the claims of national or imperial sentiment to weigh unduly in the scale. And the reason is not far to seek. The representatives of Great Britain reflected the sense of the Government at Westminster, and the views of the Government on foreign and imperial affairs were frankly and essentially those of the Radical Party. The Conservative members of the Government, who for a decade or more prior to the outbreak of war had been content to limit their imperialistic efforts to pious professions of faith, had during the war surrendered their conservative principles en bloc, and had become mere hewers of wood and drawers of water for Mr Lloyd George. And by instinct and tradition the Radical Party is frankly antiimperial and anti-national. "If you look to the history of this country," said Mr Disraeli on the 24th June 1872, "you will find that there has been no effort so continuous, so subtle, supported by so much ability and acumen, as the attempts of Liberalism to effect the disintegration of the Empire." It is only natural that this should be so, for the fundamental doctrine of Radicalism-sincerely and honestly held, and supported, so it is said, by the highest religious teaching-is that every man is his brother's keeper; that all men and women are equal in the sight of God, and should be granted equal privileges 88 brothers by Christian men; and that the Kaffir, the Hindu, the Ger

man, and the Turk, are each though sometimes misguided the brother of the Englishman, and entitled as such to an equal share in determining the Government by which he is ruled. Obsessed by the importance of the labour movement, whose aims they had once fostered, and whose demands they had habitually conceded; half in sympathy with the principles of Bolshevik philosophy, while decrying the methods of the Soviets; it was only to be expected that the British delegates would repair to the conference table, no doubt to make peace with Germany, but mainly, and with a full heart, to reconstruct the social order of Europe. They did not see that the social disorder was organic, while the trouble with Germany was merely functional; that each required separate treatment; and that to offer combined treatment would remedy neither the one disorder nor the other. The representatives of the Dominions protested, but in vain. They-and Mr Hughes in particular-were given to understand that it was both bad form and bad tactics to take too much upon themselves, and were advised to leave their interests in the hands of those who were wiser, and more experienced in foreign affairs.

The French were amazed and dumfounded, but then the German hordes had once been nearer to Paris than Croydon is to Westminster, and throughout the war were never farther than Brighton is from London.

Again and again they pressed for guarantees which would for the future secure them against German aggression. It was all in vain; and at last, exhausted and dispirited, they were compelled to accept, not what they deemed to be essential for their safety, but only what President Wilson could be induced to demand from Germany.

It was not difficult in these eircumstances for President Wilson and his coadjutors to temper the severity of the terms of peace, and to weave into the Treaty the covenant of the League of Nations; for the vision of a world demooracy regulated by the spirit of international brotherhood natural and special appeal to the sentiment of the British delegates. As to how far President Wilson, in framing the policy in which he so obstinately persisted in Paris, was acting as a good Christian, and how far as a good American, every one is entitled to his own opinion.

It is sufficient to indicate here a few facts which may be found useful in solving the problem. The election of Mr Woodrow Wilson as President of the United States was largely due to the votes of GermanAmericans, and without their assistance the Democrats can hardly expect expect to win the election which is imminent. It is equally clear that President Wilson was as ignorant of the political conditions obtaining in Europe, as were the allied statesmen of the American Constitution, and the Presi

dent's lack of authority to conclude a treaty.

On December 18, 1916, President Wilson "takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples and small States as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the rights and privileges of the great and powerful States now at war.

Each wishes itself to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this, and against aggression of selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain

balance of power amidst multiplying suspicions; but each is ready to consider the formation of a League of Nations to ensure peace and justice throughout the world.”

On January 10, 1917, the Belgians replied "that the President

seems to believe that the statesmen of the two opposing camps pursue the same objects of war. The example of Belgium unfortunately demonstrates that this is in no wise the fact. Belgium has never, like the Central Powers, aimed at conquests. The barbarous fashion in which the German Government has treated, and is still treating, the Belgian nation,

tion that Germany will preOccupy herself with guarantee ing in the future the rights of the weak nations which she has not ceased to trample under foot since the war, let loose by her, began to desolate Europe."

Further, on December 30, 1918, Mr Secretary Daniels, giving evidence before the Naval Affairs Committee, said, "It is my firm conviction that if the Peace Conference does not result in a general agreement to put an end to naval building on the part of all the nations, then the United States must bend her will and her energies, and must give her men and her money to the task of the creation of incomparably the greatest Navy in the world. She has no designs upon the territory or the trade of any other nation, or group of nations, but she is pledged to support the Monroe doctrine. She is pledged to the protection of the weak, wherever they may suffer threats. If need be she must be incomparably strong in defence against aggressors, and in offence against evildoers."

At the very time that he was urging the Conference to adopt the limitation of armaments, President Wilson telegraphed to the Chairman of the Naval Affairs Committee, "his gratitude and congratulations on the Committee's Committee's unanimous report on the three years' Naval Programme." Let the matter rest there!

Before, however, we are in

the effect which the League of Nations is likely to have upon Great Britain and her Dominions, it is necessary not only to consider the circumstances under which the Covenant was framed, and the influences which determined the form which it took; we must also study any precedent there may be for a political expedient so pretentious and far reaching, and the fate which befell it.

The political theory of the interdependence of States had its origin far back in the beginnings of civilisation, and in the Amphictyonic Assembly of the Greeks is found an early attempt to give it realisation. But it was not until after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, which brought to a close the scourge of the Thirty Years' War, that a school of thought, of whom Grotius was the father, set itself the task of thinking out the means of stabilising the inter-relationship of European States. It pursued two lines of policy(1) to establish rules to which all civilised nations would give their consent and conform in the conduct of war, as set out, e.g., in the Treaty of Paris, 1856, and the later Conventions of Geneva and the Hague; (2) to establish a system which would prevent ruptures occurring at all, and compel the disputants to refer their differences to the arbitration of an international tribunal. It was in 1713 that such a system was for the first time developed by l'Abbé de St Pierre in his