feffor Kant does not admit Revelation, and attempts to prove, à priori, that man is free; his difciple, therefore, after fome preliminary difcuffion, thus refumes the fubject.

"Man is a compound of reafon and fenfe, and he is confcious that his faculty of defiring is either determined by reafon or fenfe. When our defires are determined by fenfe, they depend on feelings; when by reason, they depend on ideas of general laws-theoretical reafon ftrives after unity, or the connection of our knowledge, by claffing all our ideas under a few heads, which it fuggefts, and which are abfolute fubfance, abfolute cauf, &c.—Practical reafon ftrives after unity or confiftency among our various defires and their objects, by holding forth to our view principles and ideas which it likewife produces..... The faculty of being determined by reafons, is will-Practical reafon, therefore, is the fame with wILL." P. 190.

Propofition. The human wILL is determined by practical prin ciples of reafon, therefore it is free. I shall firft explain what is meant by practical principles of reafon. A practical principle of reafon neceffarily excludes from its contents all objects of human volition that are diftinct from reafon. For, if it recommends to the wILL any object external to the mind, it derives from the knowledge of an external object, that is, from experience. Any practical principle deriving from experience, extends fo far as experience reaches, and is, therefore, not ftrictly univerfal; nor is it ftrictly neceffary, because our experience may indeed fhow us that fomething is fo and fo, but never that it must be fo. But it is a fact well established by consciousness, that a practical principle is ftri&tly neceffary and univerfal. For instance, Be virtuous at all times and under all circumftances of life; and let thy virtue ever be difinterested. Although the notion of virtue and difinterestedness may differ in different perfons, yet it is undeniable that, at least, the univerfality and neceffity of thefe laws is acknowledged. Hence it follows, that a practical principle cannot derive from any knowledge of external objects or experience; for elfe it could not be univerfal and neceflary, which it manifeftly is." P. 198.

Here let us paufe a little, to confider what is thus prefented to us as an axiom. The fubject of the principle here adduced as an example is virtue, and that which is affirmed of it is, "that it ought to be exercifed at all times, and under all the circumftances of life." To what do time and circumftances here refer? To exterior objects. What is pronounced on the authority of reafon? That we ought to be virtuous, whatever be the fate of exterior obje&s? But what is virtue, without reference to exterior objects or application to them?-A chimera. If a man, conftituted as we are, exifted in the universe alone, could the very idea of virtue exift? Reafon, without doubt, makes abftractions from abstractions, till fhe arrives at general principles: but whence do thefe chains of abftraction proceed? In the language of this author, from intuitions, conceptions, connections, categories, fchemes, and principles

that

that are univerfal, from impreffions received by receptivity, and fo from external objects. Can we fay then, confequently, that reafon forms its principles independently of all experience? It is, however, on that quibble, and on the notion that "man is not in time and space, although the form of his intuitive ideas are time and space" (p. 174) "that the following argument rests.

"It is a fact that a formal practical principle can be reprefented by reafon only; that it cannot be an object of fenfe, and that it, therefore, cannot refide among the fenfible phænomena. Confequently the idea of a practical principle, confidered as a ground which determines our will, inutt be different from thofe grounds which determine the events in the world of phænomena: for every ground of determination in the world of phænomena is a phænomenon itfelf; the caufe of a phænomenon in the world muft arife and be a phænomenon; the effect of a phænomenon must be a phænomenon alfo. But now the idea of a practical principle is not one of the phænomena in question; it, therefore, cannot be the effect of a phænomenon; for otherwife it would be a phænomenon, which it is not; the idea of a practical principle is an idea of reafon. But no idea of reafon is an intuition; it, therefore, is not a phænomenon; for intuitions only are phænomena, and it is only the intuitions which have the form of time and space, or are in time and space, and not the ideas of reafon. Hence the idea of a practical principle ftands uninfluenced by the world of phænomena: but our will is determined by these ideas; hence our will is determined by fomething that lies beyond the reach of the caufes and conditions of phænomena; it is, therefore, independant of the natural law of the phænomena, which is that of caufe and effect. But fuch independance is freedom; hence our will is free. Every human will, therefore, as it is determined by practical principles, is free. As the human will is free, the formal practical principles are the true laws of freedom; for it is by keeping to them only, that man can elevate himself above the influence of the furrounding world, and follow the laws of his reafon." P. 200.

We will make no formal commentary on this demonftration of human liberty, in which, though it has been faid that, "man is a compound of reafon and fenfe," and that he is confcious that his faculty of defiring is either determined by reason or fenfe, we find as yet no notion of thofe defires determined by fenfe, which are the object of this moral doctrine. Let us follow the author till he arrives at this point.

"A moral principle, expreffing the common nature of all moral principles, is a first moral principle: and to know in what ftate the fcience of morals is, we need only compare the first principles of morals recommended to us by philofophers." P. 206.

The author then fucceffively reports the principles of Socrates, Plato, Epicurus, Ariftippus, Antifthenes; of the Stoics, Ariftotle,

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BRIT. CRIT. VOL. VIII. AUGUST, 1796.

Ariftotle, Polemo, Hobbes, Mandeville, Montaigne, Hutchinfon, Smith, Wolf, Crufius, and the Electics; whom he alfo refutes fucceffively: whence it follows that, in the whole fucceffion of ages to the prefent time, man had lived in fociety without having any bafis for morality. Here then the author introduces the Principle of Kant.

"KANT.

"Act according to thofe principles only of which thou canst will that they ought to become the general laws on conduct among all reasonable beings." P. 214.

What have we here? A flat and fpiritlefs disfigurement of the fundamental moral precept in the Gofpel? And was it neceffary that Profeffor Kant fhould come into the world for this? But let us proceed. The remaining fubject is, as we have mentioned, the influence of Profeffor Kant's principles upon religion and its first object is, the immortality of the foul.

"Is the foul immortal?—If not, religion has no end. Profeffor Kant proves the immortality of the foul in the following manner: A will determinable by the moral law can have no other objects than the highest good, and all its exertions muft ultimately center in happiness and virtue. As the highest good is not practically poffible without virtue being made the cause of happinefs, it follows that only complete virtue can produce complete happiness, and thus render the highest good practically poffible. Complete virtue, therefore, though not real, muft yet be poffible; for, if it be not poffible, the highest good cannot be poffible, which is abfurd. The will of man is not completely conformable to the laws of virtue, for it is not holy, nor can it be completely virtuous, because virtue is an idea, which may be approached, but can never be reached by a finite being. But though the laws of morals cannot be completely fulfilled, yet they must be acknowledged as neceffary to be practifed. Now, as we muit follow the moral law, and can realife it only by approaches that are progreffive ad infinitum, it is necessary, for the fake of our own prac tice, to fuppofe fuch a progrefs as practically poffible. For if this progrefs is impoffible, the moral law cannot be realised; if it cannot be realifed, it is impoffible; and to practice the moral law would, therefore, be to practice fomething which is impoffible.... Now, as we are bound by reafon to fuppofe our progrefs in virtue will be infinite, and as this progrefs cannot be made, unless the fame perfon continues its exiftence, it follows that the higheft good is practically poffible only on the condition of man's immortality.-(p. 225.) In this fituation of things we maft believe in immortality, or elfe lay afide all use of reafon at once. But although we muft believe it, we cannot be certain of it, and this uncertainty is highly favourable to the cause of virtue; for were man quite certain that he is immortal, he could not be virtuous; becaufe he would act from fear or hope; and thus

degrade

degrade the purity of his moral motive, which confilis in Ariat difinureftedness." P. 219.

Let us here examine, not only the fyftem, but the author. On this fubject, the remark that firft prefents itfelf is, that the concluding fentence of the pallage has no reference to what has preceded. The propofition in question is only this; that man ought to believe in immortality, in order to render the greatest good poflible, by giving fcope for an infinite progrellion towards virtue. What connection has this idea with fears or hopes or how, from the certainty of the foul's immortality, can fuch a connection arife? Even if fears and hopes were in any way connected with the abftract idea of an infinite progreffion towards virtue, would not thefe as much affect the fimple belief of immortality as the certainty of it? and would not this chimerical idea of difintereftednefs be equally deftroyed in both cafes? It is impoffible that the author fhould not have remarked this disjunction of the concluding fentence in his argument from that which had preceded: or rather this unconnected propofition would never have occurred to him, had he not been at the fame time contemplating fomething foreign to his argument. But religion announces punishments and rewards in another life, for which reafon he took this opportunity to infinuate that, by fo doing, it "degrades the purity of moral principles."

By announcing the fyftem of Profeffor Kant, as the only one in which jult ideas have hitherto been found on the foul and the Deity, the author at once fets afide Revelation: particularly in the following argument, already noticed.

"Who can reasonably adopt or reject any ideas offered of thofe important objects, without examining them; and how can they be examined, without being compared with ideas already in the mind? Who, therefore, can pretend to have received juft and correct ideas of the foul, the Deity, &c. from Revelation, when the correctness and juftnefs of the ideas that are contained in any Revelation, can only be afcertained and acknowledged by comparing them to the ideas which muft exift in the mind ?”

Either this argument has no meaning, or it is intended to prove that it is abfurd to fuppofe a Revelation, fince all that it could teach must be already in the human mind. Since, therefore, Profeffor Kant has found that the human mind is unable to arrive at certainty refpecting the immortality of the foul, God (who, if he created man, must know whether his foul is immortal) cannot inform him of it, according to the profeffor, because he has not placed this certainty within his mind. Although God created the univerfe, he cannot inform man of it, becaufe

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because he has not placed within his mind a juft and correct idea of creation. To fum up all in a word, he cannot inftruct man in any refpect, concerning the effence of the material and insmaterial world, or upon this awful obfcurity which every where furrounds him," p. 146, because he could not make man God.

Among the questions agitated by fpeculative philofophers, of which this author fays there was no decifion, before the time of Profeffor Kant, the following may be enumerated. "Is an abfolutely necellary firft caufe, exiting or not?" Now, as this new philofopher rejects Revelation, it will follow that, till our day, the human race could never know whether a Creator of the universe existed or not. Let us fee then how this inconceivable state of human nature is altered by the arrival of Profeffor Kant upon this globe.

"I fhall now adduce Kant's argument in favour of the existence of the Deity. The higheft good, as already mentioned, is poffible to be realifed. It confifts of virtue and happiness.-As the chief part of the highest good, which is virtue, leads us into the belief of immortality, fo the fecond part of the higheft good, which is happiness, will lead us into the belief of the exiftence of the Deity. To be happy, it is requifite that all proceeds agreeably to our wishes; for we are unhappy in proportion as things take a turn contrary to our will and wifhes. Happinefs, therefore, is founded upon the agreement of the furrounding nature with our will and defires.-As the moral law, which determines our will, is different from the determining grounds of the phænomena in nature; one being a law of freedom, and the other mechanical caufes, it follows, that the moral law cannot contain the leaft ground for fuppofing a neceffary connection between virtue and a proportionate happiness, in a being belonging to the phænomena of nature, as a part, and which yet is directed in its actions by a lat directly oppofite to the mechanical courfe of nature. (p. 229.) If, therefore, virtue cannot procure a proportionate happiness, it is abfurd to practife it. For the exiftence of a man practifing virtue is not improved by virtue; on the contrary, he is always expofed by it to the fevereft facrifices, and that without attaining any regular end.-However, to keep up the ufe of our reafon, and to preferve our natural freedom, we must neceffarily ftrive after virtue, and as virtue, reason, and natural freedom were without end, if they did not tend to improve our existence and to make us proportionately happy, it unavoidably follows, that, in order to remain reafonable, we must neceffarily fuppofe a proportionate happiness to be confequent to virtue.-But he that allows this connection between the parts of the highest good, muft neceffarily allow that condition under which this connection is poffible. This condition of poffibility can lie no where elfe than in a caufe diftinct from nature, in a caufe which produced nature, and has the power to realife the agreement of nature with our moral conduct. Hence the highest good is poffible only by supposing a cause different from nature, a first caufe of all nature. But to proportion happiness to virtue, requires a will and understanding. Hence the first cause,