Should it be said, that the perfections of God cannot fail to operate in such a manner as to produce the greatest good; I acknowledge it. Still it cannot be proved, nor be rendered in any degree probable, that the greatest possible Good will not be found in a system, into which Evil has admission. That, in such a system, great good may exist, is unquestionable. The scriptural scheme of redemption proves unanswerably, to all who believe the bible, that good will, and to those who do not believe it, that good may spring, in a world where evil is found, greater than any other which can be imagined by the human mind. This argument is therefore wholly lame, with respect to the purpose for which it is introduced, and furnishes not the least reason for supposing such a second Cause.

3. If there were more Gods than one, it is incredible that no proof should be furnished of their existence.

As no intelligent being can act at all without an end in view, for which he acts; so, as has been heretofore observed,* the end proposed by the Creator of all things, must have been found in himself, and could have been no other than the manifestation of his own glory. The end of the creation of man must of course have been, that he should coincide with this great design in the exercise of all his faculties; that he should discern it with his understanding, relish it in his affections, and promote it with his active powers. But if more gods than one were concerned in the creation of man, and of the universe, it is evident that this, the only supposable end of their acting at all, cannot, so far as respects man, be possibly accomplished. That man may either discern or relish the excellence, or in the exercise of his active powers promote the designs of his Creator, it is absolutely necessary that he should be furnished with some knowledge, and therefore with some proof of his existence.

To his Creator, man is indebted for existence, and is therefore his property. Of course, man is absolutely his subject, rightfully governed by his will, rightfully subjected to his law, rightfully disposed of at his pleasure; and therefore wholly bound to coincide, voluntarily, with all his designs. From the Creator also, man derives all his blessings; and is therefore

* See Sermon I.

under the highest obligations to exercise towards Him unceasing gratitude, and to perform all the actions which gratitude can dictate or inspire. Finally, the Creator of man must be, of course, a Being infinitely great and glorious; and in this character claims from him, as an intelligent creature, his highest adoration, love, complacency, and praise. In these several methods, and in these only, is man capable of glorifying his Creator. In these therefore is found the whole, and the only end which his Maker could propose in creating man.

But to man's performance of all or any of these services, it is absolutely necessary that he should know the Being who created him, and become acquainted, in some degree at least, with his character: and to this knowledge the previous knowledge of his existence is indispensable. To an unknown being man cannot be conscious of indebtedness or obligation. By an unknown being he cannot be voluntarily governed. To the laws of an unknown being he cannot be voluntarily subject. To an unknown being he cannot be thankful. The character of an unknown being he cannot either adore, admire, love, or praise. If then his Creator be unknown, and necessarily unknown, man cannot possibly, however virtuously he may be disposed, fulfil the only purpose for which he was made. Of course his Creator has, in the case supposed, made man for a single end; and has yet so ordered the state of things, as to preclude him from any possibility of answering this end. In other words, he has created man solely to accomplish a certain purpose; and has at the same time, on his own part, prevented that purpose from any possibility of accomplishment.

What I have here said of one Creator, or one God, is, with exactly the same force, applicable to two or three, or more Creators. If two or more Gods sustaining the same character of Infinite Perfection, have been concerned in the creation and providence of this world; it is unquestionable that they made the world, and man upon it, for some end; and that this end must have terminated, as I have already in substance remarked, in themselves; or in other words, must have been the manifestation of their own glory. In the same degree it is evident, that man must have been alike indebted to them all for his being and his blessings; must be subject to their laws and government, must be bound voluntarily to coincide with their designs, and must owe them equal adoration, wonder, love,

and praise. In order to the possibility of his fulfilling this end, and performing these duties, it is absolutely necessary that he should know his obligations to them; and to this knowledge it is absolutely necessary that he should know their existence. Whence then, if two or more such beings exist, to whom man is equally indebted for his being and his blessings, has it come to pass that he is precluded, by a natural impossibility, from discovering the existence of any more than one? Whence is it, that all his sense of obligation for these high benefits; whence is it, that his gratitude, his voluntary subjection to divine government, his voluntary coincidence with the divine designs, his love, his reverence, his complacency, and his obedience, due alike to all his glorious Authors and Benefactors; are by absolute necessity, and without a possibility of its being otherwise, confined to one? Whence is it, that man is so situated as to make the very attempt, the very design, to render any part of this service to any other, besides one God, a crime, an act of impiety, ingratitude, aud rebellion? Whence is it, that his other Creators, who formed him, only that he might render to them these solemn acts of regard, have furnished him with no trace of their agency, with no proof even of their existence; and have thus put it out of his power to render them any regard whatever?

As this state of things must, if it exist, have been produced by the voluntary act of these supposed Gods, it will, I think, be conceded, that these questions, taken in their connection with the preceding observations, can admit of no answer. If this opinion be just, it will also be conceded, that this argument from reason, for the Unity of God, is not far from being couclusive.

4. The Unity of Design and Agency, in Creation and Providence, furnishes another argument in proof of the existence of but one God.

So far as we are able to understand the works of Creation and Providence, we discern a general simplicity and harmony, in the nature and operations of all things. Amid the immense complication which surrounds us, we perceive one set of laws, in accordance with which all things proceed in their course. The same causes produce, uniformly, the same effects in every place and period. Vegetables spring from the same seed, germinate by the same means, assume the same form, sustain the

same qualities, exist through the same duration, and come to the same end. Animals also are born in one manner, and exhibit the same life, powers, and tendencies. Man has one origin, form, life, system of faculties, character, and termination. All things in this world are, in one regular manner, made subservient to his use and happiness; and are plainly fitted by one design, and conducted by one agency, to this end. Day and night uniformly return by a single power, and with exact regularity. With the same regularity and simplicity, the seasons pursue their circuit. The sun shines, illuminates, warms, and moves the planets by a single law, and with exact uniformity. By one law the planets keep their orbits, and perform their revolutions. The face of the heavens is but one; and the oldest sphere which is known, presents to our view the same constellations which we now behold in the nightly firmament.

Thus all things, so far as our knowledge extends, present to our view a single design, regularly executed by a single agency. But unity of design is a proof of one designer; and unity of agency, of one agent.

This argument has ever struck the minds of thinking men with no small force. Were we able to comprehend the universe, and to discern perfectly the manner in which all the parts of it are conducted, it is not improbable that this argument would be complete. In the present state of our knowledge, it must be confessed, that its influence is less satisfactory than is here supposed. Where there is ignorance, there may, and naturally will be, doubt: and where there is doubt, there will not be complete satisfaction. Its whole force however is lent to the doctrine, that there is but one God. Against the existence of two Infinite Beings of opposite characters and designs, it is, I think, unanswerable. Should it be alleged, that it is no proof against the existence of two or more Infinite Beings, of the same character and designs, I admit the allegation; but observe, that the beings alleged, having, according to the supposition, exactly the same knowledge, disposition, and power, must of course exercise exactly the same agency, and would therefore constitute but one Supreme Agent, or one God.

I will not assert that these arguments amount to a demonstration, yet it cannot be denied that they are attended with high probability. The third of them, in my view, cannot be

:

shaken. United, they reasonably require our belief of one God only and at the same time evince, that the existence of more Gods than one is a mere hypothesis, the admission of which is, of course, a contemptible absurdity. I shall now inquire,

II. What views men have entertained of this doctrine, under the direction of Reason.

In answer to this inquiry, it may be observed,

1. That all the ancient nations, of whose religious opinions we have a distinct account, appear, in the early periods of their existence, to have acknowledged one God.

Among these nations, may be mentioned the Persians, Hindoos, Chinese, Tartars, Chaldeans, Phenicians, Canaanites, Arabians, Egyptians, and Romans. Thus Abimelech, Pharaoh, Job, his three friends, Elihu, Melchizedeck, Nahor, and Laban; Zerdusht or Zoroaster, Lao Kiun, Confucius, the ancient Brahmans, the author of the Orphic Hymns, and Numa Pompilius; all appear to have believed in one original and perfect cause of all things. The people of the Thebaid, or Upper Egypt, for a long time worshipped this God alone. From these facts, connected with many others, which cannot now be mentioned, particularly from the fact, that Noah lived three hundred and fifty years after the flood, and that Shem lived five hundred and twelve years (according to the chronology which I choose to adopt,) it may be assumed as a certainty, that all ancient nations acknowledged One God.

2. All these nations, and all others with them, except the Jews, some sooner and some later, fell into the gross idolatry of Polytheism.

By the labours of Sir William Jones and Mr. Bryant, it appears to me evident, that the polytheistical system was originally one and the same. From the united accounts of other writers concerning this subject, I am equally satisfied that it continued to be one; not however without many modifications and varieties introduced into it by superstition, ignorance, accident, caprice, and several other causes.

This system I consider as originated by that body of men, who followed Nimrod into the plains of Shinar, and built the tower of Babel; and who, being principally descendants of Cush, were called Cushites, through many succeeding genera