Page images
PDF
EPUB

modern times, have called it in question, that the Nicene Creed implies numerical unity; and these have always been contradicted. Not only so, but some of the great masters of ecclesiastical lore, have very recently avouched the opinion, in question. Schroeckh, that consummate master of church History and patristical learning, (Kirchen Geschich. v. 344) says, in reference to the meaning of quoovios, in the Nicene Creed, "It cannot be doubted, that by this word no specific unity is meant, but a numerical unity in respect to being." So Walch, in his celebrated History of Heresies, has decided (2 Th, s. 24;) and Stark, in his History of Arianism, (Berlin. 1786, 1 Th. s. 306, 307,) has given the same opinion. I will not say there is no appeal, from men of such distinguished learning as these; but I may say, that what they pronounce in an unqualified manner to be true, in a case which they have fully examined,. when confirmed by general opinion, in all ages, and by very express and (as it seems to me) satisfactory evidence in ancient times, may at least be asserted by me, without any special rashness; and may be said to be plain, from Church History.

The bearing of this investigation about numerical unity, as implied or excluded by usourias, upon the question how the Fathers used the word person, is very evident. A numerical unity being acknowledged, person can be used in reference to the Godhead, by no considerate man, in the same sense, in which it is applied to men. It designates a distinction in the Godhead-a distinction, of course in opposition to those, who maintain that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are, in all respects, identical, so far as they are divine. And when the Fathers use person, can they use it, but in "opposition to Sabellians and others of similar sentiments"? Most certainly, the Arians did not deny, that Father and Son were two hypostases. They maintained it, in such a high sense as to exclude numerical unity of substance. When the Council of Constantinople affirm, therefore, that "God exists in three most perfect hypostases or perfect persons," they evidently mean to oppose Sabellius, as they proceed to say; "So that the pest of Sabellius shall have no place, which confounds the persons, and takes away their appropriate qualities; nor the blas

phemy of the Eunomians, Arians, and opposers of the Holy Spirit prevail, which destroys the substance, and nature, and divinity of the uncreated, consubstantial, and coeternal Trinity, by introducing a posterior nature, of a different substance, and created." The latter clause here is, as if they had said, The Arians, &c. make two substances, natures, &c. of Christ and the Father, and the Macedonians explain away the being of the Spirit; but we maintain numerical unity (mar ovia) of substance, or being, in opposition to these.

Such an explanation, by these Fathers, of what the Nicene Council meant to oppose, seems to me to indicate, that the Reviewer is not correct, when he intimates that the Nicene Fathers had not any particular reference to the errors of Sabellius. To oppose Arius, was, no doubt, the special object of the Council. But then, in forming a Creed, they naturally had reference to the disputes of the times, in general. Dr. Münscher admits this. "The Nicene Council," says he, "recognized (vorfand,) as decided, the doctrine of the church, that the Son of God is called God, and is entitled to divine honours. They recognized also, the decision established in opposition to the Noetians and Sabellians, that the Son, or Logos, is a proper hypostasis." (Untersuch. &c.) "Certainly," says Bishop Bull, (opp. p. 114) "it is most clearly evident, (liquidissimo constat,) that the Nicene Fathers in their Creed, meant to impugn other heresies besides the Arian." He proceeds to say, what is very evident to be sure, that many things are contained in the Creed, which the Arians did not deny at all, and which must therefore refer to other

sects.

I have proceeded as far, in this examination, as my present limits will allow. If I have justified the shape of the paragraph, which the Reviewer has animadverted upon, given in the present edition, my special object is answered by this investigation.

Be this however as it may; as the great body of Trinitarians, since the Council of Constantinople, to say the least, have maintained the numerical unity of the Godhead, and as Mr. Channing cannot be supposed to have attacked the Trinitarianism of the Fathers, but that of the present

day; so the substance of all that was aimed at, in the paragraph of the letters under consideration, stands unimpeached. Trinitarians of modern times, maintaining the numerical unity of the Godhead, cannot, unless Mr. Channing supposes them to be most unreasonably self-contradictory, maintain that person does apply, or can apply to the Godhead, in the latitude in which he understands it. The real question, therefore, as to the justice of his attack upon their opinions, is not affected by the sense in which the Fathers used the word person. The investigation of this question, however, may not be without some use. It may, at least, provoke a more diligent examination of the subject, than has hitherto taken place among us. Should this be the case, the interests of truth may be promoted by it.] To return;

We profess to use the word person, merely from the poverty of language; merely to designate our belief of a real distinction in the Godhead; and not to describe independent, concious beings, possessing separate and equal essences, and perfections. Why should we be obliged so often to explain ourselves on this point? Is there any more difficulty here, or any thing more obnoxious, than when you say, "God is angry with the wicked every day?" You defend yourself in the use of such an expression, by saying, that it is only the language of approximation; i. e. that it is intended to describe that, in the mind of the Deity, or in his actions, which corresponds in some measure, or in some respect, to anger in men; not that he is really affected with the passion of anger. You will permit me, then, to add, that we speak of person in the Godhead, to express that which in some respect or other corresponds to persons as applied to men, i. e. some distinction; not that we attach to it the meaning of three beings, with a separate consciousness, will omnipotence, omniscience. &c. Where then is our inconsistency in this, or the absurdity of our language; provided there is a real foundation in the Scriptures, on which may rest the fact of a distinction, that we believe to exist?

I could heartily wish, indeed, that the word person never had come into the Symbols of the Churches, because it has been the occasion of so much unnecessary dispute and

difficulty. But since it has long been in common use, it is difficult, perhaps inexpedient or even impossible, altogether to reject it. If it must be retained, I readily concede that the use of it ought to be so explained and guarded, as not to lead Christians into erroneous ideas of the nature of God. Nor can I suppose, that the great body of Christians have such ideas, or understand it to mean that, which you attribute to us as believing. Then surely it is not the best mode of convincing your opponents, to take the word in a sense so different from that in which they understand it, and proceed to charge them with absurdities, consequent upon the language of their creed. It has always been a conceded point, that in the statement of difficult subjects, or the discussion of them, terms might be used in a sense somewhat different from their ordinary import. And what can declare in a plainer manner, that Trinitarians do use the word person in this way, as applied to the divine Being, than the agreement among them that God is numerically one, in essence and in attributes?

It might have been justly expected, likewise, that be fore they were charged with sentiments, which subvert the divine Unity, the meaning of the word person, in the ancient records which describe its introduction into the technical language of the Church, should have been carefully investigated. One of your rules of exegesis, to which I have with all my heart assented, demands that " every word... should be modified and explained, according to the subject which is discussed, according to the PURPOSES, feelings, circumstances and principles of the writer." Do us the justice to apply this law of interpretation to our language, and the dispute between us about the meaning of the word person, is forever at an end.

What then, you doubtless will ask, is that distinction in the Godhead, which the word person is meant to designate? I answer without hesitation, that I do not know. The fact that a distinction exists, is what we aver; the definition of that distinction is what I shall by no means attempt. By what shall I, or can I define it? What simile drawn from created objects, which are necessarily derived and dependent, can illustrate the mode of existence in that Being, who is underived, independent, uuchangeable, infinite,

eternal? I confess myself unable to advance a single step here in explaining what the distinction is. I receive the FACT that it exists, simply because I believe that the Scriptures reveal the FACT. And if the Scriptures do reveal the fact, thatthere are three persons in the Godhead, (in the sense explained;) that there is a distinction which affords ground for the appellations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; which lays the foundation for the application of the personal pronouns, I, thou, he; which renders it proper, to speak of sending and being sent; of Christ being with God, being in his bosom, and other things of the like nature; and yet, that the divine nature belongs to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost; then it is, like every other fact revealed, to be received simply on the credit of divine revelation.

Is there any more difficulty in understanding the fact, that there is a distinction in the Godhead, than there is in understanding that God possesses an underived existence? With what shall we compare such existence? All other beings are derived; and, of course, there is no object in the universe with whose existence it can be compared. To define it then, is beyond our reach. We can approximate towards a conception of it, merely by negatives. We deny that the divine existence has any author, or cause; and when we have done this, we have not defined it, but simply said that a certain thing does not belong to it. Here we must rest. The boundaries of human knowledge can never be extended beyond this.

The distinction in the Godhead, which I have now mentioned, I ought to say here, we do not, and cannot consider as a mere subject of speculation, which has little or no concern with ardent piety, or the best hopes of the Christian. We believe that some of the most interesting and endearing exhibitions of the divine character, are founded upon it and connected with it; and that corresponding duties are urged upon us, and peculiar hopes excited, and consolations administered by it.

In regard to this distinction, we say, It is not a mere distinction of attributes, of relation to us, of modes of action, or of relation between attributes and substance or essence, so far as they are known to us. We believe the Scriptures justify us in these negations. But here we leave the subject.

« PreviousContinue »