ligation to receive the Old Testament, in any sense as our guide; and that what it teaches, we are not bound" to make the rule of our lives ?" I do not feel certain, that it was your design to affirm this; but the words in their connexion seem naturally to bear this import. To such a view, I should object; that those parts of the Old Testament, which express the will of God, in reference to the great points of duty, that must, from the nature of moral beings, be forever the same under every dispensation, may be and ought to be regarded as unrepealed. It is a very sound maxim, in the interpretation of divine as well as human laws; manente ratione, manet ipsu lex, a law is unrepealed, while the reason of that law continues. Express repeal only can exempt a law from the application of this maxim. And when our Saviour says, "Till heaven and earth pass, one jot or tittle shall in no wise pass from the law, till all be fulfilled," he seems to me, plainly to have declared the immutability of the ancient moral law, in the sense already explained.

What shall we say, moreover, of the devotional parts of the Old Testament, (the book of Psalms for instance ;) or of those numerous prophetical parts, which are sermons on the duties and obligations of men, or predictions of a future Messiah, and of the nature and prosperity of his church? Are these any more Jewish, (except as to the garb in which they are clothed,) than Christian? I admit that they are all less perfect, than that which the New Testament furnishes on the same topics; but I believe them to be sanctioned by the same authority, and to require a similar respect and deference.

In regard to what you say, respecting the leading princi ple of interpreting Scripture, I cannot hesitate to declare, that nothing is clearer to my apprehension, than that God, when he speaks to men, speaks in such language as is used by those whom he addresses. Of course, the language of the Bible is to be interpreted by the same laws, so far as philology is concerned, as that of any other book. I ask with you; How else is the Bible a Revelation? How else can men ever come to agree in what manner the Scripturè should be interpreted, or feel any assurance that they understand the meaning of its language?

I find little from which I should dissent, in the remainder of your observations upon the general principles of interpretation. I might, perhaps, make some objections to the manner, in which the office of reason in the interpretation of Scripture, is occasionally described. But I am confident, that I admit as fully as you do or can do, the proper office of reason, in the whole matter of religion, both in regard to doctrine and practice. It is to our reason, that the arguments which prove the divine origin of Christianity are addressed; and it is by reason, that we prove, or are led to admit this origin, on general or historical grounds. Reason prescribes, or at any rate developes and sanctions, the laws of interpreting Scripture. The cases mentioned by you, in which reason must be exercised, are, in general, striking exemplifications of this. But when reason is satisfied that the Bible is the book of God, by proof which she cannot reject, and yet preserve her character; and when she has decided what laws of exegesis the nature of human language requires; the office that remains for her in regard to the Scripture, is the application of those laws to the actual interpretation of the Bible. When, by their application, she becomes satisfied with respect to what the sacred writers really meant to declare, in any case, she admits it without hesitation, whether it be a doctrine, the relation of a fact, or a precept. It is the highest office of reason to believe doctrines and facts, which God has asserted to be true, and to submit to his precepts; although many things, in regard to the manner in which those facts and doctrines can be explained, or those precepts vindicated, may be beyond her reach. In short, the Scriptures being once admitted to be the word of God, or of divine authority; the sole office of reason in respect to them is to act as an interpreter of revelation, and not in any case as a legislator. Reason can only judge of the laws of exegesis, and direct the application of them, in order to discover simply what the sacred writers meant to assert. This being discovered; it is either to be received as they have asserted it, or their divine authority must be rejected, and our obligation to believe all which they assert, denied. There is no other alternative. Philosophy has no right to interfere here. If she ever interferes, it must be when the

question is pending, whether the Bible is divine. Nor has system, prejudice, sectarian feeling, orthodoxy or heterodoxy, so called, any right to interfere. The claims of the Bible to be authoritative being once admitted; the simple question in respect to it, is, What does it teach? In regard to any particular passage; What idea did the original writer mean to convey? When this is ascertained by the legitimate rules of interpretation, it is authoritative; this is orthodoxy in the highest and best sense of the word: and every thing which is opposed to it, which modifies it, which fritters its meaning away, is heterodoxy, is heresy; to whatever name or party it is attached.

I presume you will agree without hesitation, to these remarks. The grand Protestant maxim, that the Bible is our only and sufficient rule of faith and practice, implies most clearly the very same principles which I have stated; and these every man must admit, that acknowledges the paramount claims of the Bible to be believed, and has any tolerable acquaintance with the subject of its interpretation.

If there be any thing to which I should object in your statement, generally considered, of the laws of Interpretation, it is rather the colouring which has been given, to some of the language in which it is expressed. You commence by saying, that your party are charged with "exalting reason above revelation; with preferring their own wisdom to God's ;" and that these charges are "circulated freely and with injurious intentions." You will readily acknowledge, as a general fact, that there is difficulty in giving an impartial statement of opinions, which we thus strongly feel to have been misrepresented. We certainly are under temptation, in such cases, to set off our own opinions to the best advantage, and to place those of our opponents in the most repulsive attitude. And although Trinitarians, in fact, differ less from you, in respect to the laws of interpretation, than you seem to have apprehended; the belief on your part, that a wider difference existed, seems to have given a peculiar cast to some sentences, which simple discussion would hardly admit.

With the two last paragraphs of your sermon, that are quoted above, I wish not to be understood as signifying that I entirely agree. It is, however, rather from the applicd

tion of some exegetical principles which is made in them, than from the principles themselves, that I dissent. I shall have occasion to remark hereafter on this subject. I have mentioned it now, merely to prevent any mistake, with regard to the meaning of what I say here upon the laws of interpretation, as exhibited by you.

It would have given me pleasure to find you unconditionally admitting, that the general principles of interpretation which you defend, are not original, nor peculiar to your party. But you seem to qualify this, by saying that “all Christians OCCASIONALLY adopt them." If I understand you rightly, then, you would concede, that only Unitarians admit substantially the system of exegesis, which you have described, and practise upon it. In this however, (if this be your meaning,) you are mistaken; at least, it appears plainly so to me, in respect to the divines of New England, who, at the present time, are called orthodox. I doubt whether any man can study the science of interpretation, for a considerable time together, without adopting those principles of it, for substance, which you seem to claim appropriately for Unitarians.

How can it be explained, then, supposing you and I are both sincerely seeking after truth, and both adopt, for substance, the same maxims of interpretation, that we should differ so widely in the results that flow from the application of these principles? Perhaps some light may be cast upon this question, in the sequel of these letters.

LETTER IK

Reverend and Dear Sir,

Ir would be very gratifying to find, in your sermon, as much respecting the doctrine of the Trinity, with which I might accord, as in your principles of interpretation. My apprehensions respecting this doctrine, however, differ from yours. It is not without examination and reflection, that I have embraced my present views of it; and the perusal of your statement of the doctrine in question, and your

arguments against it, have not persuaded me, that my views

are erroneous.

You will not expect me, however, in these letters, which are intended to be brief, to go into a discussion of this great subject, which shall embrace all the important topics which it presents. I intend to touch on those points only, on which the hinge of the controversy seems to me to turn; and on these, in a manner as summary, as the nature and difficulty of the case will permit.

The statement which you make of your own faith in regard to the unity of God, and your account of the doctrine of the Trinity, are as follow:

"First. We believe in the doctrine of God's UNITY, or that there is one God, and one only. To this truth we give infinite importance, and we feel ourselves bound to take heed, lest any man spoil us of it by vain philosophy. The proposition, that there is one God seems to us exceedingly plain. We understand by it, that there is one being, one mind, one person, one intelligent agent, and one only, to whom underived and infinite perfection and dominion belong. We conceire, that these words could have conveyed no other meaning to the simple and uncultivated people who were set apart to be the deposita. ries of this great truth, and who were utterly incapable of understanding those hair breadth distinctions between being and person, which the sagacity of latter ages has discovered. We find no intimation, that this language was to be taken in an unusual sense, or that God's. unity was a quite different thing from the oneness of other intelligent beings.

"We object to the doctrine of the Trinity, that it subverts the unity of God. According to this doctrine, there are three infinite and equal persons, possessing supreme divinity, called the Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Each of these persons, as described by theologians, has his own particular consciousness, will, and perceptions. They love each other, converse with each other, and delight in each other's society. They perform different parts in man's redemption, each having his appropriate office, and neither doing the work of the other. The Son is mediator, and not the Father. The Father sends the Son, and is not himself sent; nor is he conscious, like the Son, of taking flesh. Here then we have three intelligent agents, possessed of different consciousnesses, different wills, and different perceptions, performing different acts, and sustaining different relations; and if these things do not imply and constitute three minds or beings, we are utterly at a loss to know how three minds or beings are to be formed. It is dif ference of properties, and acts, and conciousness which leads us to the belief of different intelligent beings, and if this mark fail us, our whole knowledge fails; we have no proof, that all the agents and persons in the universe are not one and the same mind. When we attempt to