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democracy; but they may enjoy as great a portion of civil liberty, and if we can rely on history and observation, it possesses more stability, and promises a longer duration.

Under the representative form of government, the people may enjoy a greater degree of political power and liberty than under a mixed government, and less than in a democracy; and a greater security of their civil liberties, than can be had under any other form. To this end the political rights and powers of the people, and the civil powers of the government must be so distinguished, modified, and regulated as to be exercised separately by those to whom they are severally reserved or delegated. These regulations provided in the constitution, may be so guarded as to prevent any sudden and unnecessary alterations and changes in those fundamental laws through popular excitement so incident to a democracy, and that confusion of powers which is incident both to a democracy and a mixed monarchy. At the same time the obstacles to wholesome and necessary amendments, arising from an opposition of powers and interest, will be wholly removed. The people may voluntarily assemble to express their opinion of the government or the administration, by memorial, petition, or remonstrance; but such assembly will always be partial and without authority, and can make no amendments, no alteration in the constitution or laws.

That the people may constitutionally exercise their powers of political legislation, it must be provided that they shall, by their representatives elected for that purpose, meet in convention, on the call of the ordinary legislature; or the legislature may be authorized to make proposals of amendments of the constitution to the people to be ratified or rejected in their primary assemblies. Nor can the legislature, composed of members from every part of the state, fail of knowing and being influenced by the sentiments of the people on the expediency of such a measure. Some states have authorized the ordinary legislature, to make any amendment of the constitution by their own act; But requiring a greater degree of unanimity than in common cases, and that before its final adoption it shall be passed by two successive sessions that a new election of representatives may intervene, who it is supposed, will have

learned, and will be actuated by the sentiments of the people on the proposed amendment. But this must be considered, in a measure, a departure from the principles of the government; as it confounds the several powers of legislation, and in a degree, the obligation of the political and civil laws, which as they are distinct in their nature ought to be kept in a distinct view. It seems highly expedient that every amendment to be laid before the people for their consideration, should be passed with the same caution, and the same delay, that it may be maturely considered before its final adoption. Indeed none but simple propositions ought to be submitted in this way. The people in their primary assemblies are incapable of discussing intricate questions. All amendments, alterations, and changes of the constitution that require a deliberate discussion in order to a proper adjustment ought to be referred to a convention of the people, by their representatives chosen for that special purpose, where they may meet a full and fair discussion, and be adopted or rejected on mature deliberation.

Not less important is it to provide for the free and secure exercise of the right of suffrage by the people, in the periodical elections of the legislators and principal functionaries of the government, which includes the right of calling to account, through that medium, any functionary and organ of that government, that may for the purpose of a better selection be entrusted with the appointments to office, for the propriety of such appointments. Thus the people are constituted the guardians of their own rights as they are the source of all power. All those who administer the government, will be taught by this means that they are only trustees for the people, exercising a delegated power, and accountable to them and to such tribunals as are established by the constitution, for the manner in which they discharge their trust. No one is placed beyond the reach of accountability. Under this form of government is secured and realized that political liberty which has in all ages been the idol of mankind, the dread of tyrants, and which the people themselves have so often abused to their own ruin.

It is true, this form of government is a novelty in the political world, it cannot, it does not, appeal to history for proof of its excellence; but to present facts. Half a century

is hardly elapsed since the experiment was first made in these United States; during which, its success has been beyond the most sanguine expectations of its friends, and has disappointed the forebodings of its enemies. The sentiment of attachment to its institutions, and the high sense of independence it is calculated to infuse and cherish among the people, are the strength and confidence of the government. An attack upon the government is felt by all, as it in fact is an attack upon themselves, and it is suppressed or repelled with that promptitude and energy which such sentiments and feelings naturally inspire. It has also solved the great problem of imperium in imperio. It has been found capable of uniting independent states under one general government, for all national purposes, to any extent, and with increasing security and energy. From the experience we have had, and that on some of the most trying occasions, we have good reason to say, it promises stability and durability, if any thing human can be durable.

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CHAPTER IV.

Of the Division and Limitation of the Civil Powers.

From the manner in which, agreeable to the constitution, the civil powers are to be exercised, and the objects of their exertion, there naturally arises a division into a legislative, an executive, and a judiciary department. The exercise of the legislative power, by a representation of the people, is an improvement of modern times. In all the republics of ancient Greece, in Italy, and in Rome itself, where the people had a share in legislation, every freeman was a member of the legislature, and gave his suffrage personally in the assembly of the people. This brought together a body too unwieldy, even in the smallest states; in states of greater extent, where the citizens were almost innumerable, as in the Roman commonwealth, they formed a heterogeneous assemblage of sentiments, passions, and interests, that bade defiance to all hope of compromise by means of rational discussion.

Those who are little capable of reasoning, are nevertheless, capable of strong feelings. Accordingly we find in the public speeches of their most celebrated orators, comparatively little attention, to close investigation; all the powers of their eloquence are directed to the passions and sentiments of their audience; the whole vigor of the soul is collected to this point. The instruction contained in their orations, serves principally to mark the state of knowledge, the manners and sentiments of the times. The glow of imagination, which they discover, the propriety and irresistible force of sentiment and expression, which wrap the whole soul in attention, have

justly rendered them the admiration of succeeding ages. All this well accounts for the fluctuation of measures in ancient popular governments. They have, with great propriety, been compared to the fluctuations of the boisterous elements. A republican government upon this model, must always be found rash and vacilating in their counsels, and exposed to violent revolutions.

It has been the opinion of the best writers, that a democracy can be adequate to the government of a small territory only; and that, in this institution, population must be stinted, or the number of citizens, who shall have the right of suffrage, limited. The first is a very discouraging consideration. The latter constitutes a more or less numerous aristocracy. Montesquieu, clearly agrees in the general opinion. He appears to have had no conception of that improvement upon a democracy, in which the people exercise all the powers of government by representation. In his time no instance of this form had existed in any independent state, and which yet wants an appropriate name. The same author, speaking of the representative branch of the English government, observes,-" The great advantage of representatives is their being capable of discussing affairs;. for this the people at large are very unfit; which is one of the inconveniencies of a democracy."* Representatives, elected from various parts of the community, agreeable to a just apportionment, are, not only capable of discussing the affairs of the nation, be it ever so extensive or numerous, but they bring to that discussion more knowledge of the general and particular manners, interests, and sentiments of the people whose interest and happiness is alone concerned in their deliberations, and dispositions more congenial to those manners, interests, and sentiments, than can be found in any other body of men.

The legislative department ought, by the constitution, to be again divided into two co-ordinate branches, one of which, less numerous, we denominate the senate, the other the house of representatives. Both are to be in fact equally representatives of the people; the latter more numerous, to be elected from

* Sp. L. B. 1. 184.

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