SERMON XX.

CREATION.

FALLEN ANGELS.

JUDE 6.

And the Angels, who kept not their first estate, but left their own habitation, he hath reserved, in everlasting chains, under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day.

In this passage, we have a concise, but very interesting, account of certain Angels, who once dwelt in Heaven. Created, at first, with all the excellencies of the Angelic nature, placed in circumstances of the highest honour, and enjoying the greatest happiness, they are here represented as having lost their character, and forfeited their honour and happiness. The nature and allotments of these Angels furnish the subject, which next demands our attention in this System of discourses.

Before I enter on the consideration of this subject, it will be proper to take some notice of an opinion, which has, chiefly within the two past centuries, been adopted concerning it, and advanced with confidence by persons of various descriptions: an opinion, which, if true, would preclude the present discourse, as groundless and nugatory. It is this; that there are no such beings as Fallen Angels. Infidels have made the Scriptural account of these beings, a formal objection against the truth and credibility of the Scriptures. Not a small number of men, pro

fessing themselves to be Christians, have partly yielded to the objection, and partly considered the contrary doctrine as necessary to their particular systems of Theology. Thus, here, as in other cases, men apparently opposed to each other in the belief, and the denial, of the Scriptures, have yet united in overthrowing their authority, and unsettling their character as a revelation.

From the manner, in which the doctrine has been opposed, we should naturally argue unfavourably concerning the opposition. It has been most usually opposed, not with sober argument, but with ridicule and sneers. A cause, which needs this support, is bad of course; and is by its abettors seen to be bad: for no man of common sense, will ever resort to this feeble and ineffectual mode of attack, or defence, when the surer, more rational, and more efficacious, resort of sober argument, is in his power.

If the existence of fallen Angels is incredible; it must be se for one of the following reasons.

1st. That it is not revealed sufficiently to command belief; and that, as we have no direct knowledge of invisible beings, aside from Revelation, so in this case, Revelation does not warrant us to admit their existence : or,

2dly. There is some evidence in the nature of things, which disproves their existence, or at least, renders it highly improbable.

Concerning the first of these Methods of opposing the existence of fallen Angels, I observe, that it has been very little resorted to, by the opposers of this doctrine. Here, as in many other cases, Revelation has been tried before the tribunal of Philosophy. Men have supposed, that their own judgment was a more unerring standard of faith and truth, than the Scriptures. That Infidels should thus act, is certainly to be expected; for this opinion is the basis of their system. However irrational, therefore, and indefensible, their conduct may seem to us; we are certainly to feel no surprise, when they resort to it, or rely upon it, with confidence. But for this opinion, they could not retain their system for a moment.

But, that men, professing to believe in the Scriptures as a divine Revelation, should adopt this method of establishing, or refuting, their declarations, is, to say the least, wonderful. Still,

it has in every age been more or less the conduct of persons, who have professed this belief. It began to exist in the time of the Apostles; and was boldly adopted in defiance of their authority and inspiration. The declarations of St. Paul, relative to this subject, are ample proofs of the fact. The two first chapters of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, are, in a great measure, employed on this subject. In them he informs us, that to the Philosophical Greeks, who arrogated to themselves the titles of Zopo and 2000, Wise Men and Philosophers, the doctrine of the cross was foolishness. This, therefore, was then a general decision of Philosophy. Against the adoption of that Philosophy, and the imitation of the men who professed it, he strongly cautions the Corinthian Christians; who were in no small danger from its imposing and deceitful influence. At the same time, he informs them, that this foolishness, as they termed it, of God, was wiser than Men; that God had not chosen men of this character to call them to salvation, but men of an opposite character, who disclaimed the very words, as well as the spirit, of this Philosophy; men, who, although despised and accounted as nothing by these vain, arrogant Philosophers, and their followers, were yet beloved of God, and the instruments of their salvation. He farther informs them, that the wisdom of this world is foolishness with God; and again declares, that the Lord knoweth the reasonings of the wise, that they are vain. To the Colossians he writes, Beware lest any man spoil you through Philosophy and vain deceit; that is, vain and deceitful Philosophy; which, he declares, accorded with the traditions of men, and the rudiments of this world, but not with Christ. Of course, it merited contempt, on the one hand, and was fraught with danger, on the other.

From the age of the Apostles to the present time, almost every existing heresy has been derived from this source. The Scriptures were found by many men, and men, too, who were often distinguished for their ingenuity, not to agree with their Philosophy; and of course could not, in their opinion, be true, unless they could be bent to such an agreement. Those, therefore, who chose still to acknowledge the Revelation of the Scriptures, employed themselves in helping out their character, as a system of truth, and removing their supposed inconsistencies. by new

constructions, allegorical explanations, and generally, by substituting what they ought to mean for that, which, according to the natural and proper force of language, they must mean. Those, on the contrary, who cared little about them, finding the doctrines, which they contain, to disagree with their own Philosophy, denied their authority at once. Men of this class were, in my view, more rational, more self-consistent, and less injurious to the character of the Scriptures, than those of the other. For nothing can be more irrational, inconsistent, or injurious to the Scriptures, than to profess to receive them as a divine Revelation, and at the same time to make human opinion the standard, by which their declarations are to be tried. This is no other, than to sit in judgment upon God himself, (who, in this case, is acknowledged to be the Author of the declarations,) and to determine whether he has spoken truth, or falsehood. Must not Angels wonder to see Men thus employed?

The truth is; the doctrine in question is so often, and so clearly, asserted in the Scriptures, that the denial of it cannot be founded on them alone. All men act in this case, as Dr. Priestly has acted in questioning the existence of the holy Angels. In pursuing the doctrines of his peculiar system, he was led to doubt, and ultimately to deny, the immateriality of the human soul; and roundly decided, that it was nothing but organized matter. Angels, he saw plainly, stood in the way of his arguments concerning this subject for no mind possesses sufficient ingenuity to render it even remotely probable, that Angels are material. And, as the human soul may as easily be supposed to be immaterial, as an Angel can be, there was no resort left to Dr. Priestly, but to question the existence of Angels altogether. This, therefore, he chose to do, notwithstanding the numerous express declarations of God to the contrary; declarations as express as language will admit; rather than give up a doctrine, which he thought necessary to the support of his system. In this manner, the Scriptures be made to declare any thing.

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With respect to the second of these reasons, on which the existence of Fallen Angels is denied, viz. that there is some evidence in the nature of things, which disproves the existence of such beings, or at least, renders it highly improbable; I observe,

1st. That the existence of Angels, generally considered, is originally less improbable than that of Men.

To a rational being, unacquainted with the existence of either Angels or Men, pure spirits would seem more likely to be a part of the Creation of God, than spirits united to bodies; beings wholly rational, than beings partly rational and partly animal. God is a pure spirit. It is not rationally supposed, that, in creating Intelligent beings, he would unite them to Matter, in such a manner as to form one being of both matter and mind; but it is rationally supposed, that, delighting as he does in his own manner of existence, he would create beings as much like himself, as might be. In creating men, a new difficulty concerning existence, a new mystery of Philosophy, is presented to our contemplation: viz. the union of soul and body, so accomplished, as to constitute one percipient being. Should it be here observed, that Philosophers, in denying the existence of Angels, whether virtuous or fallen, avoid this difficulty, by denying also the existence of an immaterial soul in Man: I acknowledge, that the objection is fairly alleged, as being founded in truth; but I beg leave to subjoin, that in this very manner, they introduce to us a new, more mysterious, and more perplexing doctrine; a doctrine so mysterious, as to be no other than a gross absurdity :- viz. the doctrine of cogitative, or thinking, matter. As I propose hereafter to discuss this subject at length; I shall dismiss it for the present without any further remarks.

2dly. That Angels, after their creation, fell, involves no more difficulty, than that which is involved in the fall of Man.

All, that in the nature of the case, appears necessary to accomplish the fall of any finite being, is a sufficient temptation. Temptation, for aught that appears, may rise to any degree, beneath infinite; and there is no more reason to suppose, that the strength of an Angel, or his habits of virtue, are sufficient to resist all possible temptation, than to suppose, that the strength of a man is sufficient. I speak, here, of such a man as Adam; who, antecedently to the first temptation, was absolutely free from sin. The same temptation, which would overcome the man, might not, and probably would not, overcome the Angel; but a temptation, sufficiently increased to bear an equal propor