thing impoffible. From God's Existence then a Poffibility of an eternal Duration or continued Succeffion of Time cannot be inferred, there being no fuch thing as an eternal Duration incident to the Divine Nature which is effential pure Exiftence,or ISNESS, without was, or fhall be, in any fort properly and truly appropriated thereunto.

5. As the World is not eternal according to Duration, fo neither is it infinite in refpect of Magnitude, for in cafe it were infinite in bulk and greatnefs, the space from the Center of the Earth towards the East, would be either finite or infinite; if infinite, then the space from the Center of the Earth towards the Weft, North and South taken together, would not only be no greater than that towards the Eaft (because one Infinite is not greater than another) but there would also be more infinite Spaces in the Universe than one, neither of which is poffible; not the former, because three equal Spaces taken together are certainly greater. than one alone, which is no greater than any one of them; nor the latter, because, in regard the Universe is not greater than an infinite Space, it cannot contain more infinite Spaces than one; for otherwife it fhould be. greater than it felf: But if the Space from

the

the Center of the Earth towards the East were finite, then alfo the Space from the Center of the Earth towards the West, North and South, would be likewife finite, and of four finite Spaces an infinite Space cannot be made; the World therefore is not infinite in extenfion.

6. The World then is neither infinite in refpect of an eternal duration in which it has continued, nor in refpect of an immense Bulk whereto it is extended. And no lefs certain is it that an infinite number of worlds is equally impoffible, Number and Infinitude mutually of neceffity excluding each other, fince no number that can be augmented is infinite, and that to the greateft number imaginable a new Addition may be made.

A

And feeing there cannot be an infinite. number of Worlds, it follows by neceffary Confequence that there is only one. For fince the Divine Wisdom and Goodness are no less infinite and effential to God than his Omnipotency, or any other Perfection in the Deity is, he cannot without contradicting his own Attributes (which it is equally impoffible for him to do, as to deny himself, or to violate his own Nature) will or act any thing which is not according and agreeable to the highest wifdom and greatcft good

nefs,

nefs, or what's the very best (all things confidered) to be effected. Wherefore seeing it is impoffible to create an infinite number of Worlds (par. 6.) and that no definite number could be fo great, but that it would be in the Almighty's power to create a greater and greater in infinitum, if his Omnipotency be folely regarded; it plainly follows, that the creating of one World alone was, (all things confidered) the very beft; whilft if it had been better to have created two than one, it would likewise have been better to have created three than two, and four than three, and fo forward without end: in confequence whereunto, it must needs be that one only World was created.

8. That there is then but one only world appears evident which that it certainly is the most perfect for kind that could be created, may be gathered from henee, that the wifdom and goodness of God being infinite and eflential, will not permit him to do any thing but that which (all things duly weighed) is clearly beft. For if it were otherwife, he should not always act according to the highest wisdom and greatest goodness, and fo cease thereupon to be neceffarily infinitely wife and good, which he cannot do

without

without ceafing to be God. Nor doth it therefore follow, that, if God fhould act neceffarily, every effect of his acting would be infinite; for no created Being is capable of Infinity, this being peculiar to God alone, (Se&t. 1. par. 7.) The Universe then is the beft that it could be made; neither feems it to be wholly above the reach of human Reafon to conceive in fome competent measure, in what refpect it could have been no other than what it is. For, first, it is clear by the event (not to mention, that it becomes every rational Being to communicate good, when he nothing thereby diminisheth his cwn) that it was more agreeable to the divine wisdom and goodness to create, than not to create. Secondly, It is manifeft that the Almighty could not create any fingle Creature or Species of Creatures fo perfect, but that it would be in his omnipotent Power to create others more and more perfect perpetually (forafmuch as between himself and any Creature how perfect foever, there would ftill remain an infinite diftance) and confequently that it could never enter into his Mind actually to create any fingle Creature or Species of Creatures, for that, if he had done it, he had not acted according to the highest wisdom and greatest goodness,

because

because he could ftill have created better. Thirdly, It appears confonant to Reason, that it was therefore beft to create an Universe of ' feveral Beings, which in their different Natures and diftinct Stations, fhould confpire and co-operate together to procure the most comprehenfive and excellent End,that whatever could be created, fhould in its whole Latitude poffibly be capable to effect and bring to pafs under God the Author and principal Caufe of all Good.

Object. 2. If the Almighty cannot but do what is beft, he is no free Agent, and confequently it was not in his Choice, whether he would have created the World or not.

Solut. Though the Almighty cannot but do what is beft, yet he is nevertheless a free Agent; for he is not at all neceffitated thereunto from any thing without himself, nei ther is there within himself that which o

therwise engages his Will than to make the beft Choice (or what is moft agreeable to his eternal immutable wifdom and goodness) which it neceffarily always doth, but with infinite Freedom; not that there can be Election in fieri, or to be made (truly speaking) in God, who in that he is a pure ef fential Act (fect. 1. par. 9.) was from Eter nity determined in his Will about all things,

and