In every language there are not only many words directly expressing ideas of this subject, such as cause, efficiency, effect, production, produce, effectuate, create, generate, &c., or words equivalent to these; but every verb in every language, except the intransitive impersonal verbs, and the verb substantive, involves, of course, causation or efficiency; and refers always to an agent, or cause, in such a manner, that, without the operation of this cause or agent, the verb would have no meaning. In this manner have mankind declared, in the very structure of their languages, not only that they perceived and acknowledged this connection, but that it formed so considerable and essential a part of their thoughts, as to necessitate them to think in this manner only. Thus, to think, to speak, to sit, to run, to strike, to write, to love, to hate, all denote effects, and refer to an agent, or cause of those effects; and without such reference would not contain, nor express, any meaning whatever.

I have observed above, that all mankind have agreed in the acknowledgment of this connection, except a few atheistical and sceptical philosophers. These men have, indeed, denied this connection in form; but they have acknowledged it, as fully as all others, in their customary language. On every subject, except creation, or giving existence, they have spoken exactly as other men speak; and the connection between cause and effect is as often declared in their conversation and writings, and as much relied on, as in those of other men. This fact is clear proof, that they admit this connection in all cases, except those which respect the existence and government of God, in the same manner as the rest of mankind. In truth, language is so constructed, that it is impossible to write, or speak, in a different manner.

Children, so soon as they begin to speak at all, inquire more anxiously, and more universally, concerning causation and efficiency, than concerning any other subject of investigation. Every one conversant with them must have observed, that they almost continually inquire, who did this, that, and the other thing; or produced the several changes, of which they are witnesses? Who made themselves, and the various objects around them? In this manner they teach us, that this is, to man, the natural and the only natural mode of conceiving; for all children think, and speak, in this manner.

Nor are the views of mankind less forcibly evident, concerning this subject, in their actions. No man ever acted, without regarding himself as a cause; and without expecting to produce some change in himself, or in the objects around him, by his efficiency; nor made use of any instrument, without expecting from it a degree of efficacy, which should produce some change or other, not to be looked for without it. Thus all men eat and drink, lie down, and act, universally, with a design to effectuate certain changes in themselves, or other objects and atheists, as truly, and uniformly, as any other men. Thus, also, children act, from the beginning. Indeed, were men not to act in this manner, they would never act at all. No proof of absolute and universal conviction, concerning this or any other subject, can be more perfect.

Thirdly: We learn this connection from experience; and in two ways; by the testimony of our senses, and by the inspection of our minds.

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Causes operate without us, and within us; and produce their proper effects in both cases. Those which operate without us, produce their effects before our senses; and so far our knowledge of the connection between cause and effect arises from sensitive testimony. Those which operate within us, produce their effects before the eye of the mind only; and so far our knowledge of this connection is intuitive. clearly perceive, that I think, reflect, remember, choose; wish, love, and hate; that by a determination of my will I turn my thoughts from one subject to another, and transfer my affections and my conduct, voluntarily, from one object to another, and from one course to another, as that I exist, I also perceive this in the same manner, and with the same certainty; viz. with the bare inspection of the mental eye; commonly termed Intuition, and acknowledged to be attended with the highest possible certainty. Mr. Hume is, therefore, totally erroneous in his assertion, that the connection between cause and effect exists, or rather is perceived, only in the Names; and that, if we would call both by the Name, Events, we should not suppose any connection to exist between them.

This opinion is sufficiently refuted by the fact, that these

Names, and not that of Events, have been given to them. Mankind never give names without ideas; nor form any names which do not express such ideas as they really have, nor suppose themselves to have ideas which they have not, or different ideas from those which they really have. Wherever names have been given, the very ideas, which they denote, have certainly existed in the minds of those by whom they were given.

The thing which we really perceive in this case is, however, merely the fact, that cause and effect are thus connected; and not the nature of the causation, or efficiency, on which the connection is founded. That I, and not something else, think, and act, in such manners as have been recited, and that but for me the thought and action would not have existed, I perceive intuitively; but I do not perceive at all why, or by what power, I think and act. The nature of this subject lies, in every case, beyond the bounds of the human capacity. Yet this infers not in any degree any want of evidence attending the fact. The contrary opinion would be attended with this absurdity; that we cannot perceive one thing without perceiving at the same time another, totally diverse, and in the view of the mind entirely separated: an absurdity which cannot need to be exposed by me.

Fourthly: The mind cannot realize the fact, that existence, or change, can take place without a cause.

This is, at least, true with respect to my own mind. I have very often made the attempt, and with no small pains-taking; but have never been able to succeed at all. Supposing other minds to have the same general nature with my own, I conclude, that all others will find the same want of success. If nothing had originally existed, I cannot possibly realize, that any thing could ever have existed. Causes absolutely the same, must in the same circumstances produce absolutely the same effects. This is, I think, certainly self-evident, and admitted as such. An absolute want of cause involves an absolute sameness of an opposite kind; and must, with nearly the same evidence, continue for ever. The necessity of causes to all the changes of being is, so far as I know, universally admitted. Mr. Hume, particularly, talks as commonly, or rather as uniformly, in this manner, as any Christian does; and not only argues

from cause to effect, and from effect to cause, as much as other men; but discusses this subject abundantly, and gives directions, and principles, for this kind of argumentation. Indeed, without admitting it, neither he, nor any other man, could argue at all. But, if no change can take place without a cause; how can it be supposed, that existence can take place without a cause? Certainly less violence is done to our reason by supposing a being to be changed in some respect or circumstance without a cause, than to begin to exist without a

cause.

Fifthly: No absurdity can be greater than to argue with a man, who denies this connection.

He himself, in speaking, exhibits himself as a cause of all the words uttered by him, and the opinions communicated; and. in the act of arguing, admits you to be a similar cause. If his body be not a cause, and your eyes another, you cannot see him. If his voice, and your ear, be not causes, you cannot hear him. If his mind and yours be not causes, you cannot understand him. In a word, without admitting the connection between cause and effect, you can never know, that he is arguing with you, or you with him.

With these observations premised, which you will see to be inwoven with this and all other subjects of discussion, I observe in the first place, That the existence of things, universally, proves the being of God.

The argument, which leads to this conclusion, is, for substance, conducted by Mr. Locke in the following manner. Every man knows, with absolute certainty, that he himself exists. He knows also that he did not always exist, but began to be. It is clearly certain to him, that his existence was caused, and not casual; and was produced by a cause, adequate to the production. By an adequate causc, is invariably intended, a cause possessing and exerting an efficacy sufficient to bring any effect to pass. In the present case an adequate cause is one, possessing, and exerting, all the understanding necessary to contrive, and the power necessary to create, such a being as the man in question. This cause is what we are accustomed to call God. The understanding necessary to contrive, and the power necessary to create, a being com

pounded of the human soul and body, admit of no limits. He, who can contrive and create such a being, can contrive and create any thing. He, who actually contrived and created man, certainly contrived and created all things.

This argument is, in my view, perfectly conclusive: nor has it been, nor will it ever be, answered, except with sophistry, or sneers. I will not insist, that every step of it is attended with what logicians call intuitive evidence: nor, that it amounts to what is, in the logical sense, an absolute demonstration.

But

it is, in every step, attended with such evidence as excludes all rational doubt, and approaches so near to the character of demonstration as to leave the mind completely satisfied. At the same time it is opposed by no counter evidence.

Secondly: The state of existing things completely proves the being of God.

The manner in which the argument, derived from this source, is conducted by Bishop Berkeley, is clearer, and more happy, than any other, within my knowledge; and is substantially the following.

We acknowledge the existence of each other to be unquestionable; and, when called upon for the evidence, on which this acknowledgment is founded, alledge that of our senses; yet it can by no means be affirmed with truth, that our senses discern immediately any man. We see indeed a form, and the motions and actions of that form; and we hear a voice communicating to us the thoughts, emotions, and volitions of an intelligent being. Yet it is intuitively certain, that neither the form, the motions, the actions, the voice, the thoughts, nor the volitions, are that intelligent being; or the living, acting, thinking thing, which we call man. On the contrary, they are merely effects, of which that living, acting thing, denoted by the word man, is the cause. The existence of the cause, or, in other language, of the man, we conclude from the effects which he thus produces. In the same manner, and with the like certainty, we discover the existence of God. In the universe without us, and in the little world within us, we perceive a great variety of effects, produced by some cause, adequate to the production. Thus the motions of the heart, arteries, veins, and other vessels; of the blood and other juices; of the tongue, the hands, and other members; the perception of the senses,