from many sources, to throw light upon the meaning of words and sentences. From a knowledge of the geography of any country, of its climate, soil, productions, mountains, rivers, and other natural objects, as well as of the manners, customs, laws, history, &c. of its inhabitants, I may obtain assistance to explain its language, and must obtain it, if I mean to make out a satisfactory interpretation. Eut - I can never dispense with the laws of grammatical analysis. These laws are vindicated by the simple fact, that every writer wishes and expects to be understood by his cotemporaries, and therefore may be expected to use language as they do. We presume this of the Sacred Wri ters; and therefore apply to their productions, as to those of classic authors, the common rules of grammatical interpretation.

Admitting these rules to be the best and surest guide to the meaning of language, we cannot supersede them, by supposing, or conjecturing peculiarities in a writer. It is only when these peculiarities are proved, or, at least, rendered probable, that they can be admitted to influence our interpretation of any passage. Without such proof, we cannot violate the obvious principles of grammatical interpretation, for the sake of vindicating from inconsistency, absurdity, or contradiction, any author, even a Scriptural

one.

I must here explain myself, however, in order to prevent mistake in regard to my meaning. The Scriptures certainly stand on different ground, from that on which any other book rests, on account of their claim to be received as a Revelation from God. What other book can plead well authenticated miracles, for its support; or can produce declarations of a prophetic nature, that have been ful filled; or can glory in such an exhibition of the principles of piety and virtue--of love to God, and ofbenevolence and beneficence to men? Just in proportion then, as these evidences influence my mind to believe that the Bible is of divine origin, in the same proportion it becomes improbable to me, that this Bible contains absurdities, errors or contradictions. When any apparent error or contradiction attracts my attention, I hesitate to pronounce it such as it appeare to be. My reason for so doing is, the strength of the evi

dence in favour of its divine origin; which is such, that I must do violence to my convictions, if I admit that the book contains either what is erroneous or contradictory. I am then slow to attribute, in any case, such a sense to words in the Scriptures, as would make a passage speak either absurdity or contradiction. But if, after all the light w which I could gain, it should appear still to be a plain case, that there is either absurdity or contradiction in the sacred text; then I must find a different reading; or give up the passage; or renounce the whole book. I may suspend an opinion while I live, as to doubtful cases. My convictions respecting the nature and design of the Holy Scriptures; the imperfection of my knowledge; diffidence in myself all demand that I should act in this manner. But in any clear case; where the meaning of a sacred writer, or what he originally designed to say, can be definitely ascertained by the common laws of interpretation; and it appears plainly that this meaning is erroneous, or contradicts some other passage; I have no right to put a constructive sense upon the words, and do violence to the passage, in order to avoid any consequences that may follow. I cannot honestly do it. The same common sense and reason, which prescribe the laws of exegesis, decide that the meaning of a writer must be that, which those laws determine it to be. Of course, if I put a gloss upon any passage, which represents it as conveying a meaning different from that which the laws of interpretation would assign to it, I may deceive others, or I may serve the interests of party; but 1 violate the reason which God has given me by so doing, and act a párt dishonest, and unworthy of an inquirer after truth.

If the fundamental maxims of exegesis lead to the belief, that a writer of the New Testament has contradicted himself, or another sacred writer; then I must revert at once to the question, Is the book divine? Can it be so, if there is contradiction? This question I may settle, (on my responsibility to God,) as I please. But I have no right to violate the fundamental rules of language, by forcing a meaning upon the writer to make him consistent, which it is obvious, on the universal principles of explaining language, he never designed to convey. In determining the question, whether the writers of the New Testament were inspired, I must

always, in attending to the internal evidence of the books, consider whether they have contradicted each other. To determine this question, I cannot violate the simple rules of grammatical exegesis. I must read this book, as I do all other books. Then, if there evidently be contradiction, I must reject its claims; if there be not, and I think the evidence is sufficient that they are well founded, I must admit them. But at any period subsequent to this, when I have admitted the book to be inspired, I am not at liberty to aver, that the writers could never have taught some particular doctrine, which I may dislike; and therefore to do violence to the rules of grammatical interpretation, in order to explain away a doctrine of this nature, which they seem to inculcate. My simple inquiry must be, what sentiment does the language of this or that passage convey, without violence or perversion of rule ? When this question is settled philologically, (not philosophically,) then I either believe what is taught, or else reject the claim of divine authority. What can my own theories and reasonings, about the absurdity or reasonableness of any particular doctrine, avail in determining whether a writer of the New Testament has taught this doctrine or not? My investigation must be conducted independently of my philosophy, by my philology. And when I have obtained his meaning, by the simple and universal rules of expounding language, I choose the course I will take; I must believe his assertion, or reject his authority.

If these be not sound maxims of interpretation, I confess myself a stranger to the subject; nor can I help thinking that you will accord with me, at once, in the views just expressed.

Guided then by these principles, let us now come to the investigation of a few passages in the New Testament, which concern the divine nature of Christ. I take this point, because you have dwelt most upon it; and because, very obviously, when this is admitted or rejected, no possible objection can be felt to admitting or rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity.

You will not require of me, however, to examine at length every text of the New Testament, which I may suppose to have any connexion with the subject in question.

I must be permitted, in order to save time and patience, to select only those texts, the language of which appears to be genuine, and above the condemnation of textual criticism; and such as appear to contain the best and most decisive proof of the point to be discussed. Believing the New Testament to be of divine origin and authority, you will permit me to add, that I cannot think the decision of this or any other question, depends on the number of times, in which the terms of that decision are repeated.

I observe then,

1. The New Testament gives to Christ the appellation of -GOD, in such a manner, as that, according to the fair rules of interpretation, only the SUPREME GOD can be meant.

A conspicuous passage in proof of this, I should find in John i. 1-3. "In the beginning was the Word, and the -Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him; and without him was not any thing made, that was made." Verse 10,...." and the world was made by him."

All known Manuscripts agree in the text here. Griesbach has indeed recorded, that for i Osos there is a conjectural reading, O; and that for nas eos nyo 2010s, there is a conjectural reading of Θεος ην και ο λογος. The first of these conjectures was made by Crellius. (Initium Evang. Johan. restauratum per L.M. Artemonium, P. i. c. 2.) The reason of making such a conjecture, Crellius has given. "The greater Christ is," says he, "compared with other gods, (the Father excepted,) the less can he be expressly called God, lest he should be taken for the supreme God the Father." And again; "if he (Christ) had been expressly called God by the sacred writers, and had not always been distinguished from God, the sacred writers would have given an occasion to unskilful men, to regard him as the supreme God." (Init. Evang. Johan. p. 295.) To liberate John from being taxed with this imprudence, Crellius proposed to substitute Osov for Osos, in John i. 1; so as to say, the Logos was of God, instead of saying, as John has done, that He was God.

The second conjectural reading is supported by no better authority. Bahrdt, (in Neuesten Offenbarungen,) proposed it as a happy expedient, to relieve the text from the

difficulty and embarrassment, under which he thought it to labour. For instead of saying, "the Word was with God, and the Word was God;" he might then translate it thus, "The Word was with God. God was, and this Word was in the beginning with God, &c."

I have a great regard for the labours and learning of Griesbach; but I am constrained to ask here, why he should have condescended to notice conjectures so gratuitous, and unfounded as these.

I proceed to the explanation of the text. Ev aex corresponds exactly with the Hebrew л, Gen. i. 1. I cannot embrace the opinion of those critics, who think that the phrase ev apx?, of itself simply, signifies from eternity. Although I believe that the Logos did exist from eternity, I do not think it is proved directly by this expression. (Compare Gen. i. 1.) That existence from eternity, is implied, however, may be properly admitted. Ev agxy is equivalent to εv apxy xoσμov, in the beginning of the world, i.e. before the world was made; and so agreeing in this particular with the phrase John xvii. 5, "the glory that I had with thee before the world was ;" and Eph. i. 4., " before the found ́ation of the world." To say with Crellius, that by ev x? is meant the commencement of preaching the gospel, or the beginning of Christian instruction, would be making John gravely tell us, that before the Logos preached the gospel, he had an existence.

Before the world was created then, the Logos existed. Who or what was this Logos? A real existence; or only an attribute of God? A real substance; or only the wisdom, or reason, or power of God?

It is of no importance in settling this question, that we should know with certainty, whence John derived the appellation, Logos. In my mind, the most probable account is, that this appellation is bestowed on Christ, in reference to his becoming the Instructer or Teacher of mankind; the medium of communication between God and them. Be this however as it may; the Logos appears to be a real existence, and not merely an attribute. For first; the attr butes of God are no where else personified, by the New Testament writers; i. e. the usage of the New Testament authors is against this mode of writing. Secondly; Logos,