Fruition, and the Vanity of all Created Good, where the expectation is always fo much greater than the actual Enjoyment, may perhaps ferve with too much Reason to plead for, and recommend fuch a fort of Love as this is. But why this fhould be call'd by the name of Platonic Love, the belt reafon that I know of, is because People will have it fo. That Dialogue wherein Plate treats of Love, is indeed very Myftical and Allegorical; where under the veil of Figures and Similitudes, after the manner of the Old Philofophers and Poets, he represents a great deal of Philofophic Truth. But if his Interpreter Serranus understands him rightly, the main of his Notion feems reducible to thefe Two Things. First, he confiders the nature of Love, by which he means the fame as the Appetite of Happiness, or the defire of Self-Prefervation, or that inclination which all Creatures naturally have of obtaining their own proper Good; which indeed is the moft General and Adequate Notion of Love. Then having defcribed the nature of Love, he comes next to explain its Office, and to fhew (as he does at large) how many, and how great Advantages arise to us from it. Of which the laft and the greatest is this, how we may gradually afcend from the many Fairs to the chief Fair, that is to God, in whom is true Felicity. That thefe Fairs which are expofed to our Eyes, are fo to be look'd upon and loved, not that we should stick in them, but that by them, as by fo many steps we should Afcend to him who is the very Idea of Beauty, and who is the Caufe of all that is fair, that is to God, the chief good. So that the thing principally intended by Plato in his Love, and confequently that which we are chiefly to underland by what we call Platonic Love, is the Afcent of the Soul to God by the fteps of Inferiour and Subordinate Beauties; which fteps, according to Plato's own Account are thus difpofed. From the Beauty of Bodies to the Beauty of the Soul, from the Beauty of the Soul to the Beauty that is in the Offices of Life and Laws, and from thence to the Beauty X 3 But if Luft be taken in the later fenfe, as a Defire of Corporeal Pleasure in unlawful Inftances, that which our Saviour meant when he faid, He that looks upon a Woman to Luft after her, &c. Then 'tis not neceffary that the Paffion we here fpeak of fhould be Luft, becaufe then 'twould be a Sin to be in Love, and confequently, there would be a neceffity of Sinning in order to Marriage; becaufe no Man is fuppofed to Marry, but whom he thus Loves. 5. And now to your fecond Enquiry, Whether Mufick be a Senfual or Intellectual Pleafure: Before this can be determin'd, the Idea of a Senfual and Intellectual Pleasure must be stated. 6. For the better conceiving of which it is here to be confider'd, that fince Matter is not capable of Thought, it must be the Soul only that is the proper Subject both of Pleasure and Pain. And accordingly it will be neceffary to fay that the true difference between Intellectual and Senfual Pleafure does confift, not in this that Intellectual Pleasure is that which is perceiv'd by the Soul, and Senfual that which is perceiv'd by the Body; for the Body perceives not at all. Nor yet (as I once reprefented it in this very Account) in this, that Sensual Pleasure is when the Body is primarily affected, and the Soul fecondarily, or by participation; and that Intellectual Pleasure is when the Soul is primarily affected, and the Body fecondarily, or by participation, (the Soul being the only true percipient in both) but rather in this,' that Senfual Pleafure is that which the Soul perceives by the mediation of the Body, upon the occafion of fome Motion or Impreffion made upon it; whereas IntelleCtual Pleasure is that which the Soul perceives immediately by it felf, and from her own Thoughts, without any fuch occafion from the Body. 7. Now according to this Measure it feems moft reafonable to define the Pleasure of Mufic to be properly Intellectual. For tho' Sound fingly and abfolutely confider'd (which is the material part of Mufic) be a Senfa tion, that is, a Sentiment in the Soul refulting from fome Movement of the Body, and fo the Pleasure that arifes from the hearing it be accordingly a Senfual Pleafure, as truly, tho' not fo grofly, as Smelling or Tafting is, yet the Harmony and Proportion of Sounds (which is that wherein Mufic formally confists) is an Abftract and Intelligible Thing, and the Pleasure of it arifes not from any Bodily Movement, (as the other does) but from the Soul it felf contemplating the Beauty and Agreement of it. To which Beauty and Agreement, that it is in Sounds is purely accidental, fince the Sout would be pleased with the fame Proportion wherever it finds it. Nor is it proper to fay that we hear Mufic; That which we hear is only the Sound, which is a Senfation in our felves, but the Mufic-part we properly think and contemplate as an intelligible Beauty, in like manner as we do the Beauty of Truth. And confequently, the Pleasure of it must be as much Intellectual as that of the other is. To all which it may be added in the laft place, That Mufic confifting formally in Proportion, and Proportion pleafing only as underftood, the Plea fure of it must needs be Intellectual, as refulting from Thought and Underflanding, as all other Intellectual Pleasures do. 8. And thus, Sir, you have my Sentiments, with as much Brevity and Clearness as I could ule, and it may be, as the Matters would bear. I have now nothing fur ther to add, but to renew the Affurances of my being Your Friend and Servant, J. N. But if Luft be taken in the later fenfe, as a Defire of Corporeal Pleasure in unlawful Inftances, that which our Saviour meant when he faid, He that looks upon a Woman to Luft after her, &c. Then 'tis not neceffary that the Paffion we here fpeak of fhould be Luft, because then 'twould be a Sin to be in Love, and confequently, there would be a neceffity of Sinning in order to Marriage; becaufe no Man is fuppofed to Marry, but whom he thus Loves. 5. And now to your fecond Enquiry, Whether Mufick be a Senfual or Intellectual Pleafure: Before this can be determin'd, the Idea of a Senfual and Intellectual Pleasure must be stated. 6. For the better conceiving of which it is here to be confider'd, that fince Matter is not capable of Thought, it must be the Soul only that is the proper Subject both of Pleasure and Pain. And accordingly it will be neceffary to fay that the true difference between Intellectual and Senfual Pleasure does confift, not in this that Intellectual Pleasure is that which is perceiv'd by the Soul, and Senfual that which is perceiv'd by the Body; for the Body perceives not at all. Nor yet (as I once reprefented it in this very Account) in this, that Senfual Pleasure is when the Body is primarily affected, and the Soul fecondarily, or by participation; and that Intellectual Pleasure is when the Soul is primarily affected, and the Body fecondarily, or by participation, (the Soul being the only true percipient in both) but rather in this, that Senfual Pleafure is that which the Soul perceives by the mediation of the Body, upon the occafion of fome Motion or Impreffion made upon it; whereas IntelleCtual Pleasure is that which the Soul perceives immediately by it felf, and from her own Thoughts, without any fuch occafion from the Body. 7. Now according to this Measure it feems moft reafonable to define the Pleafure of Mufic to be properly Intellectual. For tho' Sound fingly and abfolutely con fider'd (which is the material part of Mufic) be a Senfa tion, that is, a Sentiment in the Soul refulting from fome Movement of the Body, and fo the Pleasure that arifes from the hearing it be accordingly a Senfual Pleafure, as truly, tho' not fo grofly, as Smeiling or Tafting is, yet the Harmony and Proportion of Sounds (which is that wherein Mufic formally confifts) is an Abftract and Intelligible Thing, and the Pleasure of it arifes not from any Bodily Movement, (as the other does) but from the Soul it felf contemplating the Beauty and Agreement of it. To which Beauty and Agreement, that it is in Sounds is purely accidental, fince the Soul would be pleased with the fame Proportion wherever it finds it. Nor is it proper to fay that we hear Mufic; That which we hear is only the Sound, which is a Sentation in our felves, but the Mufic-part we properly think and contemplate as an intelligible Beauty, in like manner as we do the Beauty of Truth. And confequently, the Pleasure of it must be as much Intellectual as that of the other is. To all which it may be added in the laft place, That Mufic confifting formally in Proportion, and Proportion pleafing only as underitood, the Pleafure of it must needs be Intellectual, as refulting from Thought and Underlanding, as all other Intellectual Pleasures do. 8. And thus, Sir, you have my Sentiments, with as much Brevity and Clearnels as I could ute, and it may be, as the Matters would bear. I have now nothing further to add, but to renew the Affurances of my being Your Friend and Servant, J. N. |