preffed this image of himself upon the mind of man, there is great reason why all men should stand in awe of him. But if there be no God, it is not easy to conceive how fear should create an univerfal confidence and affurance in men that there is one. For, whence fhould this fear come? It must be either from without, from the fuggestion of others, who first tell us there is fuch a being, and then our fear believes it; or else it must arise from within, from the nature of man, which is apt to fancy dreadful and terrible things. If from the fuggeftion of others who tell us fo, the question returns, Who told them fo? and will never be fatisfied, till the first author of this report be found out. So that this account of fear refolves itself into tradition; which shall be fpoken to in its proper place. But if it be faid, that this fear arifeth from within, from the nature of man, which is apt to imagine dreadful things, this likewise is liable to inexplicable difficulties. For, firft, The proper object of fear, is fomething that is dreadful; that is, fomething that threatens men with harm or danger; and that in God muft either be power or juftice: and fuch an object as this fear indeed may create. But goodness and mercy are effential to the notion of a God, as well as power and justice. Now, how fhould fear put men upon fancying a being that is infinitely good and merciful? No man hath reason to be afraid of fuch a being, ás fuch. So that the Atheist must join another caufe to fear, viz. hope, to enable men to create this imagination of a God. And what would the product of these two contrary paffions be? the imagination of a being which we should fear would do us as much harm, as we could hope it would do us good? which would be quid pro quo, and which our reafon would oblige us to lay afide fo foon as we have fancied it, because it would fignify juft nothing. But, fecondly, Suppofe fear alone could do it, how comes the mind of man to be fubject to fuch groundless and unreasonable fears? The Ariftotelian Atheist will fay, it always was fo. But this is to affirm, and not to give any account of a thing. The Epicurean Atheist, if he will speak confonantly to himself, muft fay, that there happened, in the original conftitution of the firft men, fuch a contexture of atoms, as doth naturally dispose men

to

to these panick fears; unless he will fay, that the first men, when they grew out of the earth, and afterwards broke loofe from their root, finding themfelves weak, and naked, and unarmed, and meeting with feveral fierce creatures ftronger than themselves, they were put in fuch a fright, as did a little diftemper their understandings, and let loose their imaginations to endlefs fufpicions and unbounded jealoufies, which did at laft fettle in the con ceit of an invisible being, infinitely powerful, and able to do them harm; and being fully poffeffed with this apprehenfion, nothing being more ordinary than for crazed perfons to believe their own fancies, they became religious; and afterwards when mankind began to be propagated in the way of generation, then religion obliged them to inftil these principles into their children in their tender years, that fo they might make the greater impreffion upon them; and this courfe having been continued ever fince, the notion of a God hath been kept up in the world. This is very fuitable to Epicurus's hypothesis of the original of men; but if any man think fit to fay thus, I cannot think it fit to confute him. Thirdly, Whether men were from all eternity fuch timorous and fanciful creatures, or happened to be made fo in the first conftitution of things, it feems however that this fear of a Deity hath a foundation in nature. if it be natural, ought we not rather to conclude, that there is fome ground and reafon for these fears, and that Nature hath not planted them in us to no purpose, than that they are vain and groundless. There is no principle that Ariftotle, the great afferter of the eternity of the world, doth more frequently inculcate than this, That Nature doth nothing in vain: and the Atheist himfelf is forced to acknowledge, and fo every man muft who attentively confiders the frame of the world, that although things were made by chance, yet they have happened as well as if the greatest wisdom had the ordering and contriving of them. And furely wifdom would' never have planted fuch a vain principle as the fear of a Deity in the nature of man, if there had not been a God in the world.

And

2dly, If fear be not a fufficient account of this univer-fal confent, the Atheist thinks it may very probably be

C 2

refolved:

refolved into univerfal tradition. But this likewife is liable to great exception. For, whence came this tradition? It must begin fometime; it must have its original from fome body; and it were well worth our knowing who that man was that first raised this spirit, which all the reafon of mankind could never conjure down fince. Where did he live, and when? In what country, and in what age of the world? What was his name, or his fon's name, that we may know him? This the Atheist can give no punctual account of; only he imagines it not improbable, that fome body long ago, (no body knows when), beyond the memory of all ages, did start fuch a notion in the world; and that it hath paffed for current ever fince. But if this tradition be granted fo very ancient, as to have been before all books, and to be elder than any hiftory, it may, for any thing any body can tell, have been from the beginning: and then it is much more likely to be a notion which was bred in the mind of man, and born with him, than a tradition transmitted from hand to hand through all generations; efpecially if we confider how many rude and barbarous nations there are in the world, which consent in the opinion of a God, and yet have scarce any certain tradition of any thing that was done among them but two or three ages before.

3dly, But if neither of these be fatisfactory, he hath one way more; which although it fignify little to men of fober and fevere reafon, yet it very unhappily hits the jealous and fufpicious humour of the generality of men, who, from the experience they have had of themselves and others, are very apt to fufpect that every body, but especially their fuperiors and governors, have a defign to impose upon them for their own ends. In fhort, it is this: That this noife about a God is a mere ftate-engine, and a politick device, invented at firft by fome great prince, or minifter of ftate, to keep people in awe and order. And if fo, from hence (faith the Atheist) we may eafily apprehend, how from fuch an original it might be generally propagated, and become univerfally current, having the ftamp of publick authority upon it befides, that people have always been found eafy to comply with the inclinations of their prince. And from hence like

wife we may fee the reafon why this notion hath continued fo long. For being found by experience to be fa excellent an inftrument of government, we may be fure it would always be cherished and kept up.

And now he triumphs, and thinks the bufinefs is very clear. Thus it was, fome time or other, (moft probably towards the beginning of the world, if it had a beginning, when all mankind was under one univerfal inonarch), fome great Nebuchadnezzar fet this image of a Deity, and commanded all people and nations to fall down and worship it. And this being found a fuccefsful device to awe people into obedience to government, it hath been continued to this day, and is like to laft to the end of the world. To this fine conjecture I have thefe four things to fay.

1. That all this is mere conjecture and fuppofition: he cannot bring the leaft fhadow of proof or evidence for any one tittle of it.

2. This fuppofition grants the opinion of a God to conduce very much to the fupport of government and order in the world; and confequently to be very beneficial to mankind. So that the Atheist cannot but acknowledge, that it is great pity that it fhould not be true; and that it is the common intérest of mankind, if there were but probable arguments for it, not to admit of any flight reafons against it; and to punish all those who would feduce men to Atheism, as the great disturbers of the world, and pests of human fociety.

So

3. This fuppofition can have nothing of certainty in it, unless this be true, that whoever makes a politick advantage of other mens principles, ought to be prefumed to contrive thofe principles into them: whereas it is much more common, because more eafy, for men to ferve their own ends of thofe principles or opinions. which they do not put into men, but find there.. that if the queftion of a God were to be decided by the probability of this conjecture, (which the Atheist applauds himself moft in), it would be concluded in the affirmative; it being much more likely, fince politicians reap the advantages of obedience and a more ready fubmiffion to government, from mens believing that there is a God, that they found the minds of men prepoffcffed

to their hands with the notion of a God, than that they planted it there.

4. We have as much evidence of the contrary to this fuppofition, as fuch a thing is capable of, viz. that it was not an arcanum imperii, a fecret of government, to propagate the belief of a God among the people, when the governors themselves knew it to be a cheat. For we find, in the histories of all ages of which we have any records, (and of other ages we cannot poffibly judge), that princes have not been more fecure from troubles of confcience, and the fears of religion, and the terrors of another world, (nay many of them more fubject to thefe), than other men; as I could give many instances, and those no mean ones. What made Caligula creep under the bed when it thundered? What made Tiberius, that great master of the crafts of government, complain fo much of the grievous ftings and lafhes he felt in his confcience? What made Cardinal Wolfey, that great minifter of state in our own nation, to pour forth his foul in thofe fad words: "Had I been as diligent to please my "God, as I have been to please my King, he would not "have forfaken me now in my grey hairs?" What rea fon for fuch actions and fpeeches, if these great men had known that religion was but a cheat? But if they knew nothing of this fecret, I think we may fafely conclude, that the notion of a God did not come from the court; that it was not the invention of politicians, and a juggle of ftate, to cozen the people into obedience.

And now, from all this that hath been faid, it seems to be very evident, that the general confent of mankind in this apprehenfion, that there is a God, must in all reafon be afcribed to fome more certain and univerfal cause than fear, or tradition, or state-policy, viz. to this, that God himself hath wrought this image of himself upon the mind of man, and fo woven it into the very frame of his being, that, like Phidias's picture in Minerva's fhield, it can never totally be defaced, without the ruin of hu

man nature.

I know but one objection that this difcourfe is liable to; which is this, That the universal consent of mankind in the apprehenfion of a God, is no more an argument that he really is, than the general agreement of fo many

nations,