SERM. as to join in cenfuring him, this was a matter XI. he was not extremely folicitous about, ex

cept for their own fakes, for, fays he, with me it is a very fmall thing that I should be judged of you, or of man's judgment.

These words, not to infift any more on the apoftle's particular circumftances referred1 to, and his defign in fpeaking them, will bear a general and very ufeful application to all of us, in directing our regards to men, and their judgment, and indeed, in forming our temper and our whole converfations: for they contain two confiderations of great, tho' very unequal importance, to the enjoyment of life, and the regulating of our behaviour, the judgment of men, our fellow creatures or fellow chriftians, and' the judgment of God.

These confiderations, I fay, are both of importance. For, even the judgment of our fellow mortals concerning us and our actions, we cannot help finding our hearts in fome degree affected with; the inftincts of our nature determine us fo, and from a refpect to this judgment, we take many of our meafures in life. But to a mind fo conftituted as St. Paul's was, fo thoroughly religious and fatisfied from it felf, that is, from a conscious

nefs

ness of its own integrity, fo poffeffed with SERM. the love and fear of God, fo fully perfuaded XI. of his being, his perfections, and government of the world, either the approbation or dif approbation of men, was but a very small matter in comparison. Though it is natural for men to defire the efteem of each other which renders their condition much more fafe and comfortable, efpecially, to a perfon in fuch a public ftation as St. Paul was, his general good reputation must contribute greatly to his ufefulness, for which reafon he principally valued it; yet to a man who makes a just estimate of things according to their real value, this is of no moment at all when fet against the divine approbation. This comparison I intend to infift on in the prefent discourse, and to fhew that the judgment of men concerning our characters and actions is very little to be valued, if we confider that he who judgeth us is the Lord: And then I fhall make fome useful obfervations upon it.

That, whatever we may think concerning the judgment of men, indeed any of mankind, and whatever folicitude we may have to obtain it in our favour, the apostle concluded rightly it is a very little thing

SERM. comparatively with the judgment of God, XI. will appear, if we confider the uncertainty

of the one, and the infallible certainty of the other; the infinitely greater importance of the latter in itself, and to all the purposes for which approbation can be defired; and lastly, the confequences of it to our interest.

First, as the fubject of the judgment here meant is the moral character and the moral conduct of men, which upon ferious reflection and by the very conftitution of our minds, must appear most worthy of our regard, the opinion we have of a perfon's judgment always bears proportion to his knowledge, to his capacity of difcerning, his opportunities of information, his impartiality and diligence in enquiring. On this account it is a small thing to be judged of men, because this judgment is little to be relied on. It is often erroneous; their understandings are very weak and narrow, their knowledge is very scanty, especially of the morality, the true intrinfic goodness of difpofitions and works. Experience has taught wife men to make very little account of the opinion of the giddy, the unthinking, and credulous populace, whether it be for or against them; for it is very often formed without under

ftanding,

ftanding, upon flender information, and upon SERM. circumstances which are very remote from XI. the true merit of perfons or actions. The judgment of the fober confiderate few, does, in the estimation of a thoughtful sedate mind, outweigh numberless multitudes of fuch, either applaufes or cenfures, which are often alike groundless and alike changeable.

But, in point of knowledge there is an infinitely greater difproportion between God and the wifeft man, than between this latter and the very weakest of all rational beings. His understanding is infinite, ours confined within very narrow limits; he fees all things clearly, they are naked and opened before him even to their inmoft effences, we see the brightest objects but darkly, and very many not at all; he difcerns effects in their caufes and extends his views to the remoteft confequences and iffues of things; we know nothing of caufes but by their apparent effects, and that very imperfectly; and for futurity, the events of it are hid from our fight in impenetrable darkness. But, especially, the fubject of our present confideration, the exact morality, or the measure of good and evil in characters and actions, is very imperfectly understood by men. We have indeed

SERM. a ftandard in our own minds and by it can try XI. qurfelves better than any others, as it is of

vaftly greater moment that we should; but for the difpofitions and works of our fellowcreatures, it is little we know of them, and the former only by the latter and even these are often misapprehended; few are ocular witneffes, and the eyes themselves are not always above the poffibility of deception; others have but hearsay evidence, which, when the utmost care is taken to ascertain it, is far from being infallible. But, when the fact is fettled as well as it can be to us, the most difficult. part to be known ftill remains, that is, the morality. It depends upon the heart, and who can penetrate into the fecrets of it, its hidden fprings of action, its intentions and motives, which yet are of effential confidetion to a true judment of right and wrong, virtue and vice? But the knowledge of God is in all things intuitive and infallible, particularly, he *Searches the hearts and tries the reins of the children of men; not only the external works, but the very thoughts of all men, their deepest designs, unknown to all other creatures are open to his view; † there is no darkness nor fhadow of death, where the workers

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