couragement which I have obviated, and then admits it. To a dispassionate, unbiassed mind, it would never gain admission. By sober reason it was never devised, and can never be supported.

Were God really unwilling that men should strive; had he discountenanced efforts, had he established no means of grace; or had those means, when anxiously and perseveringly used, failed of success; there would indeed be ample room for well founded discouragement. But when we find, as in my view we do in fact find, all these things reversed in the good pleasure and providence of God, we have every inducement to hope and to labour; much more, it would seem, than from any supposable situation, in which all things were left to fluctuation and casualty. Stupid sinners have indeed, according to this and every other scheme, the most fearful reason for discouragement and terror. But such as are awakened, anxious and engaged to seek eternal life, have solid and abundant reason for hope.

Mankind seem i: many instances to suppose, that the decrees of God produce the event without means, according to the Mohammedan doctrine of predestination. Whereas, if they believed, that the pleasure of God formed the system, and selected the means and agents by which all events are accomplished; if they believed those agents to be endued with all the powers of the freest possible agency, and to be selected and formed, so that they might act with perfect freedom; if they believed that God always furnishes them with the necessary means of obedience, and with motives to obedience, more and greater than any which they can find to disobey; if they believed that God, by a direct agency of his own, does not constrain them to any act whatever, but leaves them in all instances to act with perfect freedom, just as they please; I think they would also believe, that there is no more difficulty attending the fact, that he has chosen and formed such agents as he knew would unitedly do all his pleasure, than would attend his choice and formation of such agents as would act in any other manner whatever. But all this, for aught that appears, is true. The contrary doctrine has never been evinced to be true, at least in my apprehension, and I fully believe never will be.

On the other hand, it will be proper for a moment to turn

Can this be

our thoughts to the influence of the supposition, that God has not fixed the system of things according to his pleasure. It cannot but be acknowledged, that he knew what system was upon the whole most desirable, wisest and best. If he did not resolve on it, it was plainly because he did not desire or choose to bring it to pass. In plain English then, he did not desire the chief good of his creation, or the supreme glory of himself, with sufficient good-will to resolve on it. infinite good-will? Can it be moral perfection? It was certainly as easy for him to accomplish it, as to accomplish an inferior system of good. If then he did not resolve on the superior system, it was plainly because he loved the inferior system better, and chose to do less good rather than greater. His disposition therefore is, on this scheme, imperfectly good in itself; how imperfectly, it is impossible, according to this supposition, to determine.

According to this supposition it is further to be observed, all things are left by God in a state of absolute uncertainty. The whole happiness of his intelligent creatures is committed to the casual influence and efficacy of their own views, feelings, and conduct. God cannot, in the nature of the case, interfere, either by determination or influence, without destroying the free agency or discouraging the efforts of his intelligent creatures, for the attainment of happiness. The whole system of the universe, so far as these creatures are concerned, must of course be regulated wholly by them. Does not this scheme evidently set all their interests afloat, and leave them eternally to the uncertain and hazardous direction of finite wisdom and goodness? From the experience which we have had of the character and conduct of such creatures, is there a person in this assembly who would willingly commit his eternal interests to this perilous direction, and trust his all to the disposal of beings so weak and often so wicked? Can this be safe for creatures? Can it consist with the perfect character of God? To the wisdom and forecast of his own mind a man might, through overweening self-confidence, be willing perhaps to commit the guidance of any interest, and feel that his soul itself would be safe in his own hands. But would the same person trust himself to the final direction of others? Would he venture his eternal welfare upon the wisdom and benevolence of any or all of those by whom he is encircled? Their

fitness for this mighty trust is however not inferior to his own, and they would as justly refuse to confide their souls to his care, as he would refuse to entrust his soul to them. Were he not blinded therefore by an unwarrantable partiality for himself, he would no sooner, no more willingly, trust himself in this mighty concern, than he would trust those around him. To do either, he would clearly discern, would be foolish and dangerous in the extreme. Wisdom, on the contrary, would teach both him and them to commit themselves, and their whole wellbeing, implicitly to God.

On the connection of Prayer with this subject, I design to dwell particularly, when I shall come to the consideration of that duty. I have purposely omitted the examination of it at the present time, because several things relating to it belong to Prayer only, and demand a separate discussion.

Whether the observations which I have made on the general doctrine of this Discourse, will be viewed by others as possessing the importance which I have attached to them, I cannot determine. To me they have appeared to possess real weight. If they should contribute in any measure to remove difficulties, to settle doubtful opinions, to establish truth, and to communicate satisfactory views concerning a subject so often attended with perplexity and alarm, I shall esteem my labours amply rewarded.

SERMON XVI.

THE SOVEREIGNTY OF GOD.

O LORD, I KNOW THAT THE WAY OF MAN IS NOT IN HIMSELF; IT IS NOT IN MAN THAT WALKETH TO DIRECT HIS STEPS.

JEREMIAH x, 23.

In this passage of Scripture, the prophet, after uttering a variety of sublime declarations, concerning the perfections and providence of God, and the follies and sins of men, exhibits the progress of life as a way. In this way, all men are considered as travelling. We commence the journey at our birth, pass on through the several stages of childhood, youth, manhood, and old age, and finish it when we enter eternity. The accommodations and the fare are greatly varied among the various travellers. Some find their entertainment plentiful and agreeable; and some, even luxurious and splendid. Others are slenderly provided with food, raiment, and lodging; are almost mere sufferers, and literally have not where to lay their heads.

In the mean time, sorrow and disease, dangers and accidents, like a band of marauders, lie in wait for the travellers; and harrass and destroy a great proportion of their number. Of the vast multitude who continually walk in the path of life, almost all disappear long before they reach the goal at which it terminates. A very few arrive at the end. Of these, every one, dragging heavily his weary feet over the last division of the road, teaches us, that this part of his progress is only 'labour and sorrow.'

A remarkable fact, universally attendant on our journey, is recited in the text. O Lord,' says the deeply humbled prophet, I know that the way of man is not in himself; it is not in man that walketh to direct his steps.' The enterprise is not contrived by ourselves. We are placed in it, and necessitated to accomplish it by a superior and irresistible hand. It cannot but seem strange, that in such a journey we should originally be prevented from the ability to direct ourselves; and that while we are compelled to the undertaking, we should be furnished for it in a manner so imperfect. Yet such is unquestionably the fact. Nor is the explanation so difficult, or so unsatisfactory, as we are prone to believe. God originally intended that all his creatures should be dependent on him for aid, guidance and protection. Nor can it be rationally supposed, that such a dependence on his perfections and providence, is either unreasonable or undesirable.

The Sovereignty of God, which is so clearly and strongly visible in this interesting subject, has ever been questioned, and very often denied by mankind. To establish this doctrine in the minds of my audience is the peculiar design of the present Discourse. In a sermon lately delivered in this place on the Decrees of God, I explained what I intend by the Divine Sovereignty. It was then observed, that the conduct of God is sovereign in this sense; that he does according to his will, independently and irresistibly, without giving an account of any of his matters any farther than he pleases; but that he wills nothing without the best reason, whether that reason be disclosed to his creatures or not; that real glory to himself, and real good to his creation, not otherwise attainable, are universally the object to which his pleasure is directed, whether it respects the existence and motions of an insect, or the salvation of a man. It was remarked also at that time, that in the ordinary sense of the word, God never acts arbitrarily; and that to say he wills a thing because he wills it, is to speak without meaning. All his pleasure, all his determinations are perfectly wise and good; founded on the best of all reasons, and directed to the best of all Were purposes. he to act in any other manner, his providence would be less wise and less desirable.

It will not be questioned that this doctrine is deeply interesting to man. On this life is suspended that which is to