ed from these projects, namely, "lefs flexibility to the influence of the crown." And fince the diminu-"" tion of this influence is the declared, and perhaps the fole defign of the various fchemes that have been produced, whether for regulating the elections, contracting the duration, or for purifying the conftitution of parliament by the exclufion of placemen and penfioners; it is obvious to remark, that the more apt and natural, as well as the more fafe and quiet way of attaining the fame end, would be, by a direct reduction of the patronage of the crown, which might be effected to a certain extent without hazarding farther confequences. Superfluous and exorbitant emoluments of office may not only be fuppreffed for the prefent; but provifions of law be devifed, which fhould for the future restrain, within certain limits, the number and value of the offices in the donation of the king.

But whilft we difpute concerning different schemes of reformation, all directed to the fame end, a previous doubt occurs in the debate, whether the end itfelf be good or fafe--whether the influence fo loudly complained of can be deftroyed, or even much diminifhed, without danger to the state. Whilft the zeal of fome men beholds this influence with a jealoufy, which nothing but its entire abolition can appeafe, many wife and virtuous politicians deem a confiderable portion of it to be as neceffary a part of the Britifh conftitution, as any other ingredient in the compofition-to be that, indeed, which gives cohefion and folidity to the whole. Were the measures of government, fay they, oppofed from nothing but principle, government ought to have nothing but the rectitude of its measures to fupport them; but fince oppofition fprings from other motives, government muft poffefs an influence to counteract thefe motives ; to produce, not a bias of the paffions, but a neutrality: it must have fome weight to caft into the fcale to fet the balance even. It is the nature of power always to prefs upon the boundaries which confine it. Licentioufnefs, faction, envy, impatience of control or inferiority; the fecret pleafure of mortifying the

great, or the hope of difpoffeffing them; a conftant willingness to queftion and thwart whatever is dictated or even propofed by another; a difpofition common to all bodies of men to extend the claims and authority of their order; above all, that love of power and of fhewing it, which refides more or lefs in every human breaft, and which, in popular ailemblies, is inflamed, like every other paffion, by com munication and encouragement; thefe motives, added to private defigns and refentments, cherished alfo by popular acclamation, and operating upon the great fhare of power already poffefied by the houfe of commons, might induce a majority, or at least a large party of men in that affembly, to unite in endeav ouring to draw to themfelycs the whole government of the ftate; or at least so to obftruct the conduct of public affairs, by a wanton and perverfe oppofition, as to render it impoffible for the wifeft ftatefman to carry forwards the bufinefs of the nation with fuccefs or fatisfaction.

Some paffages of our national hiftory afford grounds for thefe apprehenfions. Before the acceffion of James the First, or, at least, during the reigns of his three immediate predeceffors, the government of England was a government by force; that is, the king carried his measures in parliament by intimidation. A sense of perfonal danger kept the members of the house of commons in fubjection. A conjunction of fortunate caufes delivered at laft the parliament and nation from flavery. That overbearing system, which had declined in the hands of James, expired early in the reign of his fon. After the reftoration, there fucceeded in its place, and fince the revolution has been methodically purfued, the more fuccessful expedient of influence. Now we remember what paffed between the lofs of terror, and the establishment of influence. The tranfactions of that interval, whatever we may think of their occafion, or effect, no friend of regal government would wish to fee revived.-But the affairs of this kingdom afford a more recent atteftation to the fame doctrine. In the British colonies of North America, the late affemblies poffeffed much

of the power and conftitution of our house of commons. The king and government of Great Britain held no patronage in the country, which could create attachment and influence, fufficient to counteract that restless, arrogating fpirit, which, in popular affemblies, when left to itfelf, will never brook an authority that checks and interferes with its own. To this caufe, excited perhaps by fome unfeasonable provocations, we may attribute, as to their true and proper original, we will not fay the misfortunes, but the changes, that have taken place in the British empire. The admonition, which fuch examples fuggeft, will have its weight with those, who are content with the general frame of the English conftitution; and who confider stability amongst the first perfections of any government.

We proteft, however, against any construction, by which what is here faid fhall be attempted to be ap plied to the juftification of bribery, or of any clandef tine reward or folicitation whatever. The very fecrecy of fuch negociations confeffes or begets a consciousness of guilt; which when the mind is once taught to endure without uneafinefs, the character is prepared for every compliance. And there is the greater danger in thefe corrupt practices, as the extent of their operation is unlimited and unknown.

Our apology relates folely to that influence, which results from the acceptance or expectation of public preferments. Nor does the influence, which we defend, require any facrifice of perfonal probity. In political, above all other fubjects, the arguments, or rather the conjectures on each fide of the queftion, are often fo equally poized, that the wifeft judgments may be held in fufpenfe. Thefe I call fubjects of indifference. But again, when the subject is not indifferent in itself, it will appear fuch to a great part of thofe to whom it is propofed, for want of information, or reflection, or experience, or of capacity to collect and weigh the reasons by which either fide is fupported. These are subjects of apparent indifference, This indifference occurs ftill more frequently in per fonal contefts; in which, we do not often difcover

any reason of public utility, for the preference of one competitor to another. Thefe cafes compofe the province of influence; that is, the decifion in thefe cafes will inevitably be determined by influence of fome fort or other. The only doubt is, what influence shall be admitted. If you renove the influence of the crown, it is only to make way for influence from a different quarter. If motives of expectation and gratitude be withdrawn, other motives will fucceed in their place, acting probably in an opposite direction, but equally irrelative and external to the proper merits of the question. There exift, as we have feen, paffions in the human heart, which will always make a ftrong party against the executive power of a mixed government. According as the difpofition of parliament is friendly or adverfe to the recommendation of the crown in matters which are really or apparently indifferent, as indifference hath been now explained, the business of empire will be transacted with ease and convenience, or embarrassed with endless contention and difficulty. Nor is it a conclufion founded in justice, or warranted by experience, that, because men are induced by views of intereft to yield their confent to measures, concerning which their judgment decides nothing, they may be brought by the fame influence, to act in deliberate oppofition to knowledge and duty. Whoever reviews the operations of government in this country fince the revolution, will find few, even of the moft questionable measures of adminiftration, about which the best inftructed judgment might not have doubted at the time but of which he may affirm with certainty, that they were indifferent to the greatest part of those who concurred in them. From the fuccefs or the facility, with which they who dealt out the patronage of the crown carried ineafures like thefe, ought we to conclude, that a fimilar application of honours and emoluments would procure the confent of parliament to counfels evidently detrimental to the common welfare ?-Is there not, on the contrary, more reafon to fear, that the prerogative, if deprived of influence, would not be long able to

fupport itself? For when we reflect upon the power of the houfe of commons to extort a compliance with its refolutions from the other parts of the legiflature; or to put to death the conftitution by a refufal of the annual grants of moncy, to the fupport of the neceffary functions of governmentwhen we reflect alfo what motives there are, which, in the viciffitudes of political interefts and paffions, may one day arm and point this power against the executive magiftrate; when we attend to thefe confiderations, we fhall be led perhaps to acknowledge, that there is not more of paradox than of truth in that important, but much decried apophthegm, "that an independent parliament is incompatible with the existence of the monarchy."

Chapter VIII.

OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.

THE first maxim of a free ftate is, that the lawa be made by one fet of men, and administered by another; in other words, that the legiflative and judicial characters be kept feparate. When thefe

offices are united in the fame perfon or affembly, particular laws are made for particular cafes, fpringing oftentimes from partial motives, and directed to private ends whilft they are kept feparate, general laws are made by one body of men, without foreseeing whom they may affect; and, when made, muft be applied by the other, let them affect whom they will.

For the fake of illuftration, let it be fuppofed, in this country, either that, parliaments being laid afide, the courts of Westminster Hall made their own laws; or that the two houfes of parliament, with the king at their head, tried, and decided caufes at their bar: it is evident, in the first place, that the decifions of