no gentlemen but of those who, in the secret confession of their conscience, admit, at this instant, while they hear me, that they would have cheerfully and heartily voted with the minister for an address directly the reverse of the one proposed. If every such gentleman were to vote with me, I should be this night in the greatest majority that ever I had the honor to vote with in this House. I do not know that the right honorable gentleman would find, even on the benches around him, a single individual who would not vote with me. I am sure he would not find many. I do not know that in this House I could single out the individual who would think himself bound by consistency to vote against the right honorable gentleman on an address for negotiation. There may be some, but they are very few. I do know, indeed, one most honorable man in another place, whose purity and integrity I respect, though I lament the opinion he has formed on this subject, who would think himself bound, from the uniform consistency of his life, to vote against an address for negotiation. Earl Fitzwilliam would, I verily believe, do so. He would feel himself bound, from the previous votes he has given, to declare his objection to all treaty. But I own I do not know more in either House of Parliament. There may be others, but I do not know them. What, then, is the House of Commons come to, when, notwithstanding their support given to the right honorable gentleman in 1796 and 1797, on his entering into negotiation; notwithstanding their inward conviction that they would vote with him this moment for the same measure; who, after found the government in a very unsettled state, and the whole affairs of the Republic deranged, crippled, and involved. He thought it necessary to reform the government; and he did reform it, just in the way in which a military man may be expected to carry on a reform. He seized on the whole authority for himself. It will not be expected from me that I should either approve or apologize for such an act. I am certainly not for reforming governments by such expedients; but how this House can be so violently indignant at the idea of military despotism, is, I own, a little singular, when I see the composure with which they can observe it nearer home; nay, when I see them regard it as a frame of government most peculiarly suited to the exercise of free opinion, on a subject the most important of any that can engage the attention of a people. Was it not the system which was so happily and so advantageously established of late, all over Ireland, and which even now the government may, at its pleasure proclaim over the whole of that kingdom? Are not the persons and property of the people left, in many districts, at this moment, to the entire will of military commanders? and is not this held out as peculiarly proper and advantageous, at a time when the people of Ireland are freely, and with unbiased judgments, to discuss the most interesting question of a legislative union? Notwithstanding the existence of martial law, so far do we think Ireland from being enslaved, that we presume it precisely the period and the circumstances under which she may best declare her free opinion! Now, really, sir, I can not think that gentlemen, who talk in this way about Ireland, can, with a good grace, rail at military despotism in France. Charge against Bonaparte, that his oaths to the But, it seems, "Bonaparte has broken his oaths. He has violated his oath of fidelity to the Constitution of the third year." Sir, I am not one of those who hold that any such oaths government. ought ever to be exacted. They are seldom or he had violated Retort on Mr. oaths are beaten and unfortunate, to think of treating? Oh! pity the condition of man, gracious God! and save us from such a system of malevolence, in which all our old and venerated prejudices are to be done away, and by which we are to be taught to consider war as the natural state of man, and peace but as a dangerous and difficult extremity! This disposi tract war by history. ever of any effect; and I am not for sporting with a thing so sacred as an oath. I think it would be good to lay aside all such oaths. Who ever heard that, in revolutions, the oath of fidelity to the former government was ever regarded, or even that, when violated, it was imputed to the persons as a crime? In times of revolution, men who take up arms are called rebels. If they fail, they are adjudged to be traitors; but Sir, this temper must be corrected. It is a who before ever heard of their being perjured? | diabolical spirit, and would lead to an On the restoration of King Charles II., those interminable war. Our history is full tion to pro who had taken up arms for the commonwealth of instances that, where we have over- condemned were stigmatized as rebels and traitors, but not looked a proffered occasion to treat, we as men forsworn. Was the Earl of Devonshire have uniformly suffered by delay. At what time charged with being perjured, on account of the did we ever profit by obstinately persevering in allegiance he had sworn to the house of Stuart, war? We accepted at Ryswick the terms we and the part he took in those struggles which had refused five years before, and the same peace preceded and brought about the Revolution? which was concluded at Utrecht might have The violation of oaths of allegiance was never been obtained at Gertruydenberg; and as to seimputed to the people of England, and will curity from the future machinations or ambition never be imputed to any people. But who of the French, I ask you, what security you ever brings up the question of oaths? He who had or could have. Did the different treaties strives to make twenty-four millions made with Louis XIV. serve to tie up his hands, Pitt respecting of persons violate the oaths they have to restrain his ambition, or to stifle his restless taken to their present Constitution, spirit? At what time, in old or in recent periand who desires to re-establish the house of ods, could you safely repose on the honor, forBourbon by such violation of their vows. I put bearance and moderation of the French governit so, sir, because, if the question of oaths be of ment? Was there ever an idea of refusing to the least consequence, it is equal on both sides! treat, because the peace might be afterward inHe who desires the whole people of France to secure? The peace of 1763 was not accompaperjure themselves, and who hopes for success nied with securities; and it was no sooner made, in his project only upon their doing so, surely than the French court began, as usual, its incan not make it a charge against Bonaparte trigues. And what security did the right honthat he has done the same! orable gentleman exact at the peace of 1783, in "Ah! but Bonaparte has declared it as his which he was engaged? Were we rendered seopinion, that the two governments of cure by that peace? The right honorable genGreat Britain and of France can not tleman knows well that, soon after that peace, the exist together. After the treaty of French formed a plan, in conjunction with the Campo Formio, he sent two confi- Dutch, of attacking our India possessions, of raisdential persons, Berthier and Monge, ing up the native powers against us, and of drivto the Directory, to say so in his name." Well, ing us out of India; as they were more recently and what is there in this absurd and puerile as- desirous of doing, only with this difference, that sertion, if it were ever made? Has not the right the cabinet of France formerly entered into this honorable gentleman, in this House, said the project in a moment of profound peace, and when same thing? In this, at least, they resemble they conceived us to be lulled into a perfect seone another! They have both made use of this curity. After making the peace of 1783, the assertion; and I believe that these two illustri- right honorable gentleman and his friends went ous persons are the only two on earth who think out, and I, among others, came into office. Supit! But let us turn the tables. We ought to pose, sir, that we had taken up the jealousy upon put ourselves at times in the place of the enemy, which the right honorable gentleman now acts, if we are desirous of really examining with can- and had refused to ratify the peace which he had dor and fairness the dispute between us. How made. Suppose that we had said-No! France is may they not interpret the speeches of ministers acting a perfidious part; we see no security for and their friends, in both houses of the British England in this treaty; they want only a respite, Parliament ? If we are to be told of the idle in order to attack us again in an important part speech of Berthier and Monge, may they not of our dominions, and we ought not to confirm also bring up speeches, in which it has not been the treaty. I ask you, would the right honoramerely hinted, but broadly asserted, that "the ble gentleman have supported us in this refusal ? two Constitutions of England and France could I say, that upon his present reasoning he ought. not exist together?" May not these offenses But I put it fairly to him, would he have supand charges be reciprocated without end? Are ported us in refusing to ratify the treaty upon we ever to go on in this miserable squabble such a pretense? He certainly ought not, and about words? Are we still, as we happen to be I am sure he would not; but the course of easuccessful on the one side or the other, to bring soning which he now assumes would have justiup these impotent accusations, insults, and prov-fied his taking such a ground. On the contrary, ocations against each other; and only when we | I am persuaded that he would have said, "This Retort in re spect to Bona that France and parte's saying England could not exist together. security is a refinement upon jealousy. You have security, the only security that you can ever expect to get. It is the present interest of France to make peace. She will keep it, if it be her interest. She will break it, if it be her interest. Such is the state of nations; and you have nothing but your own vigilance for your security." naparte's mo tives to continue the war. secure this fame, the only species of fame, perhaps, that is worth acquiring? Nay, granting that his soul may still burn with the thirst of military exploits, is it not likely that he is disposed to yield to the feelings of the French people, and to consolidate his power by consulting their interests? I have a right to argue in this way when suppositions of his insincerity are reasoned upon on the other side. Sir, these aspersions are, in truth, always idle, and even mischievous. I have been too long accustomed to hear imputations and calumnies thrown out upon great and honorable characters, to be much influenced by them. My honorable and learned friend [Mr. Erskine] has paid this night a most just, deserved, and eloquent tribute of applause to the memory of that great and unparalleled character, who is so recently lost to the world.27 I must, like him, beg leave to dwell a moment on the venerable GEORGE WASHINGTON, though I know that it is impossible for me to bestow any thing like adequate praise on a character which gave us, more than any other human be "It is not the interest of Bonaparte," it seems, Reply as to Bo. "sincerely to enter into a negotiation, or, if he should even make peace, sincerely to keep it." But how are we to decide upon his sincerity? By refusing to treat with him? Surely, if we mean to discover his sincerity, we ought to hear the propositions which he desires to make. "But peace would be unfriendly to his system of military despotism." Sir, I hear a great deal about the short-lived nature of military despotism. I wish the history of the world would bear gentlemen out in this description of it. Was not the government erected by Augustus Cesar a military despotism? and yet it endured for six or seven hundred years. Military despotism, unfortunate-ing, the example of a perfect man; yet, good, ly, is too likely in its nature to be permanent, and it is not true that it depends on the life of the first usurper. Though half of the Roman Emperors were murdered, yet the military despotism went on; and so it would be, I fear, in France. If Bonaparte should disappear from the scene, to make room, perhaps, for a Berthier, or any other general, what difference would that make in the quality of French despotism, or in our relation to the country? We may as safely treat with a Bonaparte, or with any of his successors, be they whom they may, as we could with a Louis XVI., a Louis XVII., or a Louis XVIII. There is no difference but in the name. Where the power essentially resides, thither we ought to go for peace. He may see reason to seek peace. great, and unexampled as General Washington was, I can remember the time when he was not better spoken of in this House than Bonaparte is at present. The right honorable gentleman who opened this debate [Mr. Dundas] may remember in what terms of disdain, of virulence, even of contempt, General Washington was spoken of by gentlemen on that side of the House. Does he not recollect with what marks of indignation any member was stigmatized as an enemy to his country who mentioned with common respect the name of General Washington? If a negotiation had then been proposed to be opened with that great man, what would have been said? Would you treat with a rebel, a traitor! What an example would you not give by such But, sir, if we are to reason on the fact, I an act! I do not know whether the right honshould think that it is the interest of Bo- orable gentleman may not yet possess some of naparte to make peace. A lover of his old prejudices on the subject. I hope not: military glory, as that general must I hope by this time we are all convinced that a necessarily be, may he not think that his meas- republican government, like that of America, ure of glory is full; that it may be tarnished by may exist without danger or injury to social ora reverse of fortune, and can hardly be increased der, or to established monarchies. They have by any new laurels ? He must feel that, in the happily shown that they can maintain the relasituation to which he is now raised, he can notions of peace and amity with other states. They longer depend on his own fortune, his own genius, and his own talents, for a continuance of his success. He must be under the necessity of employing other generals, whose misconduct or incapacity might endanger his power, or whose triumphs even might affect the interest which he holds in the opinion of the French. Peace, then, would secure to him what he has achieved, and fix the inconstancy of fortune. But this will not be his only motive. He must see that France also requires a respite-a breathing interval, to recruit her wasted strength. To procure her this respite, would be, perhaps, the attainment of more solid glory, as well as the means of acquiring more solid power, than any thing which he can hope to gain from arms, and from the proudest triumphs. May he not, then, be zealous to have shown, too, that they are alive to the feelings of honor; but they do not lose sight of plain good sense and discretion. They have not refused to negotiate with the French, and they have accordingly the hopes of a speedy termination of every difference.29 We cry up their con 27 The news of Washington's death, which took place December 14th, 1799, had just arrived in England. as This hit was directed against Mr. Dundas, be cause he was one of Lord North's ministry, who had poured out this abuse upon Washington. 29 It is curious to observe how adroitly Mr. Fox turns back upon his opponent almost every argu. ment he uses. Thus, in the present case, Mr. Pitt had enumerated the Americans among those whom the French had injured and insulted. plies that the Americans did not for this reason re Mr. Fox re duct, but we do not imitate it. At the beginning to deliver up their property; nor do I even know of the struggle, we were told that the French were setting up a set of wild and impracticable theories, and that we ought not to be misled by them; that they were phantoms with which we could not grapple. Now we are told that we must not treat, because, out of the lottery, Bonaparte has drawn such a prize as military despotism. Is military despotism a theory? One would think that that is one of the practical things which ministers might understand, and to which they would have no particular objection. But what is our present conduct founded on but a theory, and that a most wild and ridiculous theory? For what are we fighting? Not for a principle; not for security; not for conquest; but merely for an experiment and a speculation, to discover whether a gentleman at Paris may not turn out a better man than we now take him to be. Difficulties the return of bons. tors. My honorable friend [Mr. Erskine] has been censured for an opinion which he gave, in the way of and I think justly, that the change of the Bour- property in France since the Revolution must form an almost insurmountable barrier to the return of the ancient proprie"No such thing," says the right honorable gentleman, "nothing can be more easy. Property is depreciated to such a rate, that the purchasers would easily be brought to restore the estates." I think differently. It is the character of every such convulsion as that which has ravaged France, that an infinite and undescribable load of misery is inflicted upon private families. The heart sickens at the recital of the sorrows which it engenders. The Revolution did not imply, though it may have occasioned, a total change of property; the restoration of the Bourbons does imply it; and such is the difference. There is no doubt but that if the noble families had foreseen the duration and the extent of the evils which were to fall upon their heads, they would have taken a very different line of conduct; but they unfortunately flew from their country. The King and his advisers sought foreign aid, and a confederacy was formed to restore them by military force. As a means of resisting this combination, the estates of the fugitives were confiscated and sold. However compassion may deplore their case, it can not be said that the thing is unprecedented. The people have always resorted to such means of defense. Now the question is, how this property is to be got out of their hands. If it be true, as I have heard it said, that the purchasers of national and forfeited estates amount to one million and a half of persons, I see no hopes of their being forced fuse to negotiate; but by showing their readiness to do so, had the hopes of a speedy termination of their differences with France. In this he refers to the mission of Oliver Ellsworth, Chief Justice of the United States, Patrick Henry, and W. V. Murray, in 1799, to settle terms of peace between France and the United States. Their mission was successful, and an amicable adjustment took place a few months after. Increased by a Louis XVIII. that they ought. I doubt whether it would be the means of restoring tranquillity and order to a country, to attempt to divest a body of one million and a half of inhabitants, in order to reinstate a much smaller body. I question the policy, even if the thing were practicable; but I assert, that such a body of new proprietors forms an insurmountable barrier to the restoration of the ancient order of things. Never was a revolution consolidated by a pledge so strong. But, as if this were not of itself sufficient, Louis XVIII., from his retirement at Mittau, puts forth a manifesto, in declaration of which he assures the friends of his house that he is about to come back with all the powers that formerly belonged to his family. He does not promise to the people a Constitution which might tend to conciliate their hearts; but, stating that he is to come with all the old régime, they would naturally attach to it its proper appendages of bastiles, lettres de cachet, gabelle, &c.; and the noblesse, for whom this proclamation was peculiarly conceived, would also naturally feel that, if the monarch was to be restored to all his privileges, they surely were to be reinstated in their estates without a compensation to the purchasers. Is this likely to make the people wish for the restoration of royalty? I have no doubt but there may be a number of Chouans in France, though I am persuaded that little dependence is to be placed on their efforts.30 There may be a number of people dispersed over France, and particularly in certain provinces, who may retain a degree of attachment to royalty; how the government will contrive to compromise with that spirit I know not. I suspect, however, that Bonaparte will try. His efforts have been already turned to that object; and, if we may believe report, he has succeeded to a considerable degree. He will naturally call to his recollection the precedent which the history of France itself will furnish. The once formidable insurrection of the Huguenots was completely stifled, and the party conciliated, by the policy of Henry IV., who gave them such privileges, and raised them so high in the government, as to make some persons apprehend danger therefrom to the unity of the empire. Nor will the French be likely to forget the revocation of the edict; one of the memorable acts of the house of Bourbon, which was never surpassed in atroc ity, injustice, and impolicy, by any thing that has disgraced Jacobinism. If Bonaparte shall attempt with the Chouans some similar arrangement to that of Henry IV., who will say that he is likely to fail? He will meet with no great obstacle to success from the influence which our ministers have established with the chiefs, or in the attachment and dependence which they have on our protection. For what has the right honorable gentleman told them, in stating the con 30 The Chouans were Royalists, particularly those on the Loire, who rose against the revolutionary government. |