no man could be fo ridiculous, as from hence to infer, that I believe it poffible, notwithstanding this affurance, that there fhould be no God. For however in many other cafes an undoubted affurance that a thing is, may not exclude all fufpicion of a poffibility of its being otherwife; yet in this tenet of a Deity it most certainly does: because, whoever is affured that there is a God, is affured there is a being whofe exiftence is and always was neceffary; and confequently is affured that it is impoffible he should not be, and involves in it a contradiction. So that my difcourfe is fo far from being equivalent to the pofition he mentions, that it is a perfect contradiction to it. And he might with as much truth have affirmed, that I had exprefsly, and in fo many words, faid, that there is no God.

The other paffage is in p. 118. [i. e. vol. 3. p. 308. 309.] of my book, concerning the rule of faith. I was difcourfing, that no man can fhew by any necessary argument, that it is naturally impoffible that all the relations concerning America fhould be falfe. But yet (fay I) I fuppofe that, notwithstanding this, no man in his wits is "now poffeffed with fo incredible a folly, as to doubt whe"ther there be fuch a place. The cafe is the very fame as "to the certainty of an ancient book, and of the fenfe of "plain expreffions. We have no demonftration for thefe "things, and we expect none; because we know the things are not capable of it. We are not infallibly certain, that 66 any book is fo ancient as it pretends to be; or that it was "written by him whofe name it bears; or that this is the fenfe of fuch and fuch paffages in it. It is poffible all "this may be otherwife: but we are very well affured that "it is not; nor hath any prudent man any just cause to

make the leaft doubt of it. For a bare poffibility that a "thing may be, or not be, is no juft caufe of doubting whe"ther a thing be or not. It is poffible all the people in "France may die this night; but I hope the poffibility of "this doth not incline any man in the leaft to think that it "will be fo. It is poffible that the fun may not rife to66 morrow morning; yet, for all this, I fuppofe that no 66 man hath the least doubt but that it will."

To avoid the cavils of this impertinent man, I have tranfcribed the whole page to which he refers. And now, where is this avowed pofition of the poffible falfhood of

faith? All that I fay is this, That we are not infallible either in judging of the antiquity of a book, or of the fenfe of it: by which I mean, (as any man of fenfe and ingenuity would easily perceive I do), that we cannot demonftrate thefe things fo as to fhew that the contrary neceffarily involves a contradiction; but yet that we may have a firm affurance concerning thefe matters, fo as not to make the leaft doubt of them.

And is this to avow the poffible falfhood of faith? and yet this pofition Mr. S. charges upon thefe words; how justly, I fhall now examine.

Either by faith Mr. S. means the doctrine revealed by God; and then the meaning of the pofition must be, That what God fays, is possible to be false; which is fo abfurd a pofition, as can hardly enter into any man's mind; and yet Mr. S. hath the modefty all along in his book to infinuate, that in the forecited paffage I fay as much as this comes to.

Or elfe Mr. S. means by faith, the affent which we give to doctrines as revealed by God; and then his fenfe of infal libility must be, either, that whoever affents to any thing as revealed by God, cannot be deceived, upon fuppofition that it is fo revealed; or elfe abfolutely, that whoever affents to any thing as revealed by God, cannot be deceived. Now, although I do not, in the paffage forecited, fpeak one fyllable concerning doctrines revealed by God; yet I affirm, (and fo will any man elfe), that an affent to any doctrine as revealed by God, if it be revealed by him, is impoffible to be falfe. But this is only an infallibility upon fuppofition; which amounts to no more than this, That if a thing be true, it is impoffible to be falfe. And yet the principal defign of Mr. S.'s book is to prove this, which I believe no man in the world was ever fa fenfeless as to deny. But if he mean abfolutely, that whoever affents to any doctrine as revealed by God, cannot be deceived; that is, that no man can be mistaken about matters of faith, (as he must mean, if he pretend to have any adverfary, and do not fight only with his own fhadow): this, I confefs, is a very comfortable affertion, but I am much afraid it is not true.

Or elfe, laftly, by faith he understands the means and motives of faith; and then the plain ftate of the controverfy between us is this, Whether it be neceffary to a Chriflian belief, to be infallibly fecured of the means whereby the

Chriftian

Chriftian doctrine is conveyed to us, and of the firmness of the motives upon which our belief of it is grounded? This indeed is fomething to the purpose: for though, in the paffage before cited, I fay not one word concerning the motives of our belief of the Chriftian doctrine; yet my difcourfe there was intended to be applied to the means whereby the knowledge of this doctrine is conveyed to us. However, I am contented to join iffue with Mr. S. upon both thefe points.

1. That it is not necessary to the true nature of faith, that the motives upon which any man believes the Chriftian doctrine fhould be abfolutely conclufive, and impoffible to be falfe. That it is neceffary, Mr. S. feveral times affirms in his book; but how unreasonably, appears from certain and daily experience. Very many Chriftians, fuch as St. Austin Speaks of, as faved, not by the quickness of their underftandings, but the fimplicity of their belief," do believe the Chriftian doctrine upon incompetent grounds; and their belief is true, though the argument upon which they ground it be not (as Mr. S. fays)" abfolutely conclufive of the thing: " and he that thus believes the Chriftian doEtrine, if he adhere to it, and live accordingly, shall undoubtedly be faved; and yet I hope Mr. S. will not fay, that any man shall be faved without true faith. I might add, that in this affertion Mr. S. is plainly contradicted by thofe of his own church.

For they generally grant, that general councils, though they be infallible in their definitions and conclufions, yet are not always fo in their arguments and reafonings about them. And the Guide of controverfies expressly fays, p.35. that "it is not neceffary that a divine faith fhould always have "an external rationally infallible ground or motive thereto "(whether church-authority, or any other) on his part "that fo believes." Here is a man of their own church avowing this pofition, That faith is poffible to be falfe. I defire Mr. S. who is the very rule of controverfy, to do juftice upon this falfe Guide.

I must acknowledge, that Mr. S. attempts to prove this affertion, and that by a very pleafant and furprising argument; which is this. "The profound mysteries of faith "Che tells us, Faith vind. p. 90.) must needs feem to Some (viz. thofe who have no light but their pure natu"ral reafon, as he said before, p.89.) impossible to be

"true;

"true; which therefore nothing but a motive of its own "nature feemingly impoffible to be falfe, can conquer, fo 66 as to make them conceit them really true." What Mr. S. here means by a motive of its own nature feeming impoffible to be falfe, I cannot divine; unless he means a real feeming impoffibility. But be that as it will, does Mr. S. in good earnest believe, that a motive of its own nature feeming impoffible to be false, is fufficient to convince any man, that has and uses the light of natural reafon, of the truth of a thing which must needs seem to him impoffible to be true? In my opinion, these two feeming impoffibilities are fo equally matched, that it must needs be a drawn battle between them. Suppofe the thing to be believed be tranfubftantiation; this indeed is a very profound myftery, and is (to speak in Mr. S.'s phrafe) of its own nature fo feemingly impoffible, that I know no argument in the world strong enough to cope with it. And I challenge Mr. S. to inftance in any motive of faith which is, both to our understanding and our fenfes, more plainly impoffible to be falfe, than their doctrine of tranfubftantiation is evidently impoffible to be true. And if he cannot, how can he reasonably expect that any man in the world should believe it?

2. That it is not necessary to the true nature of faith, that we should be infallibly fecured of the means whereby the Chriftian doctrine is conveyed to us; particularly of the an tiquity and authority of the books of Scripture, and that the expreffions in it cannot poffibly bear any other fenfe. And thefe are the very things I inftance in, in the paffage fo often mentioned. And to thefe Mr. S. ought to have spoken, if he intended to have confuted that paffage. But he was refolved not to speak diftinctly, knowing his best play to be in the dark, and that all his fafety lay in the confufion and obfcurity of his talk.

Now, that to have an infallible fecurity in thefe particulars is not necessary to the true nature of faith, is evident upon these two accounts; becaufe faith may be without this infallible fecurity; and becaufe, in the particulars mentioned, it is impoffible to be had.

1. Becaufe faith may be without this infallible fecurity. He that is fo affured of the antiquity and authority of the books of fcripture, and of the fenfe of those texts wherein

the

the doctrines of Christianity are plainly delivered, as to fee no juft caufe to doubt thereof, may really affent to thofe dotrines, though he have no infallible security. And an affent fo grounded I affirm to have the true nature of faith. For what degree of affent, and what fecurity of the means which convey to us the knowledge of Christianity, are necessary to the true nature of faith, is to be eftimated from the end of faith, which is, the falvation of mens fouls. And whoever is fo affured of the authority and fenfe of fcripture, as to believe the doctrine of it, and to live accordingly, fhall be faved. And furely fuch a belief as will fave a man, hath the true nature of faith, though it be not infallible. And if God have fufficiently provided for the falvation of men of all capacities, it is no fuch reflexion upon the goodness and wisdom of providence as Mr. S. imagines, that he hath not taken care that every man's faith fhould arrive to the degree of infallibility; nor does oar bleffed Saviour, for not having made this provifion, deferve "to be esteemed by all "the world, not a wife lawgiver, but a mere ignoramus "and impoftor," as one of his fellow-controvertiffs (Labyrinthus Cantuarienfis, p. 77.) Speaks with reverence.

Befides, this affertion, That infallibility is necessary to the true nature of that affent which we call faith, is plainly falfe upon another account alfo; becaufe faith admits of degrees, but infallibility has none. The feripture Speaks of a weak and a strong faith, and of the increase of faith; but I never heard of a weak and ftrong infallibility. Infallibility is the highest perfection of the knowing faculty, and confequently the firmeft degree of affent, upon the firmeft grounds, and which are known to be fo. But will Mr. S. Jay, that the highest degree of affent admits of degrees, and is capable of increafe? Infallibility is an abfolute impoffibility of being deceived. Now, I defire Mr. S. to fhew me the degrees of abfolute impoffibility; and if he could do that, and confequently there might be degrees of infallibi lity, yet I cannot believe that Mr. S. would think fit to call any degree of infallibility a weak faith or affent.

2. Becaufe an infallible fecurity in the particulars mentioned, is impoffible to be had; I mean in an ordinary way, and without miracle and particular revelation; becaufe the nature of the thing is incapable of it. The utmost fecurity we have of the antiquity of any book, is human teftimony

b

and