gressions"): First, as a rule of life and additional sanction c duty; secondly, as a sacramental means of grace, whereby the former generations of faithful Israelites might be partakers of that salvation, which, in after times, the Almighty purposed to raise up to their children: thirdly, as a looking-glass wherein our human nature might see reflected its own weakness and deformity. After proving each of these points very satisfactorily, he advances to the second fact, that "this law was only called for until the coming of Christ," and concludes that the entire law, both moral and ceremonial, was set aside by the Christian dispensation. "All these ends," says he, "which the law so excellently answered, were temporary only, and lasted no longer than till the Seed should come to whom the promise was made, that in Him all the nations of the earth should be blessed. The assurance," he adds, "and certainty of a future judgment, &c. are a far more powerful sanction to the law of nature and conscience; and the purity of Christ's example, is a far more perfect rule of life, than any which were supplied by the law of Moses" (p. 101). And subsequently, he assumes that "the law of Moses has no weight with us, to the practice of moral and religious duties" (p. 102).

"If, then, we are asked," says the bishop, in conclusion, "why the law of Moses was given by God? The answer will be,' It was added because of transgressions, until the Seed should come to whom the promise was made.' If we are asked, whether we are bound to keep that law, we should reply, that it was not given to us nor to our fathers, and that we live under a better covenant, and have, in the example of Christ, a better rule of life before us. If it should be further inquired, why, then, do we read the Scriptures of the Old Testament? We may answer, that we read them to confirm our faith in Christ, by learning all that wonderful chain of prophecy, &c. ; that we read it to increase cur thoughtfulness, &c. If, lastly, the inquirer should ask, what obligation we have, since the law of Moses has no weight with us, to the practice of moral and religious duties? Let our

answer be given, not only with our lips, but in our lives, &c. Christ made the law of Moses unnecessary by furnishing us with stronger motives of hope and fear to the practice of the law of nature," &c. pp. 102, 103.

This is not a new opinion, and the bishop has supported it (as might be anticipated from his wellknown talent) with great ability. But if his view of the moral law be correct, then is our church in material error, the great majority of Christians are walking by an unauthorised and defective standard of duty, and a way is opened for overturning some of our most sacred institutions. That this view stands opposed to the standard of the faith and formularies of our church is most evident. The Seventh Article is decisive on this point: " Although the law given from God, by Moses, as touching ceremonies and rites, do not benefit Christian men, nor the civil precepts thereof ought of necessity to be received into any commonwealth; yet, notwithstanding, no Christian man whatsoever is free from the obedience of the commandments which are called moral." Conformably with this statement, the initiatory sacrament of baptism requires a solemn pledge of sponsors, in behalf of the infants whom they represent, that they will "obediently keep God's holy will and commandments, and walk in the same all the days of their life;" and children are reminded of this pledge in the Catechism, where moral duty is resolved into the Decalogue, and they are required to repeat, to divide, and explain the Ten Commandments in our Lord's ample and then to " and practical interpretation of them, pray to God for his special grace," to enable them to obey them; and, with a view still further to recognize and sanction this rule of duty, "the Order of Confirmation" requires" that none hereafter shall be confirmed, but such as can say," among other things, “the Ten Commandments." Nay, so essential does our church

deem a strict observance of these

laws, that every Lord's day they are repeated at large by the clergyman; the congregation, at the end of each, praying for pardon of each particular violation, and grace to keep the command, beseeching God to write them all upon their hearts. And, in addition to all this, the eighty-second canon requires, that in every church "the Ten Commandments shall be set up on the east end, where the people may best see and read the same." Considering the prominency thus given to the moral law, and the importance attached to obedience to it, by our church, it occasioned us some surprise that so eminent a bishop, and so great an ornament of that church, should write a sermon to impugn its moral obligation; and to shew that, under the Christian dispensation, it is not to be considered even as a rule of life.

It

Nor is it a consideration of slight importance that, if this opinion be correct, then the members of the Established Church, as well as almost all classes of those who dissent from it, are making that a criterion of morality which has no Divine sanction, and regulating their lives by a rule which is not merely defective, but totally annulled. might also occasion doubt whether repentance, resulting from a conviction of offences against this law, would be necessary or proper; and whether the conclusion thence deduced, of the need of a Saviour to release from the penalty supposed to be connected with the violation of a non-existing law, be well founded.

It may, also, justly excite anxiety among those who are desirous of walking by a right rule to discover in what that rule really consists. Many persons who disclaim the moral law as a standard of duty and rule of conduct, attempt to supply the deficiency by alleging that the new principle infused into the soul by regeneration, directs them to what is right, and guards them against what is wrong;

and, also, that the Holy Spirit, by his constant influence and suggestions, sanctifies their hearts, and keeps them from sin; so that the defect of a standard of duty is, in their ideas, remedied by a new and internal sense, and the secret motions of the Divine Spirit. The dangerous conclusions to which opinions like these naturally lead, no person would have more easily detected, or cautiously guarded against, than Bishop Heber; and therefore nothing of this kind is suggested by him. What, then, it may still be asked, has he substituted for the moral law, of which he has deprived us? It is the law of nature and of conscience, and the example of Christ. "The assurance and certainty," says the bishop, "of everlasting life, and of a just and equal judgment after death, are a far more powerful sanction to the law of nature and conscience, and the purity of Christ's example is a far more perfect rule of life, than any which were supplied by the law of Moses" (p. 101). Again; "We have in the example of Christ a better rule of life before us" (p. 102). And again; "Christ made the law of Moses unnecessary, by furnishing us with stronger motives of hope and fear to the practice of the law of nature" (p. 103). The law, then, of nature and of conscience, and the example of Christ, are to be the standard of duty under the Christian dispensation. But does not the important question immediately suggest itself, What is this law of our nature and conscience? Where is it defined? Of what does it consist? Who are agreed upon it? To what definite, invariable, and beneficial results does it lead ? If these questions admit of no satisfactory answer, then it may be asked, How is it possible for a holy and consistent life to result from what is vague, uncertain, and doubtful? Nor shall we find the other rule of life suggested by the bishop answerable to the exigency. We know, indeed, that "Christ has left

us an example, that we should walk in his steps." We should be humble, meek, patient, submissive, and resigned as he was; we must be crucified to the world, heavenly in our affections, devoted and zealous in our obedience. But

:

all this is general, and relates rather to the spirit and temper of our conduct, than to specific and definite actions; but it is chiefly in reference to these that we want information, and need a law. Nay, as it regards specific actions, the example of Jesus Christ often affords us no rule at all and to imitate it would sometimes be absurd, sometimes impious, and sometimes even blasphemous. Who, then, is to determine what part of his example is intended as a copy? Who shall decide, in every case, what belonged to the Divine nature of Christ, what was peculiar to his mission, what was specially required by time, place, and circumstances, and which would have been improper in any other case? And how, in the midst of all this doubt and uncertainty, should the plain and undiscriminating Christian know how to act? So that, surpassingly great as is the advantage of having many specific parts of our duty, and the spirit and temper in which every part should be performed, set forth and illustrated by the example of Christ, it cannot supersede the necessity of having some fixed and determinate law, some code of precepts like those of which this system would deprive us, plain, distinct, numbered, classified, to which every man may have easy and ready access, and may determine, at the exigency of the moment, how he ought to act. The law of love, under which the Christian lives, is a motive and stimulus, but not always a guide. The most affectionate child may not always know without specific direction what is his parent's wish. The law of love inclines the heart while the law of command regulates the understanding.

Bishop Heber assigns it as a reason for the first introduction of the law of Moses, that the law of nature and of conscience was not a sufficient security against transgressions.

"Except," says his lordship, "in two instances; that of eating the blood, of living

animals, and that of murder of their own species; no rule that we know of was given for their conduct in life, except the law of nature; that moral sense of right and wrong, that inward voice of conthen are even now, as St. Paul expresses science and of reason by which the heait, a law unto themselves.' But that

both the revelations which God had made of his own nature, and the feelings which he had implanted in the bosom of man were insufficient to subdue the unruly will and affections of our species is certain." pp. 96, 97.

With a view to remedy this evil, the bishop proceeds to state, that this very law of Moses, the moral parts of which were evidently designed to correct what was defective in moral conduct, was introduced by the Divine Legislator. Strange, then, must it seem, that the remedy is again to be relinquished, and the original law of nature and of conscience, inefficient as experience had proved it to be, again to be replaced in its stead.

But we must observe still further, that the abrogation of the moral law, as a rule of duty, strikes at the root of our most sacred institutions. We have no sufficient sanction for the particular appropriation of one day in seven to the service of God but in the Decalogue; for, previously to the giving of the law by Moses, Bishop Heber states that, except the law of nature and conscience, there were only two rules laid down for the conduct of life, one of which related to the eating of the blood of living animals, and the other to the taking away of the life of a fellow-creature by murder. Now, as no law has been laid down under the Christian dispensation for observing the Sabbath, if the law of Moses, in reference to it, is annulled, there remains no Divine sanction whatever for its obser

vance.

The only authority on which it rests, is political; and this may at any time be set aside by an act of parliament. But if this be the case, we are also destitute of any Divine authority for stated times of religious worship; we have no longer any hold on the consciences of men to assemble together for the purpose of hearing the word of God read, explained, and enforced; nor is any certain and definite season appointed for perpetuating the remembrance of the death of Christ by the holy sacrament. True it is, that Christians may, at their own discretion, fix times and seasons for these purposes; and doubtless, where pious and holy men are found, they will do so. But there have been times when piety has suffered great decay, and such characters were rarely to be found; and should these occur again, the only means of reviving the dying spark would be wanting; and, without a miracle, the very existence of Christianity would be endangered. On the subject of the Sabbath, we wish our limits would permit us to enlarge. There is none in which the vital interests of our holy religion are more deeply involved, and none which has been handled, of late, by some of the professed advocates of Christianity, with greater laxity of principle, or treated with so much disrespect by the mass of the community, or trampled upon with such insolence by the infidel and openly profane. But we must, for the present, forbear.

If, then, such would be the inevitable results of abrogating the moral law, as a rule of duty, we may be sure that Christianity is not chargeable with this suicidal act, and that some error must have found its way into Bishop Heber's reasoning from his text. Nor do we think it difficult to shew in what that error consists. We conceive, then, in the first place, that the whole discussion proceeds on an untenable assumption. It supposes that a moral law, founded, as such

a law must be, on the nature of things, that is, correctly speaking, on the immutable will of God, may be superseded or annulled. This, we think, impossible, without annihilating the nature and fitness of things themselves. We may not be able, by unassisted reason, to discover all the laws and principles which are inherent in the constitution of a moral government; but when they are brought to light, nothing can ever change their nature, or release us from their obligation: from that time they became a law of our nature, and are as fixed and immutable as that nature itself. If, therefore, the laws of the Decalogue be moral (and this, with a few circumstantial limitations, is on all hands admitted), they must still be binding and eternal. We think, also, that nothing recorded in the history of our Lord or his Apostles can fairly lead to the conclusion that it was ever designed to make any alteration in the obligation of the moral law; nay, so far from it, that it is ratified and confirmed by that history. Every thing conspires to shew that it is

Our

holy, just, and good," and, for that reason, never to be annulled. Lord, in his Sermon on the Mount, corrected some of the abuses of this law, and placed it upon its original footing, and, in doing so, gave his sanction to it; for correction, while it reproves the abuse, supposes an approbation of the thing in its purity. The very resolving of that law into the imperishable principle of love to God and to man, as our Saviour has done, and as, in fact, was done by the Jews, both before and in his time, establishes its unchangeable character. In many instances our Lord unfolded and dwelt upon the spiritual extent of that law, and took occasion, from this enlarged view of it, to fasten guilt upon the consciences of his hearers, and to lead them to repentance; which surely he never would have done, if he had intended to abrogate it as a rule of duty. Even with regard to the strict observance of the Sabbath,

which may have something of a ceremonial character in a few of its circumstantials, it is observable, that in no instance does he violate, or vindicate the violation of, any thing which intrinsically belongs to it; and whenever the Pharisees charged him or his disciples with so doing, he always vindicated both them and himself, by appealing to their own law and principles. We think, moreover, that his own positive declaration, if carefully considered in connexion with his future sufferings and atoning sacrifice, places the matter beyond all doubt: "Think not that I came to destroy the Law and the Prophets I came not to destroy, but to fulfil," &c. (Matt. v. 17.) The passage may require more explanation than we have room to give it; but it appears, on the face of it, that the whole of that law, both moral and ceremonial, was to be fulfilled by Christ the moral, as a rule of duty, and an essential qualification for his fulfilling the ceremonial. This he fulfilled as the antitype to the type; that as being the inflexible and immutable law of our moral nature: the former, when fulfilled, in the nature of it, could never be repeated: the latter, when fulfilled also, in the very nature of it, must ever be repeated. The ceremonial was fulfilled when he made an atoning sacrifice for the violation of the moral; and we think that the very fact that that sacrifice was eventually offered for sins against the moral law, as laid down by Moses, must of itself for ever establish the immutability and eternal obligation of that law. The Jews had no idea of sin but as the transgression of their law, and their daily and yearly sacrifices were offered as atonements for their sins against it. Strange, then, would it be, if the very Sacrifice which was offered for sins should abolish the law of which those sins were a violation. As reasonable would it be to say that the same sacrifice delivers us from all obligation to obey the law of nature and of conscience,

and thus, falling at once into the Antinomian scheme, the death of Christ would release us from all moral obligation of whatever kind. No; this cannot be. Christ redeems us from the penal consequences of transgression of every moral law, whether of natural conscience or of Divine revelation; the very fact of such redemption establishes, in full force, and for ever, the moral obligation of such laws; and they thus become an immutable standard of duty, and rule of life.

It is precisely in this point, that we think Bishop Heber has missed the meaning of his text. He concludes, that because the law of Moses in all its extent, was added on account of transgression, until the promised Seed should come, and because the typical law could not possibly be extended, and never was intended to be extended, beyond the coming of the Messiah, therefore both the moral and ceremonial law terminate together; not considering that the moral law was introduced to mark the nature of sin, and to shew the necessity of an atonement, and that therefore only so much of the law could, or was intended to be, set aside, as was essentially connected with the sacrifice of Christ; whilst that part of the law which rendered such a sacrifice necessary must be handed down to future generations, if for no other purpose, to shew their need also of an atoning sacrifice for their violations of the rule of life and the standard of conduct. Without moral transgression, there would be no necessity for a sacrifice; and to make such a sacrifice at all times necessary, there must at all times be the same moral cause,-a violation of the rule of life.

The sixth is an excellent practical discourse on "the Faith and Fear of a Christian," from Isaiah li. 12, 13. The bishop expresses a more favourable hope of the Christian state of the world, than we think