But either of these, and still more both of them, being too much to be attributed to accident, nothing remains but the firft fuppofition, that God, when he created the human fpecies, wifhed their happinefs, and made for them the provision which he has made, with that view, and for that purpose.

The fame argument may be propofed in different terms, thus: Contrivance proves defign; and the predominant tendency of the contrivance indicates the difpofition of the defigner. The world abounds with contrivances; and all the contrivances which we are acquainted with, are directed to beneficial purposes. Evil no doubt exifts; but is never, that we can perceive, the object of contrivance. Teeth are contrived to eat, not to ache; their aching now and then is incidental to the contrivance, perhaps, infeparable from it; or even, if you will, let it be called a defect in the contrivance; but it is not the object of it. This is a diftinction which well deferves to be attended to. In defcribing implements of hufbandry, you would hardly fay of a fickle, that it is made to cut the reaper's fingers, though from the conftruction of the inftrument, and the manner of ufing it, this mifchief often happens. But if you had occafion to defcribe inftruments of torture or execution, this engine, you would fay, is to extend the finews; this to diflocate the joints; this to break the bones; this to fcorch the foles of the feet. Here pain and mifery are the very objects of the contrivance. Now nothing of this fort is to be found in the works of nature. We never discover a train of contrivance to bring about an evil purpose. No anatomift ever discovered a fyftem of organization, calculated to produce pain and difeafe; or, in explaining the parts of the human body, ever faid, this is to irritate; this to inflame; this duct is to convey the gravel to the kidneys; this gland to fecrete the humour which forms the gout: if by chance he come at a part of which he knows not

the use, the most he can fay is, that it is useless; no one ever fufpects that it is put there to incommode, to annoy or torment. Since then God hath called forth his confummate wifdom to contrive and provide for our happiness, and the world appears to have been conftituted with this design at first, so long as this conftitution is upholden by him, we mult in reafon fuppofe the fame defign to continue. The contemplation of universal nature rather be wilders the mind than affects it. There is always a bright spot in the profpect upon which the eye refts; a fingle example, perhaps, by which each man finds himfelf more convinced than by all others put together. I feem, for my own part, to fee the benevolence of the Deity more clearly in the pleasures of very young children, than in any thing in the world. The pleafures of grown perfons may be reckoned partly of their own procuring; efpecially if there has been any induftry, or contrivance, or pursuit, to come at them; or if they are founded, like mufic, painting, &c. upon any qualification of their own acquiring. But the pleasures of a healthy infant are fo manifeftly provided for it by another, and the benevolence of the provifion is fo unquestionable, that every child I fee at its sport affords to my mind a kind of fenfible evidence of the finger of God, and of the difpofition which directs it.

But the example, which ftrikes each man most strongly, is the true example for him; and hardly two minds hit upon the fame; which fhews the abundance of fuch examples about us.

We conclude, therefore, that God wills and wishes the happiness of his creatures. And this conclufion being once eftablished, we are at liberty to go on with the rule built upon it, namely, "that the method of coming at the will of God, concerning any action, by the light of nature, is to inquire into the tendency of that action to promote or diminish the general happiness."

Chapter VI.

UTILITY.

So then actions are to be estimated by their tendency.* Whatever is expedient is right. It is the utility of any moral rule alone which conftitutes the obligation of it.

But to all this there feems a plain objection, viz. that many actions are useful, which no man in his fenses will allow to be right. There are occafions, in which the hand of the affaffin would be very ufe ful. The prefent poffeffor of fome great eftate employs his influence and fortune to annoy, corrupt, or opprefs all about him. His eftate would devolve, by his death, to a fucceffor of an oppofite character. It is useful, therefore, to dispatch fuch a one as soon as poffible out of the way; as the neighbourhood will change thereby a pernicious tyrant for a wife and generous benefactor. It may be useful to rob a mifer and give the money to the poor; as the money, no doubt, would produce more happiness, by being laid out in food and clothing for half a dozen diftreffed families, than by continuing locked up in a mifer's cheft. It may be useful to get poffeffion of a place, a piece of preferment, or of a seat in parliament, by bribery or false swearing; as by means of them we may ferve the public more effectually than in our private ftation. What then fhall we fay? Muft we admit these actions to be right, which would be to

* Actions in the abstract are right or wrong, according to their tendency the agent is virtuous or vicious, according to his defign. Thus, if the queftion be, Whether relieving common beggars be right or wrong? we inquire into the tendency of fuch a conduct to the public advantage or inconvenience. If the question be, Whether a man remarkable for this fort of bounty, is ta be efteemed virtuous for that reason? we inquire into his defign, whether his liberality sprung from charity or from ostentation? It is evident that our concern is with actions in the abstract.

justify affaffination, plunder, and perjury; or muft we give up our principle, that the criterion of right is utility?

It is not necessary to do either.

A

The true answer is this; that these actions, after all, are not useful, and for that reason, and that alone, are not right.

To fee this point perfectly, it must be observed that the bad confequences of actions are twofold, particular and general.

The particular bad confequence of an action, is the mischief which that fingle action directly and immediately occafions.

The general bad confequence is, the violation of fome neceffary or useful general rule.

Thus the particular bad confequences of the affaffination above described, are the fright and pain which the deceafed underwent ; the lofs he fuffered of life, which is as valuable to a bad man as to a good one, or more fo; the prejudice and affliction, of which his death was the occafion, to his family, friends, and dependants,

The general bad confequence is the violation of this neceffary general rule, that no man be put to death for his crimes but by public authority.

Although, therefore, fuch an action have no particular bad confequence, or greater particular good confequences, yet it is not useful by reafon of the general confequence, which is of more importance, and which is evil. And the fame of the other two inftances, and of a million more, which might be mentioned.

But as this folution fuppofes, that the moral gov. ernment of the world muft proceed by general rules, it remains that we fhew the neceffity of this.

Chapter VII.

THE NECESSITY OF GENERAL RULES.

YOU cannot permit one action and forbid another, without fhewing a difference between them. Confequently, the fame fort of actions must be generally permitted or generally forbidden. Where, therefore, the general permiffion of them would be pernicious, it becomes neceffary to lay down and fupport the rule which generally forbids them.

Thus, to return once more to the cafe of the affaffin. The affaffin knocked the rich villain on the head, because he thought him better out of the way than in it. If you allow this excufe in the prefent inftance, you must allow it to all, who act in the fame manner, and from the fame motive; that is, you must allow every man to kill any one he meets, whom he thinks noxious or useless; which, in the event, would be to commit every man's life and fafety to the fpleen, fury, and fanaticifm of his neighbour-a difpofition of affairs which would foon fill the world with mifery and confufion; and ere long put an end to human fociety, if not to the human fpecies.

The neceffity of general rules in human governments is apparent: but whether the fame neceffity fubfift in the divine economy, in that diftribution of rewards and punishments, to which a moralift looks forward, may be doubted.

I anfwer, that general rules are neceffary to every moral government; and by moral government I mean any difpenfation, whofe object is to influence the conduct of reafonable creatures.

For if, of two actions perfectly fimilar, one be punifhed, and the other be rewarded òr forgiven, which is the confequence of rejecting general rules, the fubjects of fuch a difpenfation would no longer know,