SERMON XXIV.

THE SOUL NOT A CHAIN

OF

IDEAS AND EXERCISES.

AND THE LORD GOD FORMED MAN OF THE DUST OF THE GROUND, AND BREATHED INTO HIS NOSTRILS THE BREATH OF LIFE, AND MAN BECAME A LIVING SOUL.

GENESIS II. 7.

IN my last Discourse, I proposed to consider the Nature of the human Soul. Concerning this subject I remarked, that there were three entirely different opinions.

The first of these, in the order in which they were then mentioned, is, That man is an immaterial substance, an intelligent, voluntary being; the subject of attributes, the author of actions, and destined to immortality.

The second is, That man is a material, thinking, voluntary being; differing in nothing, but his modification and its effects, from other material substances. Some of those who hold this scheme believe him immortal, while others limit his existence to the present world.

The third is, That man is neither of these, but a mere suc'cession or chain, as the abettors of it express themselves, of ideas and exercises.

In discussing this subject, I proposed the following plan,

viz. to prove the first of these doctrines, by disproving the two last observing, that as one of the three is unquestionably true, if the two last are false, the first is true of course.

The second, which asserts the soul to be material, I then considered at length.

I shall now proceed to the consideration of the third, which asserts, That the soul is a mere succession, or chain, of ideas and exercises.

Before I commence the direct arguments against this doctrine in form, it will be proper to say something on the principal reason alleged against the reception of the first of these schemes; or that which I consider as the true one, and made particularly the foundation of the reception of the third. This reason, so far as I have been informed of it (and I have heard it alleged by the ablest philosopher among all those whom I have known to adopt this scheme, on this side of the Atlantic,) is the following; that we can form no conception of any thing in ourselves, beyond our ideas and exercises. Of these we are conscious and certain; but of a supposed substance in which these are inherent, a cause whence they proceed, an agent who is the author of them, we have no conception. This argument, reduced to a general form, will stand thus; That nothing exists, of which we have no conception. For undoubtedly, if the argument is conclusive, or has weight, when alleged against the existence of man as an agent, substance, or cause; it will have the same weight or conclusiveness, against the existence of every other agent, cause, or substance; and in a word, against the existence of every thing of which we cannot form a conception.

Let us now briefly consider the length to which we shall necessarily be carried by the adoption of this supposed principle.

Of God, the original Existence, from whom all things else are derived, it is said in the Scriptures, (and Reason subjoins her fullest attestation to what is said) Canst thou by searching find out God; canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?' It,' that is, this subject, is high as heaven, what canst thou do? deeper than hell, what canst thou know? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea.' Concerning the omnipresence and omniscience of this

great Being, David exclaims, Such knowledge is too wonderful for me; it is high, I cannot attain unto it.' According to the abovementioned principle, all that which we cannot understand concerning God has no existence, and must stand for nothing. But how little do we understand concerning God: particularly, of the nature of that exalted Being; his influence as a cause, and his mode of operating. To apply the argument to the case in hand: it is, undoubtedly, at least as difficult to conceive of an Infinite agent as a finite one. If then we are to deny the existence of a finite agent, because we can form no conception of the substance of such a being, or the modes in which he operates, or the power which he possesses of producing effects; then we must also deny the existence of an Infinite agent, for exactly the same reason; since it is perfectly plain, that we can no more form any conception of these things in Him.

Nor shall we have any happier success in our inquiries concerning attributes and operations. God styles himself merciful, gracious, true, faithful, and just; and we uniformly attribute to him mercy, grace, wisdom, truth, faithfulness, and justice. These names are supposed to stand for certain things which they indicate; things which in fact exist. In the same manner also they are considered by God himself, as is evident from this plain reason: that he adopts them to express his views to mankind, as they adopt them toexpress theirs to each other; and does not indicate what, if the case were otherwise, veracity plainly demands; that he uses them in a manner diverse from that in which they are used by men. What then is the meaning of these words? What for example is Truth in God? There are but two answers which can be given to the question. One is, that he has invariably spoken truth; and the other, that there is in him a cause, disposition or propensity, which induces or inclines him to speak truth. It hardly needs to be observed, that the former of these is very rarely intended, when we speak of the Veracity of God; and the latter, almost always. As this cannot but be admitted by every man, so it is expressly declared in many parts of the Scriptures. St. Paul, speaking concerning the oath of God to Abraham, says, that it was impossible for God to lie.' Now it is perfectly evident, that the mere fact that God has invariably spoken truth heretofore, infers not in any de

All which

gree an impossibility that he should lie hereafter. can be said concerning this fact is, that it gives us satisfactory reason to conclude that he will not. The impossibility of his speaking falsehood is supposed by us to exist, where it must necessarily exist, if at all, in the cause which induces him to speak truth; that is, in the moral attribute of his nature, commonly called Truth or Veracity. If there be nothing in his nature which, as a cause, influences him to speak truth; then his speaking truth heretofore has been, and his speaking truth hereafter, if he should in fact speak it, will be a mere contingency. If then it is impossible for God to lie;' it is so for this reason only, that there is in his nature a cause which invariably produces truth in him, as its proper and uniform effect; viz. the moral attribute of truth or veracity.

But of this cause, what conception are we able to form? Plainly, none at all. Its effects are all that we know; and from these only, or from its connection with other moral attributes, do we argue even its existence. Shall we then deny this attribute to God; and say that all which we mean, and all which he means, when he is called a God of truth, is, that he has invariably spoken truth hitherto. There was a period in duration when he had not spoken at all; because there was no being beside himself, and therefore none to whom he could speak. But will any man say he was not then as truly and entirely as at any period afterwards, a God of truth?

Nor shall we be materially more successful in our inquiries concerning operations, than concerning attributes and agents. Christ declares that every man who sees the kingdom of God, must be born again of the Spirit of God.' But what conception are we able to form of regeneration, beyond the mere fact. Christ himself teaches us in his allusion to the wind, in the same discourse, that we are unconscious alike of the manner in which, and the Agent by whom it is produced. Shall we then deny the fact, that man is thus regenerated? What is true of the attribute of truth, thus considered, and of the operation by which the new birth is thus formed in man, is equally true of other attributes and other operations. Universally, substance, causation, and modus operandi, lie wholly beyond our reach. But shall we on this account deny the facts; or assert that there are no causes to produce them? In the former case, we shall annihilate the universe at once;

and in the latter, pronounce every fact to be a mere contingency.

Thus it appears, that the general argument on which the scheme concerning the human soul, opposed in this discourse, is founded, does not contribute, even in the remotest manner, to support it. It appears also, that according to this argument, the very fundamental principles of all science must be given up, as a collection of palpable absurdities.

Having premised these things, I shall now proceed to offer some direct arguments against this scheme.

1. It is directly contrary to the natural conceptions of mankind, and is therefore false.

Every man living, naturally and originally conceives, that he himself is a being, a substance, an agent; immediately the subject of his own thoughts, and the cause and author of his volitions and actions. By his preceding thoughts, volitions, and actions, he feels conscious to himself that he influences, in a great variety of ways, those which succeed; and that by his past and present conduct he so influences his future conduct, that it would never be what it is, but for such influence. At the same time he is equally conscious, that he was the subject of past thoughts, and the author of past conduct, during a period which he denominates his life. This he considers himself as knowing, by means of the evidence termed remembrance; and regards himself as having had, from the utmost limit of that period, a continued being. This he witnesses every day by saying, I was the subject of such and such thoughts, and the author of such and such conduct and designs, at such and such times' denoting, that the something which he calls I,' and which he considers as a living, acting existence, was in being at these several times, and has had a continued being to the present time. He does not say, Such an idea existed at such a time; such a volition, such an exercise or action:' but that I,' a certain something, totally distinct from the idea or the exercise,' was the subject of that idea or exercise, the author of it; the agent by whom it was performed, or brought to pass.' Whether this be not the only course of thinking adopted by us with respect to this subject, I appeal to every member of this assembly to decide: for he will find the proof complete in his own mind.

This mode of thinking is so na