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THE LOSS OF A LUSTRUM.

FIVE years have now elapsed since the issue of the Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers, one of the most important State documents ever published. With the shortcomings of our military arrangements, as revealed by the events of the Boer War, fresh in the public memory, the King's advisers were justified, nay, compelled to ask His Majesty to authorise an inquiry into the state of the Auxiliary Forces, for, as shown in the evidence of the Elgin Commission, the country had been for some two years practically denuded of of Regular troops, and the Auxiliary Forces alone had been available for home defence. In April 1900 there were in the United Kingdom but 103,000 Regular troops, and these were made up of 37,000 immature soldiers who had been rejected by the doctors as unfit to stand the hardships of campaigning, of raw recruits hastily enlisted, of a few Regular Reservists who had been found unfit, while the balance was made up of sick and wounded who had returned from South Africa.

By a happy chance, it was on the 23rd April, the day sacred to St George, the patron saint of England, in the year 1903, that the Royal Warrant was duly issued, appointing the Commission, which will be known to history as the Norfolk Commission, with full power "to inquire into the organisation,

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The Commission was composed as under: the President and Chairman was the Duke of Norfolk, who in 1900 had resigned the office of Postmaster-General to proceed to the war in South Africa; the Duke of Richmond and Gordon, who had seen soldiering in the Grenadier Guards and active service in the Boer War; the Earl of Derby, who had held office for three years as Financial Secretary for War, and for two years as Secretary of State for War. After these came Lieutenant-General (now Field-Marshal) Lord Grenfell, a soldier who had served his country with distinction in many campaigns, and had been at one time InspectorGeneral of the Auxiliary Force. Next in order was Major-General Sir Coleridge Grove, who had held important posts at the War Office for fifteen years in succession; and Sir Ralph Knox, who had served for a similar period as Accountant - General at the War Office. Besides these there were four colonels of Militia and Volunteers, all thoroughly acquainted with the work of the forces on whose condition they were to report; and finally, Mr Spenser

Wilkinson, a journalist of high reputation, who had made a study of military affairs for many years past.

On the 20th May 1904 the Commission issued its Report, a document of only sixteen pages in length, which was signed by eight out of its eleven members. It begins with the following plain statement of the work done :

"We have held," it says, "82 sittings and examined 134 witnesses. We have considered written information, in answer to printed questions, from every unit of Militia and Volunteers, and also numerous memor

anda and suggestions which have been submitted to us by officers of the two Forces, and by other gentlemen acquainted with their conditions, and further, we have received from the War Office many reports and returns of much value."

The result of this long and careful study by judges thoroughly competent to deal with the question is set forth as under:

"The principles which have been adopted, after the disastrous failure of older methods, by every great State of the European continent, are, first, that as far as possible the whole able-bodied male population shall be trained to arms; secondly, that the

training shall be given in a period of continuous service with the colours, not necessarily in barracks; and, thirdly, that the instruction shall be given by a body of specially educated and highly-trained officers. We are convinced that only by the adoption of these principles can an army for home defence, adequate in strength and military efficiency to defeat an invader, be raised and maintained in the United Kingdom. humbly submit that Your Maj. esty's Militia and Volunteer Forces

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have not at present either the strength or the military efficiency required to enable them to fulfil the functions for which they exist; that their military efficiency would be increased by the adoption of the measures set forth in the fourth section of this report, auxiliaries to the Regular Army; which would make them valuable but that a home defence army capable, in the absence of the whole or greater portion of the Regular forces, of protecting this country against invasion can be raised and maintained only on the principle that it is the duty of every citizen of military age and sound physique to be trained for in it should emergency arise." the national defence, and to take part

It is proposed now to analyse, line by line, this solemnly worded advice, to examine and see whether those who gave it were justified in so doing, and to show how far the military authorities have been guided by this advice in the reforms that have been introduced since it was issued. Finally, an endeavour will be made to account for what the ordinary man of common-sense must consider an extraordinary anomaly - viz., that the nation, having found its military body, and called in something totally wrong with specialists to report on the case, has yet failed to take the remedy prescribed by those experts in no faltering tones.

The first line of that portion of the Report which has been quoted above is pregnant with meaning and full of solemn warning, and justice could be fully done to it only by a careful consideration of the history of Europe for the last hundred For the phrase, "the years. disastrous failure of older

1 The three who did not sign were Sir Ralph Knox, and Colonels Satterthwaite and Dalmahoy all these, however, admitted the principle of compulsion.

methods," means, in the case of Germany, the awful results to Prussia of the overwhelming defeat of Jena; after which, under the guidance of patriots like Scharnhorst, Prussia adopted the great principle of compulsory and universal military training. Going further back still, it brings to our minds the fact that brave little Switzerlandwhere the principle, indeed, had always existed, though its practical application had been neglected. -was overrun in 1798 by the victorious hosts of the French Republic. The story is well told by Colonel Delmé Radcliffe, our Military Attaché at Berne at the present time, and, briefly summarised, it runs runs as follows: Full of the fervour of their new ideas, the French Revolutionaries demanded that the Swiss should also adopt their Republican doctrines. When the Swiss indignantly refused to be thus dictated to, the French invaded their territories. Scanty and ill-organised levies were hastily called out. When these suffered defeat, the Swiss turned on their unfortunate leaders and murdered them. Owing to the native gallantry of the Bernese men a few minor successes were gained; but at Grauholz the gallant Swiss were decisively beaten, though they prolonged the struggle, fighting still with desperate fury. In these fierce struggles it is computed that 50,000 men and 4000 women-for they, too, fought were slaughtered. Then came wholesale robbery, -money, pictures, plate, jewel

lery everything was plundered; the invading troops ate up the country. Worse than all, the victors carried off the ablebodied men that still remained to fight as conscripts. Switzerland had to maintain 15,000 men in the ranks of Napoleon's armies. That great general, knowing their fighting value, used the Swiss to form his rear-guard in the retreat from Russia, where nearly half of them were killed. The Swiss have not forgotten the lesson; and last year, as the result of a referendum, the voters of that country voluntarily accepted an increased period of military training.

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Studying the phrase again, we recall the fact that Denmark adopted universal service after her defeat in 1864, and Austria after the same experience two years later; and finally we have brought again before us the cruel blows received by our proud and gallant neighbours, the French, in 1870-71. The French began that campaign in full reliance on an army raised by the methods of conscription, system invented by Frederick the Great and brought to a head by the still greater Napoleon. This was the scription that our grandfathers taught us to hate. Under it Napoleon demanded from each department of France a certain quota of men, so lists were prepared of all males of certain ages, and the number required was selected by casting lots. The injustice thus initiated was made grosser by the fact that a rich man on whom the lot fell could buy a substitute,

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and thus escape his duty to the State. When we remember that Napoleon used the conscripts thus raised for wars of aggression waged for his own personal ends, and that he kept men with the colours for such periods as suited his own imperial and imperious will, we can easily grasp how harsh and odious the system must have seemed to our brave ancestors. We all know how the conscript armies of France went down before the Teuton legions banded together by compulsory and universal service, a system that forced the best men of all classes into the ranks of a "Nation in Arms"; and we all know, or ought to know, that after her cruel disasters France abolished conscription and introduced universal service on the system of her conquerors.

The armies of Russia, of Italy, and of Turkey are based on the same principles, and thus we see that the members of the Norfolk Commission were fully justified when they spoke of the adoption of compulsory and universal training for the whole of the able-bodied male population of every great State of the European continent, "after the disastrous failure of older methods."

"We are convinced," continues the Report, "that only by the adoption of these principles [viz., those of compulsory and universal military training] can an army for home defence, adequate in strength and military efficiency to defeat an invader, be raised and maintained in the United Kingdom"; and this conclusion can be based only on their finding that "Your Majesty's Militia and Volunteer Forces have not at present either

the strength or the military efficiency
required to enable them to fulfil the
functions for which they exist."
In other words, the Home-
Defence Force was weighed
carefully in the balance and
was found wanting, and the
Duke of Norfolk, speaking in
the House of Lords in June
1904, with all the facts fresh
in his mind, said: "The break-
down is in almost every case
attributed essentially to the
nature of the voluntary system
itself, which makes it impos-
sible to demand a reasonable
standard of efficiency without
greatly reducing the forces."
How far is this justified by the
evidence given before the Com-
mission? In dealing with this
question we find that the real
experts, our most famous
generals, spoke very clearly
on this point.

Lieut.-General Sir Thomas Kelly-Kenny, in answer to a question (360) as to the funda-, mental difficulties of the case, said: "The difficulties are, of course, that we cannot oblige them to come out for training sufficiently long."

The Duke of Connaught, when asked if he considered the training of the Militia long enough, answered: "No, I do not think so, either in the length of the training of the recruits or when the battalions come out for training." (Q. 3422.)

Sir John French said, that in case of invasion he would not feel any confidence in Militia battalions without a backing of Regular troops (Q. 2452).

Sir Ian Hamilton (Q. 1159): "I certainly would not pretend for the moment that

one

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Lord Wolseley when asked (Q. 1515), "But the minimum "But the minimum task for which the defence forces of England ought to be prepared, and to which they ought to be equal, would be fighting these 200,000 excellent troops?" answered "Yes," and held that "it would be an act of great imprudence to trust that task to Auxiliary troops alone."

Finally, Sir Evelyn Wood said (Q. 21622) that the country was leaning on the rottenest of reeds if it expected to be guarded against invasion by the arrangements existing in 1904.

From the evidence it is clear that the Norfolk Commission could not do otherwise than report to the King that the Militia and Volunteers were not competent to fulfil the functions for which they existed, and this fact has been of course recognised by the recent reorganisations introduced since Mr Haldane became Secretary of State for War.

The next sentence of the Report runs as follows:

"Their [the Militia and Volunteer Forces] military efficiency would be increased by the adoption of the

measures set forth in the fourth section of this Report, which would make them valuable auxiliaries to the Regular Army."

What were these measures? and have the responsible military authorities paid any attention to them?

Summarised concisely, the measures recommended were:

(i.) That the Volunteer Force should be represented at the War Office by a separate department.

(ii.) The force should be organised in brigades and divisions, and commanders and staff should be appointed to these bodies.

should be relieved of financial respon(iii.) That the commanding officers sibility, and capitation grants should be abolished.

(iv.) The training of the Volunteers should be concentrated upon essentials, each corps practising in peace the special duties it would have to carry out in war-time.

(v.) All corps should be allowed to train up to fourteen days in camp each year, with adequate allowances. (vi.) Ranges and exercising-grounds should be provided by the State.

(vii.) Transport and mobilisation equipment should also be provided.

It is a fact that should be borne in mind by all who are anxious to study the question of national defence, that all these recommendations have practically been accepted by the Secretary of State for War and his advisers on the Army Council, and are embodied in the Territorial Forces Act. At the War Office, Lord Lucas, Under-Secretary of State for War, has been appointed specially to look after the interests of the Territorial Force. The whole of that force has been organised in fourteen divisions, each division being formed on the lines of a division of Regulars, with a proper complement of horse, foot, and artillery, each division and its component brigades duly provided with

and

their own commanders
staff, most of whom are ex-
Regulars, and the remainder
specially selected ex-Militia or
Volunteer officers.

Commanding officers are almost entirely relieved from 1 Report, p. 11.

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