SERMON XV.

THE DECREES OF GOD.

JOB Xxiii. 13.

But he is in one mind; and who can turn him? and what his soul desireth, even that he doeth.

In my last discourse I asserted, from these words, the following Doctrine;

That all things, both beings and events, exist in exact accordance with the purpose, pleasure, or, what is commonly called the Decrees, of God.

In discussing this doctrine, I mentioned, that I should attempt, I. To Explain it ;

II. To Prove it; and

III. To answer the Objections, commonly made against it.

Under the first head, after having mentioned several erroneous opinions, and forms of phraseology, frequently adopted concerning this subject, I expressed my own views of it in this manner: What is commonly intended by the Decrees of God, is that choice, or pleasure, of the Divine Mind, eternally and unchangeably inherent in it, by which all things are brought into being.

Under the second head, I alleged several direct arguments in support of the doctrine; and then suggested several difficulties, which result from denying it. These, by proving the converse of the doctrine to be false, indirectly proved the doctrine to be true: VOL. I.

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according to the general axiom, that every proposition, or its converse, is true.

I shall now, as I proposed, attempt,

III. To answer the Objections, commonly made against this doc

trine.

These, I think, may be reduced to the following;

1st. That it is equivalent to the Stoical doctrine of Fate, or Destiny:

2dly. That it exhibits God as the Author of sin :

3dly. That it destroys the Free Agency of rational creatures and,

4thly. That it discourages all the Efforts of mankind towards Reformation.

I will not say, that no other objections are brought against this doctrine; but I think of no others, which appear to be regarded, as material, by those who allege them; or which, if these be fairly obviated, would be supposed sensibly to affect the question in debate. These, therefore, I shall now proceed to consider in the order proposed.

1st. It is objected, that the general doctrine of this discourse, is equivalent to the Stoical doctrine of Fate, or Destiny.

The Fate of the Stoics, as explained by Cicero, was of this nature. These Philosophers supposed a series, and it would seem an eternal one, in which each link of the vast chain was the effect of the preceding, and the cause of the succeeding, one: every link being alternately a cause and effect. These causes, so far as I understand the subject, (for it is not very clear, that we understand precisely what was the Stoical doctrine, nor that the Stoics understood, or united in, it themselves,) were not considered by them as either intelligent, or voluntary; but as merely coerced by those which preceded, and as coercing those which followed. In other words, the doctrine was substantially the same with that of Atheists concerning an eternal series, which was exploded in a former Discourse*. To the irresistible efficacy of this series of causes, the Gods, acknowledged by the Stoics, were absolutely subjected; and Jupiter himself, their

*See Sermon II.

supreme Ruler, was utterly unable to resist, divert, or at all change, the order of things, brought to pass by the compulsion of this Fate, or Destiny.

He, who can find any resemblance between this doctrine, and that on which the present discourse is founded, must find it by the aid of an ingenuity, to which I can make no claim. I freely own, that I cannot perceive any similarity between an unintelligent and involuntary series of causes, compelling by natural necessity, or coercion, the existence of their consequent effects, and controlling by inevitable necessity the actions of both Gods and Men; and the free, wise, and voluntary, agency of the infinitely intelligent and benevolent Mind, originally planning, and steadily executing, a system of infinite good, according to the dictates of his boundless wisdom, and perfect pleasure. I cannot perceive a similarity, sufficient to enable me to discern in what the professed difficulty lies; or what the real objection is, which I am required to answer. I shall take the liberty, therefore, of waiting until I shall find the objection so stated, as either to induce me to acknowledge its force, or enable me to attempt a refutation.

2dly. It is objected, that this doctrine exhibits God as the Author of sin.

To the phrase, Author of sin, very different meanings are annexed by different persons. In order to meet this objection, therefore, with any hope of success, it will be necessary, in the first place, to determine the true meaning of the phraseology. Some persons understand by it the immediate and efficient Cause of sinful volitions: others, not only mean the efficient, but the guilty, Cause of such volitions: others, still, such a Cause, as in any manner, however remote, lays a foundation for the existence of sin and others, a Cause, supposed to be intelligent, which, when possessed of sufficient power to prevent the existence of sin, did not interfere to prevent it. When it is said, that this doctrine exhibits God as the Author of sin; I shall, for the present, consider the phrase, as used in one, or both, of the two first of these senses; and regard the objector as intending, that, according to this doctrine, God is either the guilty, or guiltless, immediate, and efficient, cause of sinful volitions in his creatures: In

other words, that he constrains, or compels, them to sin. That the doctrine, which I have defended, involves this consequence I cannot perceive, nor admit.

To support the objection, it must be shown, that God cannot will, and accomplish, the existence of voluntary agents, who, acting, freely, shall nevertheless act in exact accordance with what is, upon the whole, his pleasure; and who, in the circumstances in which they are severally placed, and with the attributes which they severally possess, will, with perfect freedom, contribute, each his proper part and efficiency, towards the promotion of the infinite good, originally proposed as the end of the divine system. But this, I apprehend, has never been, and never will be, shown. It must be proved, that in the infinite multitude of possible free agents, present to the view of the divine Mind, there were none, possessed of such attributes, and capable of being placed in such circumstances, as, while they acted with perfect freedom, would also perfectly accomplish the purposes of the divine pleasure. No man will, I presume, attempt to prove this position. If it be granted, that such agents were possible, and that the Infinite Mind discerned their nature and character; it must, in order to support the objection, be proved, that God, having these agents in full view, chose not to select them, and bring them into existence. But this, I presume, will not be admitted by the objector himself. Till this can be done, however, the objection cannot be maintained.

That Sin is in the world, and that the world, with all which it contains, is under the government of God, in some sense or other, must be acknowledged by the objector himself; unless, on the one hand, he denies the divine government absolutely, or, on the other, the distinction between moral good and evil. Sin has, therefore, entered the world in some manner or other, while it was under the divine government. There are three ways, in which men have attempted to explain the difficulty, involved in this fact. Some persons assert that by his direct efficiency, God caused; others, that he permitted; and others still, that he could not prevent, its existence.

That God could not prevent the existence of sin cannot be maintained. He has prevented it in the angels, who kept their

first estate. He prevented it in the person of Christ; who in his human nature knew no sin. He has promised, that he will prevent it, and he will therefore certainly prevent it, in the spirits of just men made perfect in the heavens. Should it be said, that these beings by their own voluntary agency, and without any interference, or influence, on the part of God continue in a state of holiness; I answer, that this supposition affects not the point at all; for God plainly could have created every moral agent with exactly the same attributes, and placed them in exactly the same circumstances, with those several virtuous beings, who persist in holiness. Whatever we suppose to be the means, by which they are preserved from sin; those very means he certainly could have used, to preserve in the same effectual manner all others.

Beyond this, he has not only continued holiness in the minds of many of his creatures; but has restored it to vast multitudes, who had fallen into a state of hopeless guilt and pollution. This fact is a proof, that he could have continued it in the minds of these creatures, if he had judged this conduct to be, upon the whole, wise and good for him to pursue.

That God by an immediate agency of his own, creates the sinful volitions of mankind, is a doctrine, not warranted, in my view, either by Reason, or Revelation. There are, I know, many respectable men in modern times, and particularly in our own country, as there have been at other times, and in other countries, who have thought this the easiest way of arriving at satisfaction concerning this abstruse subject. I cannot, as some persons have thought it proper to do, attribute to these men evil designs. In many instances, at least, they appear to give as unquestionable proofs of piety and virtue, as are given by any others; and to devote their labours as cheerfully, and faithfully, to the promotion of truth and righteousness, in the world. I cannot accord with this doctrine; nor hesitate to believe, that they have in several instances darkened counsel by words without knowledge. There is a bound, as I have remarked before, beyond which the mind cannot pass; and it is as easily found <in investigating this subject, as in any course of human inquiry. The metaphysical nature of Moral Agency, both in God and his

Still,