lovely, which can promote the happiness of his fellow-creatures, or secure the approbation of his God.

Thus have I taken a summary comparative view of these two schemes of existence. In that of the Christian, an intelligent mind, possessed of boundless power, wisdom, and goodness, existed from everlasting; commanded into being the universe of matter, and the universe of minds; is present in every place; sees, with an intuitive survey, every thing; controls all things with an almighty and unerring hand; and directs all to the accomplishment of the divine and eternal purpose, for which all were made. Over the universe of minds, destined to an immortal existence, he exercises a moral and eternal government; and prescribes laws which require the best conduct, and insure the greatest happiness. To obedience he promises an endless reward, to disobedience he threatens an endless punishment. From this great source the Christian sees himself derived, to this glorious end believes himself destined; and in this sublime scheme is presented with all motives to make him good, and with all means to make him happy.

The Atheist, on the contrary, supposes all things derived from chance or necessity; originated without design, existing to no purpose, and terminating, whenever they do terminate, by the coercion of fate, or the sport of accident, as they began. Himself he regards as a lump of organised matter, without a mind, without law or government, except that of fate or force; without moral action, incapable of obligation or rectitude, united to his fellow-men only by time and place, formed only to animal enjoyment, and destined to perish with his kindred brutes. By this scheme, all that is glorious, divine and lovely, in that of the Christian, is annihilated; and all which in the natural world cannot be annihilated, and which possesses an inherent greatness and sublimity, is miserably contracted and degraded. Nothing is left to expand his views, refine his affections, or ennoble his conduct. Motives to virtue, dignity, and usefulness, he obliterates from the creation. In the future world he finds no such motives, for to him the future world is nothing. His evil passions, in the mean time (for such passions, whencesoever derived, he possesses) are let loose without restraint, to rage and riot without control. Of all motives to do evil his

scheme is prolific, of motives to do good it is absolutely barren. At the same time it is founded on mere hypothesis, sustained by no evidence, and believed against demonstration and impossibility.

Thus it is, I think, unanswerably evident, that he who hath said, There is no God, is a Fool; that his Atheism is a scheme dictated only by an evil heart; that it corrupts, of course, the whole moral character; that it is productive of all abominable works, and that it completely precludes the performance of any thing that is good.

SERMON IV.

UNITY OF GOD.

THERE IS NONE OTHER GOD BUT ONE.

1 CORINTHIANS VIII. 4.

IN the three preceding Sermons I have attempted to prove the Existence of God; to refute the objections, and expose the systems of Atheists; and by an examination of the necessary influence of these systems on the intellect, heart, and life, compared with that of the Christian system, to shew the malignant efficacy of the former, and the desirable consequences of the latter.

The text is a direct declaration of the Unity of God, the next subject of discourse in the order which I have proposed.

That there is but one God, is a doctrine acknowledged in this country by every man. No attempt therefore to prove the soundness of this doctrine by arguments can be necessary, in order to produce conviction of its truth. My design in choosing it for the subject of the present Discourse is, to exhibit the manner in which we become possessed of it, and the evidence with which it is attended. In pursuing this design, I shall inquire,

I. What arguments are presented to us by the works of Creation and Providence in support of this doctrine: II. What views men have entertained concerning it, under the direction of Reason:

III. What has been the influence of Revelation on the reception and continuance of this doctrine.

I. I shall inquire, what arguments are presented to us by the works of Creation and Providence, in support of this doctrine.

In answer to this inquiry, I observe, that the works of Creation and Providence furnish to Reason, unaided by Revelation, the following considerations.

1. The human mind, whenever it has admitted the being of One infinite God, has plainly found a difficulty in admitting the existence of more.

This argument I have chosen to express in these general terms, because I am aware that different men have thought differently concerning this subject. This indeed is not at all to be wondered at, when we remember the peculiarly abstruse nature of those doctrines which respect Infinity. The only conception which the human mind is capable of forming concerning infinity is, that it exists. This fact we distinctly understand, and from it we can argue with success; but the nature of the thing, which is infinite, or, in more proper language, the nature of infinity itself, we cannot understand, nor can we argue from it at all. As the idea cannot enter our minds, so it is plain, we can never compare it with any other idea; for it is self-evident, that an idea which we have not, can never by us be compared with another idea. Of course,

no proposition can be formed by us in this case, and no argument founded or conducted, with any knowledge or evidence. In every such case, when men think that they conceive, argue, conclude, and demonstrate, they deceive themselves; and will, if they examine, find, that they have formed propositions without ideas, or mere collections of signs without any thing signified; so far at least as they are concerned.

Multitudes of mankind have considered it as obviously impossible, that two infinite beings should exist. As an infinite being and finite beings can, however, coexist in time and place, I see no decisive evidence, that two infinite beings cannot coexist. In truth, there is no perceptible difficulty arising from the nature of the case, in supposing, that Spirits, or immaterial beings, can occupy the same place at the same time. The contrary opinion seems at least to attribute to Spirits a property, or mode of being, substantially the same with what is called Solidity, or Impenetrability, in Matter.

Others, and so far as I know, all who have acknowledged

one infinite God, have regarded the acknowledgment of more as an absurdity. In this sentiment have concurred the Patriarchs, Jews, Christians, Mohammedans, and all those modern Infidels, who have not denied the existence of such a God. These classes of men have with one voice renounced the idea of more than one such God. Such a general accordance in men, differing in other respects so widely, clearly indicates, that the admission of one infinite God brings with it to the human mind, serious difficulties against the admission of more; and plainly implies, that more cannot be admitted by the mind without violence done to the understanding.

Some degree of force is lent to this argument by Polytheism. Wherever more gods than one have been acknowledged, it is remarkable, that none of them have been considered as Infinite.

The ideas of polytheistical nations concerning their gods have, I confess, been confused and contradictory. But it appears to me evident, that no such nation, and no individual holding a plurality of gods, has ever introduced an infinitely perfect being into a religious creed. From this fact it would seem, that the idea of infinite perfection was, in the view of the human mind, incompatible with polytheism.

Several ancient nations, as well as individuals, particularly the Persians, Egyptians, Chaldeans, and Greeks, according to Plutarch, agreed in the acknowledgment of two gods. Plutarch himself also, and according to his testimony Plato, in his old age, together with the Pythagoreans, acknowledged two gods; the one the author of good, the other the author of evil. From the account given of this subject, taken in all its parts, it would seem however, that the evil God, or Anupyos, was inferior to the Ayabapyos, or good God. Two equal original causes seem not to have been received into any scheme of theology, much less two infinite original causes. That such was generally the fact, if not universally, will I presume be acknowledged without a question.

From all these facts taken together, it may I think be fairly concluded, that the sense of the human mind has everywhere been against the admission of more than one Infinite God.

2. Although the proofs of the existence of God are complete, yet there is no proof of the existence of more than one God.

The argument for the being of God, which I mentioned as