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mined degree of happiness, or diminish my misery ; but wilt take my ease, and will enjoy the comfort of sloth and negligence.” Such a man contradicts himself ; he says, the meas. ure of his future happiness and misery is already fixed, and he will not try to diminish the one, nor add to the other ; but yet, in his very conclusion, he contradicts this ; for, he takes up this conclusion, to add to his future happiness, by the ease and comfort of his negligence ; and to diminish his future trouble and misery, by saving himself the trouble of using means and taking pains.
Therefore persons cannot reasonably make this improvement of the doctrine of necessity, that they will go into a voluntary negligence of means for their own happiness. For the principles they must go upon in order to this, are inconsistent with their making any improvement at all of the doctrine ; for to make some improvement of it, is to be influenced by it, to come to some voluntary conclusion, in regard to their own conduct, with some view or aim ; but this, as has been shown, is inconsistent with the principles they pretend to act upon. In short, the principles are such as cannot be acted upon, in any respect, consistently. And, therefore, in every pretence of acting upon them, or making any improvement of thems there is a selfcontradiction..
As to that objection against the doctrine, which I have endeavored to prove, that it makes men no more than mere ma
chines; I would say, that notwithstanding this doctrine, man ' is entirely, perfectly and unspeakably different from a mere machine, in that he has reason and understanding, and has a faculty of Will, and so is capable of volition and choice ; and in that, bis Will is guided by the dictates or views of his understanding; and in that his external actions and behavior, and, in many respects, also his thoughts, and the exercises of his mind, are subject to his Will; so that he has liberty to act according to his choice, and do what he pleases; and by means of these things, is capable of moral habits and moral acts, such inclinations and actions as, according to the common sense of mankind, are worthy of praise, esteem, love and
reward ; or, on the contrary, of disesteem, detestation, indigo nation and punishment.
In these things is all the difference from mere machines, as to liberty and agency, that would be any perfection, dignity or privilege, in any respect ; all the difference that can be desired, and all that can be conceived of; and indeed all that the pretensions of the Arminians themselves come to, as they are forced often to explain themselves. (Though their explications overthrow and abolish the things asserted, and pretended to be explained) for they are forced to explain a selfdetermining power of Will, by a power in the soul, to determine as it chooses or Wills ; which comes to no more than this, that a man has a power of choosing, and, in many instances, can do as he chooses. Which is quite a different thing from that contradiction, his having power of choosing his first act of choice in the case.'
. Or, if their scheme makes any other difference than this, between men and machines, it is for the worse ; it is so far from supposing men to have a dignity and privilege above machines, that it makes the manner of their being determine ed still more unhappy. Whereas, machines, are guided by an understanding cause, by the skilful hand of the workman or owner; the Will of man is left to the guidance of nothing, but absolute blind contingence.
Concerning that Objection against the Doctrine
which has been maintained, that it agrees with the Stoical Doctrine of Fate, and the Opinions of Mr. Hobbes.
WHEN Calvinists oppose the Arminian notion of the fretdom of Will, and contingence of volition, and insist that there are no acts of the Win, nor any other events whatsoever, but what are attended with some kind of necessity ; their opposers cry out of them, as agreeing with the ancient Stoics in their doctrine of fate, and with Mr. Hobbes in his opinion of necessity. • It would not be worth while to take notice of so imperti. pent an objection, had it 'not been urged by some of the chiof Arminian writers. There were many important truths maintained by the ancient Greek and Roman philosophers, and especially the Stoics, that are never the worse for being held bly them. The Stoic philosophers, by the general agreement of Christian, and even Arminian divines, were the greatest, wisest, and most virtuous of all the heathen philosophers; and, in their doctrine and practice, came the nearest to Christiani. ty of any of their sects. How frequently are the sayings of these philosophers, in many of the writings and sermons, even of Arminian divines, produced, not as arguments of the falseness of the doctrines which they delivered, but as a confirmation of some of the greatest truths of the Christian religion, relating to the unity and perfections of the Godhead, a future state, the duty and happiness of mankind, &c. as observing how the light of nature and reason, in the wisest and best of the Heathens, harmonized with, and confirms the Gospel of Jesus Christ.
And it is very remarkable, concerning Dr. Whitby, that although he alleges the agreement of the Stoics with us, wherein he supposes they maintained the like doctrine with us, as an argument against the truth of our doctrine ; yet, this very Dr. Whitby alleges the agreement of the Stoics with the Arminians, wherein he supposes they taught the same doctrine with them, as an argument for the truth of their doctrine.* So that, when the Stoics agree with them, this (it seems) is a confirmation of their doctrine, and a confutation of ours, as shewing that our opinions are contrary to the natural sense and common reason of mankind : Nevertheless, when the Stoics agree with us, it argues no such thing in our favor ; but, on the contrary, is a great argument against us, and shews our doctrine to be heathenish.
It is observed by some Calvinistic writers, that the Arminjans symbolize with the Stoics, in some of those doctrines wherein they are opposed by the Calvinists ; particularly in their denying an original, innate, total corruption and deprayity of heart; and in what they held of man's ability to make himself truly yirtuous and conformed to God; and in some other doctrines.
It may be further observed, it is certainly no better objection against our doctrine, that it agrees, in some respects, with the doctrine of the ancient Stoic philosophers, than it is against theirs, wherein they differ from us, that it agrees, in some respects, with the opinion of the very worst of the heathen philosophers, the followers of Epicurus, that father of atheism and licentiousness, and with the doctrine of the Sadducees and Jesuits.
I am not much concerned to know precisely, what the ancient Stoic philosophers held concerning fate, in order to de. termine what is truth; as though it were a sure way to be in the right, to take good heed to differ from them. It seems, that they differed among themselves ; and probably the doctrine of fate as maintained by most of them, was, in some respects, erroneous. But whatever their doctrine was, if any of
* Whitby on the Five Points, Edit. III. p. 325. 326, 327.
them held such a fate, as is repugnant to any liberty, consisting in our doing as we please, I utterly deny such a fate. If they held any such fate, as is not consistent with the common and universal notions that mankind have of liberty, activity, moral agency, virtue and vice, I disclaim any such thing, and think I have demonstrated that the scheme I maintain is no such scheme. If the Stoics, by fate, meant any thing of such a nature, as can be supposed to stand in the way of the advantage and benefit of the use of means and endeavors, or makes it less worth the while for men to desire, and seek after any thing wherein their virtue and happiness consists; I hold no doctrine that is clogged with any such inconvenience, any more than any other scheme whatsoever ; and by no means so much as the Arminian scheme of contingence ; as has been shewn. If they held any such doctrine of universal fatality, as is inconsistent with any kind of liberty, that is or can be any perfection, dignity, privilege or benefit, or any thing desirable, in any respect, for any intelligent creature, or indeed with any liberty that is possible or conceivable ; I embrace no such doctrine. If they held any such doctrine of fate, as is inconsistent with the world's being in all things subject to the disposal of an intelligent, wise agent, that presides, not as the soul of the world, but as the Sovereign Lord of the Universe, governing all things by proper will, choice and design, in the exercise of the most perfect liberty conceivable, without subjection to any constraint, or being properly under the power or influence of any thing before, above or without himself, I wholly renounce any such doctrine.
As to Mr. Hobbes' maintaining the same doctrine concerns ing necessity, I confess, it happens I never read Mr. Hobbes. Let his opinion be what it will, we need not reject all truth which is demonstrated by clear evidence, merely because it was once held by some bad man. This great truth, that Jesus is the Son of God, was not spoiled because it was once and again proclaimed with a loud voice by the devil. If truth is so defiled, because it is spoken by the mouth, or written by the pen of some illminded mischievous man, that it must nev. er be received, we shall n :ver know, when we hold any of the