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King's servants a communication of the papers described in the motion, and I am persuaded that the alarming state of facts, as well as the strength of reasoning with which the noble Duke has urged and enforced that necessity, must have been powerfully felt by your Lordships. What I mean to say upon this occasion may seem, perhaps, to extend beyond the limits of the motion before us. But I flatter myself, my Lords, that if I am honored with your attention, it will appear that the meaning and object of this question are naturally connected with considerations of the most extensive national importance. For entering into such considerations, no season is improper, no occasion should be neglected. Something must be done, my Lords, and immediately, to save an injured, insulted, undone country; if not to save the state, my Lords, at least to mark out and drag to public justice those servants of the Crown, by whose ignorance, neglect, or treachery this once great, flourishing people are reduced to a condition as deplorable at home as it is despicable abroad. Examples are wanted, my Lords, and should be given to the world, for the instruction of future times, even though they be useless to ourselves. I do not mean, my Lords, nor is it intended by the motion, to impede or embarrass a negotiation which we have been told is now in a prosperous train, and promises a happy conclusion.

[Lord Weymouth.-I beg pardon for interrupting the noble Lord; but I think it necessary to remark to your Lordships that I have not said a single word tending to convey to your Lordships any information or opinion with regard to the state or progress of the negotiation. I did, with the utmost caution, avoid giving to your Lordships the least intimation upon that matter.] I perfectly agree with the noble Lord. I did not mean to refer to any thing said by his Lordship. He expressed himself, as he always does, with moderation and reserve, and with the greatest propriety. It was another noble Lord, very high in office, who told us he understood that the negotiation was in a favorable train.

[Earl of Hillsborough.—I did not make use of the word train. I know the meaning of the word too well. In the language from which it was derived, it signifies protraction and delay, which I could never mean to apply to the present negotiation.]

This is the second time that I have been interrupted. I submit to your Lordships whether this be fair and candid treatment. I am sure it is contrary to the orders of the House, and a gross violation of decency and politeness. I listen to every noble Lord in this House with attention and respect. The noble Lord's design in interrupting me is as mean and unworthy as the manner in which he has done it is irregular and disorderly. He flatters himself that by breaking the thread of my discourse, he shall confuse me in my argument. But, my Lords, I will not submit to this treatment. I will not be interrupted. When I have concluded, let him answer me, if he can. As to the word which he

has denied, I still affirm that it was the word he made use of; but if he had used any other, I am sure every noble Lord will agree with me, that his meaning was exactly what I have expressed it. Whether he said course or train is indiffer

ent.

He told your Lordships that the negotiation was in a way that promised a happy and honorable conclusion. His distinctions are mean, frivolous, and puerile. My Lords, I do not understand the exalted tone assumed by that noble Lord. In the distress and weakness of this country, my Lords, and conscious as the ministry ought to be how much they have contributed to that distress and weakness, I think a tone of modesty, of submission, of humility, would become them better; "quædam causæ modestiam desiderant." Before this country they stand as the greatest criminals. Such I shall prove them to be; for I do not doubt of proving, to your Lordships' satisfaction, that since they have been intrusted with the King's affairs, they have done every thing that they ought not to have done, and hardly any thing that they ought to have done.

The noble Lord talks of Spanish punctilios in the lofty style and idiom of a Spaniard. We are to be wonderfully tender of the Spanish point of honor, as if they had been the complainants, as if they had received the injury. I think he would have done better to have told us what care had been taken of the English honor. My Lords, I am well acquainted with the character of that nation-at least as far as it is represented by their court and ministry, and should think this country dishonored by a comparison of the English good faith with the punctilios of a Spaniard. My Lords, the English are a candid, an ingenuous people. The Spaniards are as mean and crafty as they are proud and insolent. The integrity of the English merchant, the generous spirit of our naval and military officers, would be degraded by a comparison with their merchants or officers. With their ministers I have often been obliged to negotiate, and never met with an instance of candor or dignity in their proceedings; nothing but low cunning, trick, and artifice. After a long experience of their want of candor and good faith, I found myself compelled to talk to them in a peremptory, decisive language. On this principle I submitted my advice to a trembling council for an immediate declaration of a war with Spain.3 Your Lordships well know what were the consequences of not following that advice. Since, however, for reasons unknown to me, it has been thought advisable to negotiate with the court of Spain, I should have conceived that the great and single object of such a negotiation would have been, to obtain complete satisfaction for the injury done to the crown and people of England. But, if I understand the noble Lord, the only object of the present negotiation is to find a salvo for the punctilious honor of the Spaniards. The absurdity of such an idea is of it

2 Some causes call for modesty.

3 In 1761. See P. 63.

self insupportable. But, my Lords, I object to | country ever produced (it is hardly necessary to our negotiating at all, in our present circum-mention the name of Sir Walter Raleigh), sacristances. We are not in that situation in which a great and powerful nation is permitted to negotiate. A foreign power has forcibly robbed his Majesty of a part of his dominions. Is the island restored? Are you replaced in statu quo? If that had been done, it might then, perhaps, have been justifiable to treat with the aggressor upon the satisfaction he ought to make for the insult offered to the Crown of England. But will you descend so low? Will you so shamefully betray the King's honor, as to make it matter of negotiation whether his Majesty's possessions shall be restored to him or not?

ficed by the meanest prince that ever sat upon the throne, to the vindictive jealousy of that haughty court. James the First was base enough, at the instance of Gondomar, to suffer a sentence against Sir Walter Raleigh, for another supposed offense, to be carried into execution almost twelve years after it had been passed. This was the pretense. His real crime was, that he had mortally offended the Spaniards, while he acted by the King's express orders, and under his commission.

or 1765. Will the ministry assert, that, in all that time, the Spanish court have never once claimed them? That their right to them has never been urged, or mentioned to our ministry? If it has, the act of the Governor of Buenos Ayres is plainly the consequence of our refusal to acknowledge and submit to the Spanish claims. For five years they negotiate; when that fails, they take the island by force. If that measure had arisen out of the general instructions constantly given to the Governor of Buenos Ayres, why should the execution of it have been deferred so long?

My Lords, the pretended disavowal by the court of Spain is as ridiculous as it is false. If I doubt not, my Lords, that there are some your Lordships want any other proof, call for important mysteries in the conduct of this affair, your own officers who were stationed at Falkwhich, whenever they are explained, will ac- land Island. Ask the officer who commanded count for the profound silence now observed by the garrison, whether, when he was summoned the King's servants. The time will come, my to surrender, the demand was made in the name Lords, when they shall be dragged from their of the Governor of Buenos Ayres or of his Cathconcealments. There are some questions which, olic Majesty? Was the island said to belong sooner or later, must be answered. The minis- to Don Francisco Buccarelli or to the King of try, I find, without declaring themselves explic-Spain? If I am not mistaken, we have been in itly, have taken pains to possess the public with possession of these islands since the year 1764 an opinion, that the Spanish court have constantly disavowed the proceedings of their governor; and some persons, I see, have been shameless and daring enough to advise his Majesty to support and countenance this opinion in his speech from the throne. Certainly, my Lords, there never was a more odious, a more infamous falsehood imposed on a great nation. It degrades the King's honor. It is an insult to Parliament. His Majesty has been advised to confirm and give currency to an absolute falsehood. I beg your Lordship's attention, and I hope I shall be understood, when I repeat, that the court of Spain's having disavowed the act of their governor is an absolute, a palpable falsehood. Let me ask, my Lords, when the first communication was made by the court of Madrid of their being apprised of the taking of Falkland's Island, was it accompanied with an offer of instant restitution, of immediate satisfaction, and the punishment of the Spanish governor ? If it was not, they have adopted the act as their own, and the very mention of a disavowal is an impudent insult offered to the King's dignity. The King of Spain disowns the thief, while he leaves him unpunished, and profits by the theft. In vulgar English, he is the receiver of stolen goods, and ought to be treated accordingly.

My Lords, if the falsehood of this pretended disavowal had been confined to the court of Spain, I should have admitted it without concern. I should have been content that they themselves had left a door open for excuse and accommodation. The King of England's honor is not touched till he adopts the falsehood, delivers it to his Parliament, and adopts it as his own.

I can not quit this subject without comparing the conduct of the present ministry with that of a gentleman [Mr. George Grenville] who is now no more. The occasions were similar. The French had taken a little island from us [in 1764] called Turk's Island. The minister then at the head of the treasury [Mr. Grenville] took the business upon himself. But he did not nego

If your Lordships will look back to a period of the English history in which the circumstantiate. ces are reversed, in which the Spaniards were the complainants, you will see how differently they succeeded. You will see one of the ablest men, one of the bravest officers this or any other

4 History confirms this statement. Adolphus says that when Lord Weymouth inquired "whether Grimaldi had instructions to disavow the conduct of Buccarelli, he received an answer in the negative." -Vol. i., p. 431. It was not until January 22d, 1771, nearly three months after, that the disavowal was made. See Adolphus, i.. 435.

He sent for the French embassador and made a peremptory demand. A courier was dispatched to Paris, and returned in a few days, with orders for instant restitution, not only of the island, but of every thing that the English subjects had lost."

Such, then, my Lords, are the circumstances 5 A similar measure of spirit was adopted by the same minister with the Spaniards, who had driven our settlers from Honduras, to whom fourteen days had been allowed; upon which, all was instantly and amicably adjusted.

men.

of our difference with Spain; and in this situa- | Spain. My Lords, I disclaim such counsels, and tion, we are told that a negotiation has been I beg that this declaration may be remembered. entered into; that this negotiation, which must Let us have peace, my Lords, but let it be honhave commenced near three months ago, is still orable, let it be secure. A patched-up peace depending, and that any insight into the actual will not do. It will not satisfy the nation, state of it will impede the conclusion. My Lords, though it may be approved of by Parliament. I am not, for my own part, very anxious to draw I distinguish widely between a solid peace, and from the ministry the information which they the disgraceful expedients by which a war may take so much care to conceal from us. I very be deferred, but can not be avoided. I am as well know where this honorable negotiation will tender of the effusion of human blood as the noend-where it must end. We may, perhaps, be ble Lord who dwelt so long upon the miseries of able to patch up an accommodation for the pres- war. If the bloody politics of some noble Lords ent, but we shall have a Spanish war in six had been followed, England, and every quarter months. Some of your Lordships may, perhaps, of his Majesty's dominions would have been glutremember the Convention. For several success- ted with blood-the blood of our own countryive years our merchants had been plundered; no protection given them; no redress obtained for them. During all that time we were contented to complain and to negotiate. The court of Madrid were then as ready to disown their officers, and as unwilling to punish them, as they are at present. Whatever violence happened was always laid to the charge of one or other of their West India governors. To-day it was the Governor of Cuba, to-morrow of Porto Rico, Carthagena, or Porto Bello. If in a particular instance redress was promised, how was that promise kept? The merchant who had been robbed of his property was sent to the West Indies, to get it, if he could, out of an empty chest. At last, the Convention was made; but, though approved by a majority of both houses, it was received by the nation with universal discontent. I myself heard that wise man [Sir Robert Walpole] say in the House of Commons, "'Tis true we have got a Convention and a vote of Parliament; but what signifies it? We shall have a Spanish war upon the back of our Convention." Here, my Lords, I can not help mentioning a very striking observation made to me by a noble Lord [Granville], since dead. His abilities did honor to this House and to this nation. In the upper departments of government he had not his equal; and I feel a pride in declaring, that to his patronage, his friendship, and instruction, I owe whatever I am. This great man has often observed to me, that, in all the negotiations which preceded the Convention, our ministers never found out that there was no ground or subject for any negotiation. That the Spaniards had not a right to search our ships, and when they attempted to regulate that right by treaty, they were regulating a thing which did not exist. This I take to be something like the case of the ministry. The Spaniards have seized an island they have no right to; and his Majesty's servants make it a matter of negotiation, whether his dominions shall be restored to him or not.

From what I have said, my Lords, I do not doubt but it will be understood by many Lords, and given out to the public, that I am for hurrying the nation, at all events, into a war with

The Convention here referred to was the one made by Sir Robert Walpole in 1739, which Lord Chatham at the time so strenuously resisted.

My Lords, I have better reasons, perhaps, than many of your Lordships for desiring peace upon the terms I have described. I know the strength and preparation of the house of Bourbon; I know the defenseless, unprepared condition of this country. I know not by what mismanagement we are reduced to this situation; but when I consider who are the men by whom a war, in the outset at least, must be conducted, can I but wish for peace? Let them not screen themselves behind the want of intelligence. They had intelligence: I know they had. If they had not, they are criminal, and their excuse is their crime. But I will tell these young ministers the true source of intelligence. It is sagacity. Sagacity to compare causes and effects; to judge of the present state of things, and discern the future by a careful review of the past. Oliver Cromwell, who astonished mankind by his intelligence, did not derive it from spies in the cabinet of every prince in Europe: he drew it from the cabinet of his own sagacious mind. He observed facts, and traced them forward to their consequences. From what was, he concluded what must be, and he never was deceived. In the present situation of affairs, I think it would be treachery to the nation to conceal from them their real circumstances, and, with respect to a foreign enemy, I know that all concealments are vain and useless. They are as well acquainted with the actual force and weakness of this country as any of the King's servants. This is no time for silence or reserve. I charge the ministers with the highest crimes that men in their stations can be guilty of. I charge them with having destroyed all content and unanimity at home by a series of oppressive, unconstitutional measures; and with having betrayed and delivered up the nation defenseless to a foreign enemy.

Their utmost vigor has reached no farther than to a fruitless, protracted negotiation. When they should have acted, they have contented themselves with talking "about it, goddess, and about it." If we do not stand forth, and do our duty in the present crisis, the nation is irretrievably undone. I despise the little policy of concealments. You ought to know the whole of your situation. If the information be new to the ministry, let them take care to profit by it. I

mean to rouse, to alarm the whole nation; to rouse the ministry, if possible, who seem to awake to nothing but the preservation of their places-to awaken the King.

Early in the last spring, a motion was made in Parliament for inquiring into the state of the navy, and an augmentation of six thousand seamen was offered to the ministry. They refused to give us any insight into the condition of the navy, and rejected the augmentation. Early in June they received advice of a commencement of hostilities by a Spanish armament, which had warned the King's garrison to quit an island belonging to his Majesty. From that to the 12th of September, as if nothing had happened, they lay dormant. Not a man was raised, not a single ship was put into commission. From the 12th of September, when they heard of the first blow being actually struck, we are to date the beginning of their preparations for defense. Let us now inquire, my Lords, what expedition they have used, what vigor they have exerted. We have heard wonders of the diligence employed in impressing, of the large bounties offered, and the number of ships put into commission. These have been, for some time past, the constant topics of ministerial boast and triumph. Without regarding the description, let us look to the substance. I tell your Lordships that, with all this vigor and expedition, they have not, in a period of considerably more than two months, raised ten thousand seamen. I mention that number, meaning to speak largely, though in my own breast I am convinced that the number does not exceed eight thousand. But it is said they have ordered forty ships of the line into commission. My Lords, upon this subject I can speak with knowledge. I have been conversant in these matters, and draw my information from the greatest and most respectable naval authority that ever existed in this country-I mean the late Lord Anson. The merits of that great man are not so universally known, nor his memory so warmly respected as he deserved. To his wisdom, to his experience and care (and I speak it with pleasure), the nation owes the glorious naval successes of the last war. The state of facts laid before Parliament in the year 1756, so entirely convinced me of the injustice done to his character, that in spite of the popular clamors raised against him, in direct opposition to the complaints of the merchants, and of the whole city (whose favor I am supposed to court upon all occasions), I replaced him at the head of the Admiralty, and I thank God that I had resolution enough to do so. Instructed by this great seaman, I do affirm, that forty ships of the line, with their necessary attendant frigates, to be properly manned, require forty thousand seamen. If your Lordships are surprised at this assertion, you will be more so when I assure you, that in the last war, this country maintained eighty-five thousand seamen, and employed them all.

Now, my Lords, the peace establishment of your navy, supposing it complete and effective (which, by-the-by, ought to be known), is six

teen thousand men. Add to these the number newly raised, and you have about twenty-five thousand men to man your fleet. I shall come presently to the application of this force, such as it is, and compare it with the services which I know are indispensable. But first, my Lords, let us have done with the boasted vigor of the ministry. Let us hear no more of their activity. If your Lordships will recall to your minds the state of this country when Mahon was taken, and compare what was done by government at that time with the efforts now made in very similar circumstances, you will be able to determine what praise is due to the vigorous operations of the present ministry. Upon the first intelligence of the invasion of Minorca, a great fleet was equipped and sent out, and near double the number of seamen collected in half the time taken to fit out the present force, which, pitiful as it is, is not yet, if the occasion was ever so pressing, in a condition to go to sea. Consult the returns which were laid before Parliament in the year 1756. I was one of those who urged a parliamentary inquiry into the conduct of the ministry. That ministry, my Lords, in the midst of universal censure and reproach, had honor and virtue enough to promote the inquiry themselves. They scorned to evade it by the mean expedient of putting a previous question. Upon the strictest inquiry, it appeared that the diligence they had used in sending a squadron to the Mediterranean, and in their other naval preparations, was beyond all example.

My Lords, the subject on which I am speaking seems to call upon me, and I willingly take this occasion, to declare my opinion upon a question on which much wicked pains have been employed to disturb the minds of the people and to distress government. My opinion may not be very popular; neither am I running the race of popularity. I am myself clearly convinced, and I believe every man who knows any thing of the English navy will acknowledge, that without impressing, it is impossible to equip a respectable fleet within the time in which such armaments are usually wanted. If this fact be admitted, and if the necessity of arming upon a sudden emergency should appear incontrovertible, what shall we think of those men who, in the moment of danger, would stop the great defense of their country? Upon whatever principle they may act, the act itself is more than faction—it is laboring to cut off the right hand of the community. I wholly condemn their conduct, and am ready to support any motion that may be made for bringing those aldermen, who have endeavored to stop the execution of the Admiralty warrants, to the bar of this House. My Lords, I do not rest my opinion merely upon necessity. I am satisfied that the power of impressing is founded upon uninterrupted usage. It is the "consuetudo regni" [the custom of the realm], and part of the common law prerogative of the Crown. When I condemn the proceedings of some persons upon this occasion, let me do justice to a man whose character and conduct

have been most infamously traduced; I mean | ice shall accept of the command and stake his the late Lord Mayor, Mr. Treacothick. In the reputation upon it. We have one ship of the midst of reproach and clamor, he had firmness line at Jamaica, one at the Leeward Islands, and enough to persevere in doing his duty. I do not one at Gibraltar! Yet at this very moment, for know in office a more upright magistrate, nor, aught that the ministry know, both Jamaica and in private life, a worthier man. Gibraltar may be attacked; and if they are attacked (which God forbid), they must fall. Nothing can prevent it but the appearance of a superior squadron. It is true that, some two months ago, four ships of the line were ordered from Portsmouth and one from Plymouth, to carry a relief from Ireland to Gibraltar. These ships, my Lords, a week ago were still in port. If, upon their arrival at Gibraltar, they should find the bay possessed by a superior squadron, the relief can not be landed; and if it could be land

Permit me now, my Lords, to state to your Lordships the extent and variety of the service which must be provided for, and to compare them with our apparent resources. A due attention to, and provision for these services, is prudence in time of peace; in war it is necessity. Preventive policy, my Lords, which obviates or avoids the injury, is far preferable to that vindictive policy which aims at reparation, or has no object but revenge. The precaution that meets the disorder is cheap and easy; the rem-ed, of what force do your Lordships think it conedy which follows it, bloody and expensive. The first great and acknowledged object of national defense in this country is to maintain such a superior naval force at home, that even the united fleets of France and Spain may never be masters of the Channel. If that should ever happen, what is there to hinder their landing in Ireland, or even upon our own coast? They have often made the attempt. In King William's time it succeeded. King James embarked on board a French fleet, and landed with a French army in Ireland. In the mean time the French were masters of the Channel, and continued so until their fleet was destroyed by Admiral Russel. As to the probable consequences of a foreign army landing in Great Britain or Ireland, I shall offer your Lordships my opinion when I speak of the actual condition of our standing army.

The second naval object with an English minister should be to maintain at all times a powerful Western squadron. In the profoundest peace it should be respectable; in war it should be formidable. Without it, the colonies, the commerce, the navigation of Great Britain, lie at the mercy of the house of Bourbon. While I had the honor of acting with Lord Anson, that able officer never ceased to inculcate upon the minds of his Majesty's servants, the necessity of constantly maintaining a strong Western squadron; and I must vouch for him, that while he was at the head of the marine, it was never neglected.

The third object indispensable, as I conceive, in the distribution of our navy, is to maintain such a force in the Bay of Gibraltar as may be sufficient to cover that garrison, to watch the motions of the Spaniards, and to keep open the communication with Minorca. The ministry will not betray such a want of information as to dispute the truth of any of these propositions. | But how will your Lordships be astonished when I inform you in what manner they have provided for these great, these essential objects? As to

the first-I mean the defense of the ChannelI take upon myself to affirm to your Lordships, that, at this hour (and I beg that the date may be taken down and observed), we can not send out eleven ships of the line so manned and equipped, that any officer of rank and credit in the serv

sists? Two regiments, of four hundred men
each, at a time like this, are sent to secure a
place of such importance as Gibraltar ! a place
which it is universally agreed can not hold out
against a vigorous attack from the sea, if once
the enemy should be so far masters of the bay
as to make a good landing even with a moderate
force. The indispensable service of the lines
requires at least four thousand men.
The pres-
ent garrison consists of about two thousand three
hundred; so that if the relief should be fortu-
nate enough to get on shore, they will want eight
hundred men of their necessary complement.

Let us now, my Lords, turn our eyes home-
ward. When the defense of Great Britain or
Ireland is in question, it is no longer a point of
honor; it is not the security of foreign com-
merce or foreign possessions; we are to con-
tend for the being of the state.
I have good
authority to assure your Lordships that the
Spaniards have now a fleet at Ferrol, complete-
ly manned and ready to sail, which we are in
no condition to meet. We could not this day
send out eleven ships of the line properly equip-
ped, and to-morrow the enemy may be masters
of the Channel. It is unnecessary to press the
consequences of these facts upon your Lord-
ships' minds. If the enemy were to land in full
force, either upon this coast or in Ireland, where
is your army? Where is your defense? My
Lords, if the house of Bourbon make a wise and
vigorous use of the actual advantages they have
over us, it is more than probable that on this day
month we may not be a nation.
What military
force can the ministry show to answer any sud-
den demand? I do not speak of foreign expe-
ditions or offensive operations; I speak of the
interior defense of Ireland and of this country.
You have a nominal army of seventy battalions,
besides guards and cavalry. But what is the
establishment of these battalions? Supposing
they were complete in the numbers allowed,
which I know they are not, each regiment
would consist of something less than four hun-
dred men, rank and file. Are these battalions
complete? Have any orders been given for an
augmentation, or do the ministry mean to con-
tinue them upon their present low establishment?
When America, the West Indies, Gibraltar, and

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