SERMON XIV.

THE DECREES OF GOD.

BUT HE IS IN ONE MIND, AND WHO CAN TURN HIM? AND, WHAT HIS SOUL DESIRETH, EVEN THAT HE DOETH.

JOB XXIII. 13.

IN this passage of Scriptare Job asserts, that the mind or will of God is one and unchangeable, or incapable of being turned; and that all its dictates, or desires, are carried by him into execution. As God does whatsoever he chooses, it is hardly necessary to observe that he does nothing but what he chooses. As his mind is unchangeable and but one; so, this being admitted, it is intuitively certain that it has always been but one. As all things were originated, are preserved, directed and controlled by God; so it is plain that they all come to pass exactly according to his pleasure. This doctrine is therefore clearly contained in the text;

That all things, both beings and events, exist in cxact accordance with the purpose, pleasure, or what is commonly called, The Decrees of God.

Before I begin the direct discussion of this doctrine, I shall make a few preliminary observations.

It is well known to the Christian world at large, that no subject has been the foundation of more, or more strenuous, controversy than this. By various classes of Christians, and some of them very numerous, it has been roundly and steadily denied in form. The things which have been written concerning it with heat and obstinacy, would fill many volumes.

divine character, Those who have

It has been asserted to be injurious to the and destructive of all finite moral agency. holden the doctrine, have been charged by their antagonists with denying the free agency of God himself; and with introducing into the Christian system the stoical doctrine of Fate, and making an iron-handed Necessity, or blind Destiny, the ultimate and irresistible disposer of all things. At the same time it has been alleged, that they shroud all human hopes in midnight darkness, and prevent or destroy every effort of man to become finally virtuous and happy.

Such things as these certainly prove, that there is in the human mind a strong bias against the doctrine. This appears often in the conduct of those who believe it, many of whom seem desirous that it should either rarely or never be brought into the desk. Multitudes appear utterly unwilling even to converse concerning it, and perhaps equal multitudes decline to make it a subject of contemplation.

It must be acknowledged that this doctrine has been indiscreetly handled, both in sermons and in other discourses. As many things pertaining to it are in their nature very abstruse, and many others lie without the reach of the human understanding; so it will be easily believed, that in the ardour of investigation, disputants will of course be in danger of asserting many things which are neither satisfactorily evinced, maturely considered, nor well understood by themselves; and extend their enquiries to many other things, about which inquisition is fruitless, because discovery is impracticable. The bounds of the human mind, as well as of the human race, are fixed; and beyond them it cannot pass. They are, however, distant enough from each other to leave a field of investigation so ample as to allow of the utmost employment of the greatest talents. Every attempt to push our inquiries beyond them is unwise, both because it is vain, and because it is a waste of that time which might be usefully employed on things within our reach.

But if the doctrine which I have stated is true; if it is a doctrine revealed in the Scriptures; it cannot fail to be a proper subject of thought, of conversation, and of preaching; for all Scripture is given by inspiration of God; and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, and for instruction in righteousness.' Perhaps it is unnecessary, and would not be

useful, to make it a subject of very frequent discussion in the pulpit. A considerable number of persons in every congregation must be regarded as being imperfectly competent to judge advantageously of such a subject from such discussions. Such persons, to say the least, would fail of being instructed; and if not instructed, would probably be bewildered. At the same time, though frequently asserted, it is very little discussed in the Scriptures: and the Apostle Paul, alluding to it, breaks out into this exclamation; O the depth of the riches, both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out!'

No occasion can be more proper for the introduction of this doctrine into the desk than the present. I have just finished a series of Sermons on the Being and Perfections of God. His decrees, or counsels, are the next subject of inquiry in a system professedly comprising all the important doctrines of Theology. That the doctrine concerning this subject which is true and scriptural, whatever it may be, is one and a very important one, of such a system, will not be questioned, either by those who believe or those who disbelieve the doctrine advanced, as the principal subject of the present Discourse. The controversies about it, and the sentiments expressed by the several disputants, prove this point beyond any necessity of debate.

In considering this doctrine, I shall attempt, first, to explain it; secondly, to prove it; and thirdly, to answer the objections commonly made against it.

I. I shall attempt to explain this doctrine.

This is peculiarly necessary; because, if I mistake not, both its friends and enemies have perplexed it not a little, by the manner in which they have represented the doctrine, and each other's opinions.

It has been frequently said, that the Decrees of God are the consequence of his knowledge, and that his foreknowledge is in consequence of his decrees: and it is asked, how is it possible that God should foreknow the existence of any thing, until he has decreed that it should exist? This phraseology, if applied to men or other finite beings, might be correct. Such beings usually consider, then determine, and then, so far as is applicable to their nature and circumstances, foresee or fore

know the event. But when applied to God, it is necessarily erroneous. In the Divine Mind, succession is impossible. There is not, there cannot be, one act, by which God knows any or all things; another following it, by which he determines their existence; and then another, by which he foreknows that they will exist. Whatever exists in the Divine Mind exists co-etaneously and co-eternally, with all other things which exist in it. God in this respect is no more the subject of variableness, or any shadow of turning,' than in other respects. Whatever is intended by knowledge, foreknowledge, or decrees, all is simultaneous, or absolutely co-existent. St. Paul exhibits this subject in a happier manner. Whom he foreknew,' says this Apostle, he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son.' By this declaration we are not to understand that the predestination spoken of followed the foreknowledge, any more than that the foreknowledge followed the predestination. The Apostle says, Whom he foreknew,' not after he had foreknown them.

Should it be said that this phraseology is adopted merely in condescension to human infirmity, and that it is intended to express these things as they exist in the order of nature, and not in the order of time; I answer, that the language is still dangerous, because it is incorrect in itself; and so liable to be misunderstood, that it leads both those who use it and those to whom it is used, into very serious errors. The act or state of

the Divine Mind, which gave birth to the existence of all things, is one; and there never was a period in duration, nor even an indivisible moment, in which it was not absolutely and inseparably one.

The decrees of God are often said to be general and special; the special decrees being those which respect the acceptance or rejection of mankind, and the general decrees those which respect other things. This language is also in my view erroneous, and leads those who adopt it into mischievous consequences. There is no metaphysical or real distinction in the nature of the several decrees of God. Nor are they distinguishable from each other, except either numerically, or by means of the objects which they respect. Nor is there any more speciality pertaining to one of them than to another. God wills or chooses the existence, conversion or salvation of a man, the fall of a sparrow, or the descent of rain, with a

volition in every sense metaphysically, or in its own nature, the same. The strict truth is, that one indivisible act, perhaps it might be as properly called state of the Divine Mind, gave birth to the existence of all things.

The decrees of God are frequently styled eternal. They are truly eternal, in the same sense in which God is eternal : viz. they are eternally present, and incapable of being compared, metaphysically, with a successive state of being. In this sense they are always, like God himself, possessed of an existence eternally present; being no other than an unchangeable state of the Divine Mind.

Farther, the decrees of God are said to be sovereign. In explaining this term, some persons speak of God as willing, decreeing, &c., because he wills, chooses or pleases, &c.; while others on the contrary suppose that the Decrees of God, in whatever sense understood, must if they exist, be arbitrary, and therefore unreasonable; and hence they conclude that there are no such decrees. Both, in my view, think and speak erroneously. To say that God wills a thing, because he wills it, is to speak without meaning. It is impossible that any thing should be the cause of itself, nor can an act be any more the cause of its own existence than a being. This doctrine, it is to be observed, is equally true of the final, as of the efficient cause. Nothing can be the end for which itself exists. The assertion is also injurious to God; because it exhibits him as choosing, or decreeing, without any reason, and to no end. This conduct in men, if we suppose it possible, would be folly in the extreme: it can therefore never be imputable to the only wise God.' The decrees and the conduct of God are sovereign, in the true and scriptural sense; viz. that he does according to his will, independently and irresistibly; and that he gives no account of any of his matters, any farther than he pleases. Still it is equally true, that he wills nothing without the best reason, whether the reason be disclosed to his creatures or not. Real glory to himself, and real good to his creation, not otherwise attainable, furnish the reason of the divine choice, whether it respects the existence or motions of an insect, or the conversion and salvation of a man. The kind, the degree, the manner, and many other things, are either wholly or partially unknown to us; but the good is always in view, and always the reason of the divine determination.