translation, there is nothing in the original. Hence it has been supposed by some commentators, that the passage ought to be rendered, let there be no God. Whether this rendering

be admitted or not, there can be no doubt, that the chief reason why the assertion is adopted at all, is the indisposition of the heart to acknowledge the existence of the Creator.

That we easily believe, what we wish to believe, is a truth so obvious as to have passed into a proverb. He who hates the control, disrelishes the character, and dreads the inspection, judgment, and retribution of his Maker, and intends to persevere in a course of sin, will find no refuge from anxiety and alarm, and no source of quiet in sinning so comfortable, or in his view so safe, as the belief that there is no God. It is not strange, therefore, that this belief has been cherished by such beings as mankind are; and particularly, by such beings as Atheists have universally been.

Still, this conduct cannot be denied to be folly of a very gross kind. As our belief can make no difference in the fact; as if God exists, he will continue to exist; as our danger from his anger against our sins is exactly the same whether we be lieve it or not; as our quiet in sin will in this case only cheat us into ruin; and as the little consolation which we find in the indulgence of this belief, will only enhance our wretchedness by adding to it the anguish of disappointment; no sober man will hesitate to pronounce this conduct foolish in the extreme. To him who walks over the edge of a precipice, what benefit can it be to shut his eyes? What greater stupidity can there be, than to shut our eyes, when this conduct will prove the certain means of conveying us to this scene of absolute destruction?

Atheists have however determined to encounter this hazard, and boldly resolved that there is no God. Against the doctrine of the Divine existence they have raised up several ob jections, which they declare to be satisfactory, at least to themselves. These they have also formed into a scheme, and presented it to the public with a face of bold assurance. Even this has not satisfied them. They have triumphed in the most open manner, in the supposed ingenuity of their efforts; and, in the boasted strength of their arguments, have ridiculed the arguments of their antagonists; and have treated the doctrines not only of Christianity, but even of Theism, with contempt

It is the design of this Discourse to examine the objections of these men, and the principal doctrines with which they have been connected.

The first of these objections, which I shall mention, is, that Creation is so great a work, as to make it seem impossible, even for God to accomplish it.

This was the great difficulty in the mind of Aristotle. This singular man, in the early parts of his life, found his thoughts so much perplexed with this consideration, that he for a time gave up the doctrine of Creation, and determined that the Universe, as to its substance at least, had existed from eternity. I cannot help remarking here the difference between him and the modern opposers of the divinity of Christ. Arians and Socinians have very generally insisted, that Creation is so easy a work, as to afford no proof of divine agency; and declared, that, even if Christ did in fact create all things, this fact does not infer his divinity. To Aristotle it appeared too difficult a work, even for God himself to perform.

He

To this objection we are furnished with a conclusive answer. God does actually, and daily, create the human soul, in innumerable instances; and the creation of the soul evidently demands all the power necessary to the creation of matter. who can give existence to the soul, can plainly give existence to any thing. As I propose, in the progress of these Discourses, to discuss at large the immateriality of the soul, I shall at present take it for granted.

This objection is also completely overthrown by the fact, that God upholds, moves, and governs the universe. Had Aristotle known the doctrines of the Copernican Astronomy, and beheld God moving, with entire and unabated ease, the systems of worlds which compose the universe, his capacious mind would, I think, have been irresistibly led to admit, that the hand which moves them, could with the same ease have created them. Indeed this great man appears, in the later parts of his life, not to have placed any serious reliance on this objection.

Secondly: It is objected, that the state of the world is such as to forbid the belief, that it is the work of a God.

'The world,' say the objectors, is full of imperfection, and

of suffering. The course of nature is such as to entail upon all its animated inhabitants, pain, disease, and death. Nor is the moral state of things materially different from the natural. Depravity, in all its odious forms, appears to have existed from the beginning; and has ever constituted, to say the least, no small part of the character of mankind.' God, on the part of all enlightened men, who believe in the existence of such a being, and particularly on that of Christians, is declared to be possessed of infinite perfection. Can a being of such perfection be supposed to be the author of so imperfect, incongruous, and deformed a work? Is it not plain, that God either did not make the world, or that he has forgotten it, and left it wholly to the control of chance?

To this objection, which is attended with a degree of speciousness, and fitted to awaken fretfulness, where it will not produce conviction, I answer,

1. That all the real weight of it lies in the existence of moral evil; a subject which I shall have occasion to examine, when I come to discourse on the benevolence of God, and on the apostasy of man.

2. The whole force of this objection lies in the inexplicableness of certain things which it alleges; and amounts to no more than this, that there are several things in the world, the nature, use, and end of which we cannot understand. The argument contained in it, if resolved into a general principle, will stand thus. Nothing, the nature, use, and end of which we cannot understand, can be the work of God. This argument needs only to be proposed, to be exploded; for it is so absolutely certain, that God can do very few things, whose nature, use, or end, can be comprehended by us. It is equally certain, that, according to this rule of concluding, the same thing may, at the same time, be proved to be, and not to be, the work of God. One man may distinctly comprehend the nature of a thing, and discern in it certain proofs of divine workmanship. Another man may, at the same time, be wholly ignorant of the nature of the same thing; and his ignorance will, according to this rule, be decisive proof, that it is not a divine work. The same man also may, according to this rule, in the different periods of childhood and manhood be able to prove a thing to be, and not to be, wrought by the hand of God. The evidence of the divine agency, and the want of it, are

here placed, not in the nature of the work, but in the nature of the optics, by which it is perceived: an absurdity too palpable to need any farther discussion. The real proof in this and every other case must, if it be found at all, be found in something which we know, and not in our ignorance. But it has not been, and cannot be shown, that in the existing world there is any thing inconsistent with the doctrine, that it was created, and is governed by God. It is readily acknowledged, that in the system, of which we are a little part, mystery and inexplicableness are found everywhere, and in every thing, in the view of such minds as ours. At the same time it is also certain, that nothing else can be rationally looked for in the works of Him, whose ways are higher than our ways, as the heavens are higher than the earth.'

The myste

ries alleged, instead of being an objection against the doctrine, that the world was made by God, are a strong presumptive argument in its favour.

3. The direct proof of the divine agency in the formation and government of this very world, found in innumerable things, which itself contains, is hitherto unanswered, and is plainly unanswerable. This, having its foundation in what we know, can never be affected in any manner by what we do not know; or in other words, by the mere inexplicableness of the objects around us.

Universally, until we know thoroughly the nature, use, and end of the things, on which the objection is founded, it must be a mere and miserable presumption, that they have not such a nature, use, and end, as are worthy of God.

The Doctrines which Atheists have connected with these objections, and which are deserving of any serious attention, are the following:

I. That things have existed in an Eternal Series:

II. That their existence is Casual: and,

III. That all distinct or separate beings owe their existence to the Powers and Operations of Matter.

These I shall consider in the order specified.

I. It is asserted by Atheists, that there has been an Eternal Series of things.

The absurdity of this assertion may be shown in many ways.

But every

1. Each individual in a series is an unit. collection of units, however great, is, with intuitive certainty, numerable; and, therefore, cannot be infinite.

2. Every individual in the series (take for example a series of men) had a beginning. But a collection of beings, each of which had a beginning, must, however long the series, have also had a beginning.

This likewise is intuitively evident. Should it be said, that the first in each series had not a beginning, but was from everlasting; which is the only possible method of evading the answer already given; I reply, that according to this supposition, the first in each series was uncaused and self-existent; and, containing in itself the principles of eternal existence, could never have ceased to be. At the same time, an endless multitude of finite self-existent beings must be admitted on this supposition, possessed in all instances of few and feeble active powers, and in most instances of none but such as are merely passive. Thus, for example, there must have been an eternal Man, an eternal Lion, an eternal Eagle, an eternal Oak, an eternal Rose, eternal Grass, and in a word as many eternal self-existent beings, as there are kinds and sorts of existences in the world: for no being of one kind can possibly produce, or bring into existence, a being of any other kind. Of course, there must have been one, eternal and self-existent, at the head of every existing series; and at the head of every series of animated beings an eternal self-existent pair. From these also, the whole series must have sprung without any contrivance, and in most instances without any consciousness. All this, with a train of absurdities following it, literally endless, must be admitted on this supposition. For what purpose must all this be admitted? Truly, to relieve us from the difficulty of admitting the existence of One self-existent Being. At the same time, the existence of such a finite self-existent being is a mere hypothesis, without a shadow of support.

Beyond this, all such beings must have lived, as we do, through a succession of years, and their whole existence. must be made up of parts, or divisions, succeeding each other. These parts are a collection of units; and are therefore numerable.

Should it be said, that Saints and Angels in Heaven are immortal, and will therefore exist through an infinite duration;