nite in being and perfection, a pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible, &c." West. Con. p. 32.

Now is this the denial of the divine unity, with which we are implicitly charged? Can Unitarians present a more complete assertion of the divine Unity, than is presented by these Symbols of different denominations of Christians, who admit the doctrine of the Trinity?

But admitting our statement of the divine Unity to be correct; you will aver, probably, that my second proposition is subversive of the first, Whether this be so, or not, is what I now propose to investigate,

The common language of the Trinitarian Symbols is, "That there are three PERSONS in the Godhead." In your comments upon this, you have all along explained the word person, as though it were a given point, that we use this word here, in its ordinary acceptation as applied to men. But can you satisfy yourself, that this is doing us justice? Is it not evident from Church History, that the word per son was used in ancient times, as a term which would express the disagreement of Christians in general, with the reputed errors of the Sabellians, and others of similar sen, timents, who denied the existence of any real distinction in the Godhead, and asserted that Father, Son, and Holy Ghost were merely attributes of God, or the names of different ways in which he revealed himself to mankind, or of different relations which he bore to them and in which he acted? Some of the principal Fathers and Councils meant to deny the correctness of such assertions, by using the word person to designate some real, not merely nominal distinction, in the Godhead; to signify that something more than a diversity of relation or action, in respect to us, was intended. They seem to me to have used the word person, because they supposed it to approximate nearer to express ing the existence of a real distinction, than any other which they could choose.

[By comparing the preceding paragraph, with the same in the former editions of this work, the reader will see, that some of it is modified, to avoid the ambiguity, which seemed to be chargeable upon the former editions; or changed, to correct that, which, if literally taken, would be erroneous I had said, that "the word person was introduced

into the Creeds of ancient times, merely as a term which would express the disagreement of Christians in general, with the reputed errors of Sabellius, and others of similar sentiments:" and although I certainly did not mean to say, that such a use of it was universal, and without exception, as I well knew the phrase had been variously and loosely used by some of the Fathers; yet I prefer to remove the ambiguity of the phrase, by a limitation, which, so far as I have been able to examine, seems more accurately to correspond with the state of the case. My belief is, that the leading and most influential Fathers and Councils of antiquity did use person, as I have now stated.

As the text stood, in former editions of this work, it would appear, as if I meant to say that the Nicene Fathers, in their Symbol, had used the word person, in the sense alleged. This however, I did not then mean to say; although it will appear on examination, perhaps, that I might have safely said it. I admit that my expression is of a dubious nature; or even that it will convey the sense, which the Reviewer has given to it. I meant to say, that the Fathers who belonged to the Nicene Council, the divines of that age, in their writings, used the word person, to designate a distinction in the Godhead, in opposition to the opinions of Sabellius, and others of like sentiments with him.

The Reviewer, however, in the Christian Disciple, in admonishing me of an error, in respect to this, has, perhaps, himself fallen into one. He says, that the Nicene Creed contains neither the word υποστασις nor προσωπον ; whereas, if he had read the Creed four or five lines beyond what I have quoted, he would have found it anathematizing those," who affirm that the Son is of a different hypostasis (Torrarews) from the Father." The sense of Toracis here, however, some may incline to think, is not that of person, but of substance simply. But Basil, and in like manner Bishop Bull, have contended, perhaps triumphantly, for the meaning of person. Bull. Opp. p. 114, &c.

The only question of any importance, at issue on the present topic, is; Did the ancient Fathers use the word person, in respect to the Godhead, to designate beings so distinct, as to have only a specific unity, as the Reviewer, after Whitby and others, has asserted; or did they use it

to designate a distinction in the Godhead, in opposition to sentiments like those of Sabellius, and with the acknowledgment of the numerical unity of the Godhead? The question, of course, is; Did the leading and most influential divines and Councils, maintain the one or the other of these views? If the former, then my allegation is incorrect; if the latter, then the substance of what I have hitherto said upon this subject, has not been disproved.

It were easy to occupy a volume with the discussion of this subject; but my limits necessitate me to be very brief. I begin with an inquiry into the meaning of ὑποστασις.

The Antenicene Fathers used this word, perhaps commonly, in the sense of ovia substance or essence. But some used it to signify person, or distinction in the Godhead. In consequence of the word being differently used, by different writers, and in reference to diverse heresies, great disputes arose in the Church about it. At first, the orthodox Fathers, in general, strongly objected to reFrais as applied to designate a distinction in the Godhead, because, they averred, that it meant substance or essence; and to assert that there were three substances in the Godhead, they said was antiscriptural. Thus Dionysius Romanus (about A. D. 250) reprobates those," who separate the Divinity into three different hypostases. (Advers. Sabell. as cited in Athanas. decret. Synod. Nic. p. 230.) And again; "They preach as it were three Gods, dividing the sacred Unity into three hypostases, diverse and altogether separate from each other."

So Athanasius, (Epist. ad Antioch.) says; "We speak of one hypostasis, deeming hypostasis and overa, substance, the

same.

The opposition to hypostasis, in such a sense, was general in the Latin Churches; because they translated both Terracis and ovora by substantia, substance: and they refused to say, that there were three substances in the Godhead.

How far Origen, and others of his school, were implicated in the condemnation passed by them upon such a use of hypostasis, does not certainly appear. Origen maintains three hypostases; but that he asserts them in such a sense as to exclude numerical unity of essence and attributes in the Godhead, I have not seen satisfactorily evinced.

P

After the Sabellian opinions were propagated in the Church, many of the Greek Fathers maintained, in opposition to them, that there were three hypostases in the Godhead. Contentions soon arose about this phraseology, because it was deemed, by some, to imply too much. These contentions were in some measure composed, however, by the Synod of Alexandria, (A. D. 362.) at which Athanasius was present, who decided that "any one was at liberty, to aver that there was but one hypostasis in the Godhead, provided the threefold distinction therein was preserved, or to maintain three hypostases, provided that only one substance was meant. (Hardouin, Tom. I. 734.)

About this time, in order to avoid the ambiguity of hypostasis, the Greeks began to substitute gownov, person, in imitation of the Latin persona, which was used in the western Churches. The classical use of both the Greek and Latin word, is indeed quite different from the ecclesiastical But Tev and persona evidently assumed a technical use, in the Churches. After the Synod of Alexandria, the Greek Church used both ὑποστασις and προσωπον, in the same sense; as did the Latins persona and hypostasis, in respect to the subject in question.

one.

It remains now, after having given this sketch of the history of Tais and gorov in the Greek Church, and persona and hypostasis in the Latin, to shew that a distinction in the Godhead was designated by them, which was deemed consistent with numerical unity of substance and attributes, and was not intended to designate person, in such a sense as admitted only specific unity.

It will of course be seen, that this question does not regard the use of zorraris, in the classic sense of substance, or essence, a sense which some of the Fathers gave to it, when they affirmed that there could be but one hypostasis in the Godhead; but the use of hypostasis to designate person or distinction in the Godhead. In a word, when the Greek Fathers use hypostasis or gorway for a distinction in the Godhead, or the Latins persona or hypostasis, in the same way; do they use them, so that we must fairly understand them, as admitting a numerical unity of essence and attributes, or only a specific unity of the Godhead?

That a uniformity among the Fathers, in the use of these

terms, existed without exception, and that no inconsistency or inaccurary in respect to the use of them can be found, is more than any one would undertake to prove, who knows how loosely many of the Fathers have written, and how little the study of accuracy, in the use of language, prevailed among them. Making only proper allowances for this, (allowances which must be made for modern as well as ancient times,) I think it can be shewn, that the view which I have given, in the paragraph of my Letters that occasioned this discussion, is substantially correct.

Tertullian, the earliest Father who presents us with the terms person, and Trinity, (Lib. advers. Prax. c. 2,) in a passage quoted hereafter in these Letters, more at length, seems plainly to use the word person, in the sense which I have attached to it. His antagonist, Praxeas, denied that there was any distinction in the Godhead, or any except a verbal one. "This perversity, (i. e. of Praxeas,) thinks itself," says Tertullian, " to be in possession of pure truth, while it supposes that we are to believe in one God, not otherwise than if we make the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost the self same; as if all were not one, while all are of one, viz. by a unity of substance."

Farther on, he says, "I call him, (the Logos) a person and pay him reverence." And again, "We are baptized into the persons (of the Godhead,) severally, by the use of their several names."

The key to this language is plainly to be found, in the opinions of Praxeas, which denied any distinction in the Godhead. Tertullian means to assert it, to do which he uses the word person, and persons; while he expressly acknowledges a unity of substance. That this unity is numerical and not specific, seems to me to be plainly indicated, by the manner in which he expresses himself; which is equivalent to saying, 'about the unity of the Godhead as to substance, we do not dispute with Praxeas; we only maintain that there is a distinction, which we call person, not inconsistent with such a unity.'

In regard to Origen, it has generally been thought that he maintained nothing more than a specific unity in the Godhead, while it is beyond a doubt that he asserts the existence of three hypostases. (See Com. in Johan. p. 24.)