I

I am certainly willing to allow, that the evidences of the divine Unity, in the New Testament, are sufficient. But may be permitted to suggest, here, that in my view, the passages asserting it are fewer in number, than the passages which assert or imply that Christ is truly divine. I cannot but think that the frequent assertions of your Sermon, and of Unitarians in general, with regard to this subject, are very erroneous; that they are made at hazard, and without a diligent and faithful comparison of the number of texts that respect the divine Unity, in the New Testament, and the number of those which concern the divinity of the Saviour. After all; to what purpose is it, that so great a multitude of texts should be required, to prove the divinity of Christ, by those who believe, as you do, that the decisions of the Scriptures are of divine authority? The decision of one text, fairly made out by the laws of exegesis, is as authoritative as that of a thousand. Would a law a thousand times repeated, have any more authority attached to it for the repetition? It might be better explained, by the repetition in different connexions; but its authority is uniformly the same.

But, to return from this digression; suppose I should affirm that two subjects, A and B are numerically identical in regard to something called X, but diverse, or distinct, in regard to something else called Y: is there any absurdity. or contradiction in this affirmation? I hope I shall not, by making this supposition, be subjected to the imputation, of endeavouring to prove the doctrine of the Trinity by the science of Algebra; for my only object in proposing this statement is, to illustrate the answer that we make, to a very common question, which Unitarians put us; "How can three be one, and one three?" In no way, I necessarily and cheerfully reply. "How then is the doctrine of the Trinity in Unity to be vindicated?" In a manner, which is not at all embarrassed by these questions. do not maintain that the Godhead is three, in the same respects that it is one, but the reverse. In regard to X, we maintain its numerical unity; in regard to Y, we maintain a threefold distinction; I repeat it, we maintain simply the fact that there is such a distinction, on Scripture authority. We do not profess to understand in what it consist3.

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Will you not concede, now, provided the statements made above are correct, that we are not very unreasonable, when we complain, that from the time in which Tertullian maintained the doctrine of the Trinity against Praxeas, down to the present period, the views and statements of Trinitarians, in regard to this subject, should have been so frequently misunderstood or misrepresented?

I have dwelt sufficiently on my statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the difficulties that lie in the way of proving this statement to be erroneous or contradictory. Before I proceed to the next topic, I will merely mention, in a brief way, two of the most formidable objections to our views which I have seen, and which were adduced by two men, who must be reckoned among the most intelligent, that have embraced the cause of Unitarianism. The first is from Faustus Socinus, and runs thus:

"No one is so stupid, as not to see that these things are contradictory, that our God, the creator of heaven and earth, should be one only in number, and yet be three, each of which is our God. For as to what they affirm that our God is one in number, in respect to his essence, but threefold in regard to persons; here again they affirm things which are self-contradictory, since two, or three persons cannot exist, where there is numerically only one individ ual essence; for to constitute more than one person, more than one individual essence is required. For what is person, but a certain individual, intelligent essence? Or in what way, I pray does one person differ from another, unless by the diversity of his individual or numerical essence?...This implies, that the divine essence, is numerically one only, yet that there is more than one person; although the Divine essence which is numerically one, and divine person are altogether identical." (Opp. tom. i. p. 697.)

Here, however, it is obvious that the whole weight of the objection lies in an erroneous use of the words person and essence. Socinus attaches to them a sense, which Trinitarians do not admit. How then can Trinitarians be charged with inconsistencies, in propositions which they do not make?

Of the same tenor with the objection of Socinus, is the

objection mentioned by the famous Toellner, (Theolog. Untersuchungen, B. I. p. 29,) which, to save room, I shall merely translate, without subjoining the original. "The most considerable objection, (against the doctrine of the Trinity,) is this," says he, "that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are each a particular substance endowed with understanding; and at the same time, neither of them is said to have his separate being, his separate understanding, his separate will, his separate power of action; but all three together have only one being, one understanding, one will, one power of action. As it appears then, it is affirmed that there are three real beings, truly separate; each, consequently, having his own individual power of action, and not having it; three separate persons, and three persons not separate."

All the difficulty, which this masterly writer has, in his usual way, so strikingly pourtrayed, lies merely in the representations of those Trinitarians, who have expressed themselves on this subject so incautiously, as to be understood to affirm, that there are three separate beings, (persons in the common sense of the word,) in the Godhead, with distinct powers, volitions, &c. If there be any now, who defend such a statement of this subject, I must leave them to compose the difficulty with Toellner as they can. The view of the doctrine of the Trinity given by Toellner, in his statement of the objection, is not that which I have presented, or which I should ever undertake to defend. Of course it cannot be adduced as an objection, against the statement which I have given, and have undertaken to defend.

The second objection appears, at first sight, more formidable and perplexing. It comes from Taylor, and was inserted in the English Theological Magazine, Vol: I. No. 4. p. 111. 1770. I have not opportunity of access to the original, and take the ideas from a Latin translation of the piece, which was published in Germany.

"There can," says Taylor, "be no real distinction between the Father and the Son, unless they so differ from each other, that what is peculiar to the Father, is wanting in the Son; and what is peculiar to the Son, is wanting in the Father. Now that property which belongs ex

clusively to the Father, or the Son, must be numbered among the perfections of God; for in the divine nature no imperfections can exist. It follows then, that some perfection is lacking, both in the Father and in the Son, so that neither is endowed with infinite perfection, which is essential to the divine nature. It must be conceded then, that the essence of the Father and the Son is not one and the same."

Ingenious and specious as this is, still I am unable to see that it settles the point in debate. The essence and attributes of God, so far as they are known to us, are numerically one, as we have already admitted. If by "perfection," Taylor means all which belongs to the Godhead; then I answer merely by saying, It is essential to the perfection of the Godhead, that the distinction between the Father and Son should exist; for that otherwise there would be imperfection. My right to make such a statement, is just the same as his to make the assertion, that the distinction between Father and Son, involved an imperfection in each. The very distinction between Father and Son is essential to complete Divinity; and did not these exist, something would be wanting to complete the perfection of the Godhead. I acknowledge this is assumption; but so is Taylor's statement and an argument, which is built on an assumption, may surely be opposed by another argument, which has the same foundation.

My object in the present letter has been, thus far, to compare our views of the Trinity, with those which you have ascribed to us; to show that we are not exposed on account of our belief, to be justly charged with gross and palpable absurdity, or with "subverting the Unity of the Godhead;" and to prove that the question, after all, whether there is a distinction in the Godhead, must be referred solely to the decision of the Scriptures.

To them I shall appeal, as soon as I have made a few remarks on the twofold nature, which we ascribe to Christ. You say (p. 11,)

"We (Unitarians,) believe in the unity of Jesus Christ. We believe that Jesus is one mind, one soul, one being, as truly one as we are, and equally distinct from the one God. We complain of the doctrine of the Trinity, that not satisfied with making God three

beings, it makes Jesus Christ two beings, and thus introduces infinite confusion into our conceptions of his character. This corruption of Christianity, alike repugnant to common sense, and to the general strain of Scripture, is a remarkable proof of the power of a false philosophy in disfiguring the simple truth of Jesus."

You will admit that this is expressed in terms of severity. Whether we are really deserving of it, who hold the doctrine in question, every lover of truth will permit to be brought to the test of fair examination.

I am not certain, that I have rightly apprehended your meaning, when you say that the twofold nature of Christ is 66 repugnant to common sense." Do you mean, that common sense may determine first, independently of Revelation, that the doctrine cannot be true; and then maintain the impossibility that Revelation should exhibit it? If so, then we are able to decide, a priori, what can be revealed, and what cannot; consequently what we may believe, and what we must disbelieve. It follows, then, that a Revelation is unnecessary; or rather that it is impossible, at least, one which shall be obligatory upon our belief: for we have only to say, that our common sense decides against the propriety or the possibility of the things said to be revealed, and then we are at liberty to reject them.

But is this the proper sphere, in which common sense should act? Is it not true, that common sense is limited to judging of the evidences, that the Bible is of divine origin and authority; to establishing the rules of exegesis common to all languages and books; and finally, to directing a fair and impartial application of those rules, to determine what the original writer of any portion of the Scriptures designed to inculcate? Having once admitted, as you have, the divine authority of the Scripture in deciding all questions; and your obligation to submit to its decision when you can understand the meaning of it, by using the common rules of interpretation; how is it to be determined by common sense, whether Christ has two natures or one? Common sense may investigate the language of the inspired writers, and inquire what they have said; and if, by the sound rules of interpretation, it should appear that they have ascribed two natures to Christ; or asserted