them. Neither can I be ignorant what offence my handling of them has given to many whose good will I value, and with what relief they will learn that the handling is now to cease." For theological controversy involved him in controversy politico-theological, and this in turn degenerated into unadulterated politics, until he learned by bitter experience the truth of his own saying: "Politics is a good thing and religion is a good thing, but they make a fractious mixture."

A

I

RNOLD'S criticism of the Bible is pre-eminently

a criticism, as he would have said, "in the grand style." It is not a question of rectifying petty misconceptions, of reconciling contradictions, of glossing here and amplifying there, of renewing the well-fought contest between inspiration and revelation, nor even, save parenthetically, of determining the validity of miracle, but of revolutionising fundamental conceptions-in his own words, of "recasting religion." And the resultlet us confess it-is a picture not merely pathetic but tragic. God is seen, if seen at all, receding into the background of human history. All that mankind seemed to have learned of the meaning of life and destiny, all its sublimest aspirations, its deepest religious experiences, its supposed intuitions of the supernatural, its wistful glimpses into the future,-these are but delusions and phantasmagoria, the stuff of which dreams are made. Man can as yet be sure of nothing, for he knows nothing. He has all his weary work to

go through once more-all the travail, all the tribulation, which seemed to have brought within his reach glowing certitudes of reason, inspiring assurances of faith.

But is the prospect really so gloomy and so depressing? The answer requires some examination of Arnold's main contentions. And here the writer expressly disclaims at the outset all theological purpose and pretension; what he too offers is exclusively a layman's literary criticism.

Happily for the critic of all the foregoing criticism, the scope of his task has been strictly limited for him by Arnold himself. The essential parts of the task are clearly these: to inquire whether Arnold's interpretation of the God-idea as developed amongst the Israelites is really adequate, to inquire whether his own conceptions of religious truth are in reality, as he contends, free from metaphysical elements, and are entirely deducible from experience; and finally to inquire whether his religion of righteousness, from which he would eliminate the supernatural, is a safe substitute for Christianity, having regard to his perpetual injunction that conduct is three-fourths of life. For the practical effects of his speculations cannot be overlooked, and must, indeed, take a leading place in any countercriticism, since the strongest justification which he advances for this recasting of religion lies in the contention that in the form known to his countrymen, Christianity, its present ground of appeal tends more and more to be weakened and undermined.

The idea of God as righteousness is not, indeed, quite original. It forms the substance of a good deal of German idealistic philosophy; and even the purely contemplative Joubert, whom Arnold so warmly admired, seems to have come near the same conception. Writing to his friend Molé August 10, 1803, Joubert says: "Oui, Dieu sensible à l'âme et devenant pour elle une règle qui la touche et qu'elle ne voit pas, mais à laquelle, autant que peut le supporter sa liberté, elle est forcée de se conformer, parce qu'elle en a de toutes parts le sentiment; Dieu devenant par sa présence perpétuelle, quoique cachée, le principe, la cause constante et l'auteur sentiment du juste et de l'injuste, c'est là une idée qui est fixée en moi, qui vient, qui revient, qui se représente facilement, dans les agitations mêmes de l'existence extérieure, comme une chose vraie, solide et pleine de réalité." It is Arnold's plea, however, that this conception was the Hebrew conception also, which is a very different thing. And the most obvious comment upon the transformation which the religious thought of the Israelites has received at his hands is that his argument here is not merely inconclusive, it is not even persuasive. For proof of his thesis, that in the Hebrew idea of God there is no trace of personality or of metaphysics, he relied upon texts. The natural method of refutation would seem to be to adduce rebutting evidence of the same kind, and certainly if the Bible is to be forced into the witness box-and its 1 Correspondance de J. Joubert, par Raynal.

evidence is clearly necessary to a right understanding of the question-it should be made to furnish a full and unbiased testimony. But Arnold picked and chose his texts at will, so as to suit his own case, in a method which was neither scientific nor judicial nor, let it be added, literary. Some of the illustrations which he adduces in support of his view are strangely unconvincing. "Free as is his use of anthropomorphic language," he writes in one place, "Israel . . . had far too keen a sense of reality not to shrink when he comes anywhere near to the notion of exact speaking about God, from affirmation, from professing to know a whit more than he does know." And in proof of this he quotes from a purely poetical and imaginative book, the poem of Job, the words: "Lo! these are the skirts of his ways, but how little a portion is known of him." And yet, as if anticipating the objection that the sober mind of Israel is more faithfully reflected by prophet and seer than poet, he at once adds the further illustration from the Book of Deuteronomy: "The secret things belong unto the Eternal our God, but the revealed things belong unto us and to our children for ever," etc. Unfortunately for the strength of this illustration another received translation gives to the words a precisely contrary meaning, and one which would not suit Arnold's purpose at all: "The secret of the Lord our God is revealed to us and to our children for ever," etc. One might also question, were it very material to the issue, whether Arnold, in his employ