2dly, That this foreign opium caused a yearly drain of silver; from the small range of Chinese commerce, it is impossible for China to draw upon foreign states; much of the imports must now be paid for in hard downright silver, which is the more disgusting, as formerly the current of silver ran precisely in the other direction.

3dly, That the English have become objects of intense jealousy at the court of Pekin. Indeed, it is time for that Cabinet to look about with some alarm, were it only that a great predominating power has arisen in India-a conquering power, and a harmonizing power, where heretofore there was that sort of balance maintained amongst the many Indian principalities which Milton ascribes to the anarchy of chaos; one might rise superior for a moment, but the restlessness of change, and the tremulous libration of the equipoise, guaranteed its speedy downfal. Here, therefore, and in this English predominance, is cause enough for alarm; how how much more since the war against Nepaul, in virtue of which the English advance has pushed forward the English outposts within musket range of the Chinese, and against the Burman empire, in virtue of which great interposing masses have been seriously weakened. It is become reasonable that China should fear us; and, fearing us, she must allowably seek to increase her own means of annoyance, as well as to blunt or to repel ours. Much of ours must lie in the funds by which we support our vast Indian establishment; and towards those funds it is understood that the opium trade contributes upwards of three millions sterling per annum. In mere prudence, therefore, the cabinet of Pekin sets itself to reduce our power by reducing our money resources, and to reduce our money resources by refusing our opium.

Such are the three reasons upon which it has been alleged that Lin and his master have been proceeding. And now, if it were so, what has any man to say against these reasons? Have not nations a right to protect their own interests? Is not the path of safety open to them, because it happens to lead away from British objects? Why, as to that, measures are not always allowable in a second or third stage of intercourse which might have been so in the first. But for the present we

meditate no attack on these measures. Let them be supposed purely within the privilege of a defensive policy. Only let us have things placed on their right footing, and called by their right names; and let us not be summoned to admire, as acts of heroic virtue which put to shame our Christianity, what under this second view appears to be a mere resort of selfish prudence.

But, then, is it certain that this second view of the case is the correct view? Why, we have before acknowledged that documents are wanting for either view: any inference, for or against the Chinese, will be found too large for the premises. The materials do not justify a vote either of acquittal or of impeachment; but, as this is so, let us English have the benefit of this indistinctness in the proofs equally with the Chinese. So much, at the very least, is fair to ask, and something more; for, upon the face of this Chinese solicitude for the national virtue, some things appear suspicious. Nemo repente fuit turpissimus-Nobody mounts in a moment to the excess of profligacy: and it is equally probable that Nemo repente fuit sanctissimus. This sudden leap into the anxieties of parental care, is a suspicious fact against the Chinese Government.

Then, again, is it, or can it be true, that in any country the labouring class should be seriously tainted by opium? Can any indulgence, so costly as this, have struck root so deeply as to have reached the subsoil of the general national industry? Can we shut our eyes to this gross dilemma? Using much opium, how can the poor labourer support the expense-using little, how can he suffer in his energies or his animal spirits? In many districts of Hindostan, as well as of the Deccan, it is well known that the consumption of opium is enormous: but amongst what class? Does it ever palpably affect the public industry? The question would be found ludicrous. Our own working class finds a great providential check on its intemperance in the costliness of intoxicating liquors. Cheap as they seem, it is impossible for the working man (burdened with average claims) to use them to excess, unless with such intervals as redress the evil to the constitution. This stern benediction of Providence-this salutary operation of poverty-has made it impossible for one generation to shatter the health of the next. Now, for the opium-eater this counteracting provision presses much more severely. Wages are far lower in the opium countries: and the quantity of opium required, in any case where it can have been abused, is continually increasing; whereas the dose of alcohol continues pretty stationary for years.

These things incline a neutral spectator to suspect, grievously, some very earthly motives to be working below the manœuvres of the Celestial Commissioner, since it really appears to be impossible that the lower Chinese should much abuse the luxury of opium; and, as to the higher, what a chimerical undertaking to make war upon their habits of domestic indulgence! With these classes, and in such a point, no Government would have the folly to measure its strength. And, as to the classes connected with public industry, we repeat and maintain that it is impossible (for the reason explained) to suppose them seriously tainted; so that a delusion seems to lie at the very root of this Chinese representation.

But, apart from all that, we see two pinching dilemmas even in this opium case-dilemmas that screw like a vice -which tell powerfully in favour of our Tory views; first, as criminating the present Whig administration beyond all hope of apology; secondly, as criminating the Chinese administration. The first clenches the argument, moved by Sir James Graham, on the criminal want of foresight and provision in our own cabinet; and weare surprised that it could have been forgotten in the debate: the second goes far to justify our right of war against

China.

We will take these dilemmas in the inverse order, putting forward the latter dilemma first.

I. When Lin seized the British opium, and in one day pillaged our British merchants to the extent of more than two millions sterling, by what means was it that Lin got "a hank" over so much alien property? The opium was freighted on board various ships; and these ships were lying at various distances in the waters of the Bocca Tigris. No considerable part of it was on shore, or in the Canton factory. What is our inference from this? Why, that the opium was not in Lin's power. Indeed, we are sure

of that by another argument: for Lin begs from Captain Elliot the interposition of his authority towards get ting the opium transferred to Chinese custody-a thing which most assuredly he would not have done, had he seen the slightest hopes of its coming into his possession by violence. Merely the despair of success in any attempt to seize it, prevailed with him to proceed by this circuitous course. Captain Elliot-for reasons not fully explained -granted this request. Now, then, what we ask is that all who advocate the Chinese cause, would be pleased to state the terms on which this deliberate transfer of British property was made over to Lin-what were the terms understood by the party surrendering and by the party receiving, viz. Lin? That monosyllabic hero did, or he did not, make terms with Captain Elliot. Now, if you say he did not, you say a thing more severe, by twenty times, against the Whig Superintendent than any of us Tories, in or out of Parliament, has ever hinted at. What! a British agent, sent to protect British interests, giving up British property by wholesale - sacrificing millions of British pounds sterling-without an effort to obtain an equivalent, without a protest, without a remonstrance! Why, a diplomatist, acting for the most petty interests, gives up nothing without a consideration; nothing at all, without a struggle at the first, without an equivalent at the last. Quid pro quo is the very meaning and essence of diplomacy. And observe that Captain Elliot does far more than sanction the surrender: it is not as though Chinese artillery had been ready to enforce a seizure, and Captain Elliot, for peace's sake, interfered to substitute a milder course. Nothing of the sort: but for him the opium would not and could not have passed into Chinese hands. In such circumstances for of course he insisted for some equivalent you cannot suppose the first horn of the dilemma-that he did not. That is too incredible. Suppose, therefore, the other horn of the dilemma. You must suppose it. Mere decency binds us to suppose, that Captain Elliot, in compliance with the most flagrant demands of duty, did make terms. What were those terms? What was the equivalent? This we have a right to know, because hitherto (and, by Lin's account, the affair is now terminated)

no equivalent at all, no terms of any kind, have been reported as offered by the Chinese, or as accepted by the British. Sundry of the Chinese have, indeed, since that time made an awk. ward attempt at cutting sundry British throats, and have had their own cut instead a result for which we heartily grieve, as the poor victims were no willing parties to this outrage upon our rights. But this could hardly be the equivalent demanded by Elliot. And, as to any other, it is needless to enquire about it, since nothing of any kind has been offered to the British except outrages and insults. Here, then, is a short two-edged argument, which it will be difficult to parry -Lin agreed to a stipulation for equivalents, in which case he must have broken it. Lin did not agree, in which case we have a heavier charge against the superintendent, that is, the representative of our own Government, than any which has yet been put forward.

II. But worse, far worse, as respects our own Government, is the second dilemma. It is this: - Those who had charge of the opium surrendered it on the most solemn official guarantee of indemnification. Now, in offering that guarantee, was Captain Elliot authorized by his Government?-or was he not authorized? Practically, there is no such indulgent alternative now open to the Government: because the time is now passed in which that Government could claim the benefit of a disavowal. Instantly to have disavowed Captain Elliot was the sole course by which the Whig Government could retrieve their position, and evade the responsibility created for them by their agent. When they first appointed him, they had delegated their responsibility to him; they had notified that delegation to all whom it might concern. It must

be an extreme case, indeed, which can warrant a minister in disavowing his own agent, so deliberately selected-and much more when the dis tance is so vast. In no case can this be done unless where it can be demonstrated that the agent has flagrantly exceeded his powers. But, in cases of money guarantees, or the drawing of bills, it is hardly possible that an agent should do so: such cases are not mixed up with the refinements of politics, about which the varieties of opinion are likely to arise. Always, and

in all situations, an agent knows what are the limits of his powers as to so definite a subject as money. And, were it otherwise, what would become of the innumerable bills drawn upon the British treasury by consuls and naval officers in ports of countries the most remote? Nobody would take such bills: no ship in our navy, no shipwrecked crew, could obtain aid under the worst circumstances, if a practice existed of disavowing authorized agents, or resisting bills when pres sented for payment. The Elliot guarantee, therefore, was hardly within the privilege of disavowal by Lord Melbourne's Government. They it was who sent the agent-who clothed him with authority-who called upon all men in the East to recognise him as representing themselves who proclaimed aloud, "Behold the man whom the Queen delighteth to honour: what he does is as if done by ourselves: his words are our words: his seal is our seal!"

The argument, therefore, will stand thus: - Captain Elliot solemnly undertook to the British merchants, in order to gain a favourite point for Lin, that no fraction of the money at which the opium had been valued, should finally be lost. On the faith of that undertaking, the surrender was made quietly, which else, confessedly, would not have been made at all. Now, in making that perilous engagement-so startling by the amount of property concerned, that no man could pretend to have acted inconsiderately-was Captain Elliot exceeding his powers or not? Did the Government disavow his act, even in thought, on first hearing it reported, or did they not? If they did-if privately they were shocked to find the enormity of responsible obligation which Elliot had pledged on their behalf-if they felt that he had created no right in the persons who held his engagements-why did they not instantly publish that fact? Mere honesty, as in a commercial transaction, requires this. If a man draws on you unwarrantably for an immense sum, you never think of replying, " I have not money enough to meet this demand." You say to the holders of the bills and you say it indignantly -and you say it instantly-without taking time to finesse, or leaving time for the creditor to lose his remedy"This man has no authority whatever to draw upon me. I neither am myself his debtor, nor do I hold the funds of any third party who is." But what was the answer of the English Government, when summoned to make good the engagements of their agent? Did they say boldly" We disavow this agent: we disown this debt: we desire that these bills may be noted and protested?" No: but evasively, perfidiously, as speaking to ruined men, they reply: -" Oh, really, we have not funds to meet these bills; and, if we should go to Parliament for funds, we have a notion that there will be the deuce to pay for contracting so large a debt!" Like a riotous heir, they dare not show to their public guardians the wild havoc of funds which they have authorized.

The sole evasion of this argument would be, if it could be alleged that the bills were bad bills, that they were given without a consideration. But that can be maintained only by those who are misinformed as to the facts. Were it the case that Lin could have seized the opium, though in honour the Government would still be answerable for the acts of their agent, and though a contract is a contract, still it might have been said that the British merchants, after all, had been placed in no worse situation by the act of Captain Elliot. But, as the case really stands, the total loss-every shilling of it was a pure creation of Elliot's. The ships were not in the situation of an army having to stand the hazard of a battle before they could carry off the contested property; in which case it might have been wise to pay some fine for escaping a struggle, however certain the issue. No: they had but to raise their anchors and spread their sails; a lunar month would have seen the opium safe in the waters of Bengal, from which it would have been landed to await the better market of the following year.

But, say some extravagant people, the Chinese had the right of seizure, though not the power to enforce that right; and the inference which they would wish us to draw from that is, that it was the duty of the British merchants to show respect for the laws and maritime rights of China. What! at the cost of two and a half millions sterling? Verily, the respect for China must be somewhat idolatrous which would express itself on this

magnificent scale. But, waiving that, mark the reply: Nobody doubts the right of China to seize contraband goods when they are landed, or in the course of landing; because, by that time the final destination of the goods is apparent. And our own Govern ment at home-but having power to sustain their claim-go somewhat further; they make prize at sea of cargoes which are self-demonstrated as contraband. But who in his senses ever held the monstrous doctrine, that a smuggler is under some obligation of conscience to sail into an English port, and there deliver up his vessel as a victim to the majesty of the offended revenue laws? The very most that China could in reason have asked was, that the opium ships should sail away, and not hover on the coasts. Even this is a great deal more than China had a right to ask conceding also throughout that China had not herself for years invited this contraband commerce, cherished it, nursed it, honoured it because it is certain that a maritime kingdom, without a revenue fleet, has no more right to complain of smugglers in its defensive diplomacy, than offensively it has to declare a port or a line of coast under blockade without bona fide efforts and means to enforce that blockade. Certainly not, it will be said; and the English opium ships were acting under no recognised maritime law when they SO foolishly surrendered their cargoes. But it will be alleged in apology for that rash surrender, that perhaps it might not be merely the Elliot indemnification which persuaded them to this actthat barely made it a safe act. What made it a politic act was probably the belief, that, for any less price, they could not purchase back the general renewal of Chinese commerce. Ay, now we come to the truth. This was the equivalent, beyond a doubt, understood between Lin and Elliot, as the condition upon which the surrender was to take effect. Well understood, most assuredly it was; and if it was not expressed, was not reduced to writing, the blame of that is to be divided (in such proportions as may hereafter be settled) between the confiding folly of our English dupe and the exquisite knavery of the Celestial Lin. Non nostrum tantas componere lites.

We have stated these two dilemmas

more diffusely-and yet not diffusely, since nothing has been said twice over; but more, however, in detail than else might have been necessary-because a transaction of this kind, unless kept steadily before the eye for some time, is too easily forgotten, and no proper impression of its nature is retained. But the broad result from the whole is that Lin used Captain Elliot as an engine for cheating Englishmen; the roasting chestnuts could not be extracted from the fire: Lin knew that: he was well aware that he must have burned his own paws in attempting it; and, like the monkey in the fable, he wisely used Elliot as his cat's-paw. 2dly, That Lin also cheated the English out of that commerce, the restoration of which he had in effect sold to them, and again through Elliot; and 3dly, that the English Government has cheated the English merchants out of two and a half millions of pounds sterling-again, for the third time, through Elliot; and, in fact, were it a case at Bow Street against the swell mob, the English Government would have been found in rank collusion with Lin. Lin picks the left-hand pocket, first of opium, and secondly of trade: the Government then step in, whilst the merchants are all gazing at Lin, and pick the other pocket of money: both speaking at first through Elliot, but finally speaking directly in their own persons.

Even this is not all: there is something still worse and more jesuitical in the conduct of our home Government. They proceed to decree reprisals against China. But why? Very fit it is that so arrogant a people should be brought to their senses; and notorious it is that in Eastern lands no appeal to the sense of justice will ever be made available which does not speak through their fears. We, therefore, are the last persons to say one word against this ultima ratio, if conducted on motives applying to the case. By all means thump them well: it is your only chance-it is the only logic which penetrates the fog of so conceited a people. But is that the explanation of war given by Government? No, no. They offer it as the only means in their power of keeping faith with the opium-dealers and not breaking with Elliot. "What do you want?" they say at the Treasury, "Is it money? Well, we have none;

but we can take a purse for you on the Queen's highway, and that we will soon do." Observe, therefore, you have them confessing to the debt. They do not pretend to deny that. Why, then, what dishonesty it was to say in the first instance to the billholders "We have no funds?" They had then, it seems, been authorizing engagements, knowing at the time that in respect of those engagements they were not solvent.

This is the first thing that meets us; viz. that, at all events, they had meditated fraud. But when, after some months' importunity for payment, a Treasury attorney suggests this new fashion of paying just debts, which is in effect to go and kick up a spree in the Oriental seas, and to fetch back the missing funds out of all the poor rogues whom they can find abroad, note this above all things: letters of marque and reprisals may be fair enough against European nations, because as much commercial shipping as they have afloat, so much warlike shipping they have to protect it. The one is in regular proportion to the other; fair warning is given: we say, take care of yourselves; your war shipping ought to protect your commercial shipping; and if it cannot, the result will be a fair expression that we have measured forces against each other, nation against nation-the result will be one of fair open fighting. Now, in the Chinese seas there are none but commercial ships. There are no fighting ships worth speaking of. Consequently no part of the loss will fall on the state. Our losses in opium will be made good by the ruin of innumerable private traders. That cannot be satisfactory to any party; and quite as little can it satisfy our British notions of justice, that the rascally Government, and that "sublime of rascals," Lin, will escape without a wound. Little teasings about the extremities of so great a power, and yet, in a warlike sense, so unmaritime a power as China, will be mere flea-bites to the central government at Pekin; not more than the arrows of Liliput in the toes of Gulliver, which he mistook for some tickling or the irritation of chilblains.

Are we then comparing our own naval power, the most awful concentration of power, and the most variously applicable power which